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or decades the poor in developing countries (and elsewhere) were essentially
shut out of credit and savings services. Because the poor did not meet the tradi-
tional criteria for borrowing, financial institutions perceived them as bad credit risks.
More recently, development practitioners have come to see that the poor can indeed
make effective use of credit to raise their incomes and get access to more food and
other necessities. In fact, in some quarters microcredit is now seen as the solution to
poverty. Research conducted at IFPRI shows, however, that although credit can be
an important tool in the fight against poverty, credit alone cannot be guaranteed to
raise incomes, increase food security, and improve nutrition.
In this research report, Aliou Diagne and Manfred Zeller examine the case of
Malawi, where several institutions offer credit to poor, smallholder farmers to allow
them to buy fertilizer, seeds, and other inputs for growing maize and tobacco as a
way of helping raise incomes. Surprisingly, they find that farmers who participated
in these credit programs ended up with less net crop income than those who did not.
Their results make clear that the conditions surrounding credit programs must be
right—that is, they must reflect the actual opportunities and constraints faced by poor
farmers—for credit to work effectively. For example, credit is not of much use in sit-
uations in which farmers have little access to roads, markets, health care, and com-
munications infrastructure and are subject to drought that can wipe out their crops,
as is the case in Malawi.
This research report reveals how complicated the task of effective rural develop-
ment can be, but it also points to concrete steps, in addition to offering credit ser-
vices, that governments and development organizations can take in their efforts to
eradicate poverty and food insecurity. This research report should be of great signif-
icance to anyone interested in how rural finance can be made to work best for those
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A
s in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the majority of poor smallholders
in Malawi are left out of the agricultural extension and credit systems. These
households, characterized by landholdings of less than 1 hectare and very low crop
yields, are unable to grow enough food to feed themselves even though they focus
much effort on producing food crops, especially maize. It has been argued that most
of these farmers are too poor and cash-strapped to be able to benefit from any kind
of access to credit and that, even if they received adequate supplies of the right in-
puts, their land constraints are so severe that any increase in productivity would still
fall short of guaranteeing their food security. For these households, credit to support
nonfarm income-generating activities has been suggested as a policy alternative for
alleviating their food insecurity.
To gain a better understanding of the possible role of credit in improving house-
hold food security and alleviating poverty in Malawi, in November 1994 the Inter-
national Food Policy Research Institute and the Department of Rural Development,
Bunda College of Agriculture, University of Malawi, initiated a research program on
rural financial markets and household food security in Malawi. The main objective
of the research program was to analyze the determinants of access to credit in Malawi
and its impact on farm and nonfarm income and on household food security. The
study also sought to quantify the relationship between the demand for formal loans
and that for informal loans. From a policy perspective, such an analysis is important
for at least two reasons. First, by quantifying the welfare impact of access to finan-
cial services, it can inform policymakers about the social benefits (if any) of policy
strategies to promote the formation and expansion of microfinance institutions in ru-
ral areas. Second, the analysis can provide knowledge about the relative importance
of the various socioeconomic factors within or beyond the control of policy that de-
termine whether or not some households will benefit from access to formal credit.
This latter information can guide the design of institutional arrangements and the
choice of financial services to be offered to different target groups.
The research emanating from this program was published during 1996–98 in a
number of reports and papers disseminated by IFPRI and the Bunda College of Agri-
culture, following an October 1996 workshop held at the college at which the major
x
Summaryresearch results were shared and discussed with policymakers, microfinance practi-
tioners, and researchers. This research report presents an in-depth analysis address-
ing the research objectives described.
The study analyzed the determinants of access to formal and informal credit and
the demand for loans. It found that formal lenders in Malawi—such as rural banks,
savings and credit cooperatives, and special credit programs supported by the gov-
ernment and nongovernmental organizations—prefer to give loans to households
with diversified asset portfolios and therefore more diversified incomes. This is pre-
sumably done to increase and stabilize repayment rates. It also found that households
in Malawi are generally credit constrained in both the formal and informal sectors of
the credit market. For example, close to half of the households participating in for-
mal credit programs still have binding credit constraints. However, Malawian house-
holds would borrow on average only about half the amount of any increase in their
credit limits.
The level of interest rates charged on loans seems not to be an important factor
for households in deciding in which microfinance institution to participate. Nonprice
attributes of credit institutions and their services play a larger role. These attributes
include the types of loans provided and the restrictions on their use, as well as the
types of nonfinancial services provided by the programs, such as training in the man-
agement of microenterprises. This result suggests that the acceptance of an institu-
tion by its clientele, and therefore its prospects for growth and sustainability, are de-
termined by a range of characteristics of both its financial and its nonfinancial
services.
The main findings of the study regarding the impact of access to credit on house-
hold welfare outcomes do not support the notion that improving access to micro-
credit is always a potent means for alleviating poverty—an opinion voiced, for ex-
ample, at the Microcredit Summit in Washington, D.C., in February 1997. Both the
tabular and the econometric analysis shows that when households choose to borrow
they realize lower net crop incomes than nonborrowers. Although this result is not
statistically significant, it nonetheless points out the risk of borrowing: that bor-
rowers can be worse off after repaying the principal and interest.
Two main reasons for the negative (albeit insignificant) relationship between bor-
rowing and net crop incomes are identified. Both have important implications for fi-
nancial sector policy and the conduct of rural financial institutions in Malawi. The
first reason is the focus of the loan portfolio on one loan product, which provides
farmers too much costly fertilizer for hybrid maize. Three of the four institutions in-
vestigated in this study provided agricultural credit, focusing mainly on an input
package for hybrid maize. The second reason is the below-average rainfall in the two
survey years and the concentration of the loan portfolios of the formal lenders on
maize, a drought-sensitive crop.
Consistent with the insignificant results for crop income, we find no significant
impact of access to credit on the per capita incomes, food security, and nutritional
status of credit program members. As the credit services of the formal institutions
are mostly geared toward income generation, and in particular toward the growing
xiof fertilized hybrid maize and tobacco, access to the type of credit products offered
in Malawi is expected to have mostly indirect effects on consumption and nutrition
through its potential effect on income. The rural financial institutions in Malawi cov-
ered in this study do not offer financial products, such as consumption credit and pre-
cautionary savings options, that could eventually have a direct effect on consump-
tion or on nutritional status.
Growing tobacco is found to be the most important determinant of household
crop income. Another finding of the study, however, is the fact that households that
grow tobacco are less food secure, with significantly lower per capita daily calorie
intake and a higher prevalence of both chronic and acute malnutrition compared with
households that do not. The food insecurity and malnutrition of tobacco households
may be traced to the combination of larger than average household sizes because of
the labor-intensive nature of tobacco growing and the high relative cost of buying
maize for consumption.
The study also found that the price of maize has a significant and negative direct
impact on household per capita calorie intake, while its indirect effect on the latter
through household income is positive but statistically insignificant. This finding is
consistent with two other findings of the study: that the marginal impact of the price
of maize on household income, although sizable, is not statistically different from
zero and that smallholder farmers in Malawi are, on average, net buyers of maize be-
cause of their 59 percent average maize self-sufficiency. Therefore any increase in
the price of maize is likely to have a negative impact on the food security of the av-
erage smallholder farm household.
A major conclusion of this study is that the contribution of rural microfinance in-
stitutions to the income of smallholders can be limited or outright negative if the de-
sign of the institutions and their services does not take into account the constraints
on and demands of their clients. Developing attractive credit services requires both
identifying farm and nonfarm enterprises and technologies that are profitable under
the conditions experienced by subsistence-oriented farmers and responding to the
numerous constraints of resource-poor rural households. The results suggest that a
strategy of expanding financial institutions in rural, drought-prone areas with inad-
equate market and other infrastructure may—at least in below-average rainfall
years—have no significant positive welfare effects. The risk of drought in Malawi,
as in much of rainfed Sub-Saharan Africa and other countries, constitutes a consid-
erable challenge for developing sustainable rural financial institutions. In such envi-
ronments, a strategy providing for greater diversification of the portfolio of assets
and liabilities of the rural financial institutions, as well as adequate provisions for
loan defaults and the building up of reserves for rescheduling loans, is a necessary
precondition for rural financial institutions to prosper and to be able to offer their
clientele reliable access to future credit and savings services.
The necessary resources, infrastructure, and socioeconomic environment are not
yet in place for access to formal credit to realize its full potential benefits for
Malawi’s rural population. Therefore—considering that the formation of sustainable
rural financial institutions is a difficult task to achieve in rural economies that lack
xiiirrigation, exhibit insufficient hard and soft infrastructure, and support a poorly ed-
ucated rural population adversely affected by malnutrition and disease, and consid-
ering that the benefits at the household level may not materialize in drought years—
the report recommends a cautious and gradual strategy for expansion of rural
financial institutions in Malawi. This strategy would require direct support by the
state through an adequate legal and regulatory framework, through the support of in-
stitutional innovations and pilot programs in rural areas that may have the potential
to reduce transaction costs in providing savings, credit, and insurance services to ru-
ral clientele.
Adoption of a cautious strategy would also imply that the formation and initial
expansion of rural financial institutions should focus on high-potential agricultural
areas that allow for lending to those growing a diversified array of cash and food
crops as well as offering financial services for off-farm enterprises at low transaction
costs. This does not mean that low-potential and drought-prone agricultural areas
should be neglected, because credit may be the best or only option for the small-
holder farmers to finance their input acquisitions after experiencing a crop failure.
Indeed the evidence showed that without access to credit the ability of smallholder
farmers to recover from a crop failure is extremely limited. The mere knowledge that
credit will be available in case of crop failure can be beneficial to poor farmers by
inducing them to adopt new and more risky but potentially profitable crops or tech-
nologies. The econometric analysis has confirmed the positive and quite sizable
(though not statistically significant) impact of merely having the option to borrow,
even if it is not exercised. However, the expansion of microfinance into marginal ar-
eas with insufficient market and other infrastructure should be coupled with a greater
emphasis on other growth- and welfare-enhancing investments (such as those in
transport, health, and communications infrastructure) and with targeted safety-net
interventions for the very poor.
In summary, the benefits of access to credit for smallholder farmers depend on a
range of agroecological and socioeconomic factors, some of which are time-variant
and subject to shocks such as drought. Access to credit is therefore no panacea for
poverty alleviation. The full potential of credit access in increasing the welfare of the
poor can only be realized if coupled with adequate investments in hard and soft in-




s is the case in many African countries, the majority of smallholders in Malawi
are left out of the rural financial system. These households, characterized by
average landholdings of less than 1 hectare, do not grow enough food to feed them-
selves even though they concentrate almost exclusively on the production of maize,
the major staple food in Malawi. Consequently, as land is a binding constraint in most
areas of Malawi, increases in agricultural productivity, in particular in the growing
of maize, and increased diversification into other food and cash crops as well as non-
farm enterprises are key requirements for poverty alleviation. Such changes in the
production and consumption strategies of households require capital, and they are
risky to implement for households that produce maize for subsistence with low-in-
put, low-output technology in a highly drought-prone environment.
It has been argued that most of Malawi’s smallholder farmers are too poor to be
able to benefit from any kind of access to credit, and that, even if they had access to
adequate credit and inputs, their land constraints are so severe that any increase in
productivity would still fall short of guaranteeing their food security (Government
of Malawi 1995). For these households, credit for nonfarm income-generating ac-
tivities has been suggested as a policy alternative to address their food insecurity and
malnutrition. To gain a better understanding of the possible role of credit in improv-
ing income and household food security and in alleviating poverty in Malawi, in No-
vember 1994 the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the De-
partment of Rural Development (DRD) of the Bunda College of Agriculture,
University of Malawi, initiated a research program on rural financial markets and
household food security in Malawi. The objectives of the research program were to
study the determinants of access to and participation in existing formal and informal
credit and saving systems, and to analyze the effects of household access to credit on
agricultural productivity, income generation, and food security. This report presents
the major results of that research project.
1
CHAPTER 1
IntroductionThe Potential Contribution of Improved Access
to Formal Credit in Poverty Alleviation
It is generally agreed among researchers and policymakers that poor rural households
in developing countries lack adequate access to credit. This lack of adequate access
to credit is in turn believed to have significant negative consequences for various ag-
gregate and household-level outcomes, including technology adoption, agricultural
productivity, food security, nutrition, health, and overall household welfare.
Access to credit affects household welfare outcomes through three pathways
(Zeller et al. 1997). The first pathway is through the alleviation of the capital con-
straints on agricultural households: expenditures on agricultural inputs and on food
and essential nonfood items are incurred during the planting and vegetative growth
periods of crops, whereas returns are received only after the crops are harvested sev-
eral months later. Most farm households show a negative cash flow during the plant-
ing season. Therefore, to finance the purchase of essential consumption and produc-
tion inputs, the farm household must either dip into its savings or obtain credit.
Access to credit can therefore significantly increase the ability of poor households
with little or no savings to acquire agricultural inputs. Furthermore, easing potential
capital constraints through the granting of credit reduces the opportunity costs of
capital-intensive assets relative to family labor, thus encouraging the adoption of la-
bor-saving, higher-yielding technologies and therefore increasing land and labor pro-
ductivity, a crucial factor in encouraging development, in particular in many African
countries (Delgado 1995; Zeller et al. 1997).
The second pathway through which access to credit affects household welfare is
by increasing a household’s risk-bearing ability and by altering its risk-coping strat-
egy. The third pathway—enabling access to credit for consumption smoothing—is
closely linked to the second, and we therefore discuss them together because they
both affect the resilience of households in bearing production and consumption risks.
The mere knowledge that credit will be available to cushion consumption against an
income shortfall if a potentially profitable, but risky, investment should turn out badly
may induce a household to bear the additional risk. The household may therefore be
willing to adopt new, riskier technologies (Eswaran and Kotwal 1990). A household
may also benefit from mere access to credit even if it is not borrowing, because with
the option of borrowing it can avoid adopting such risk-reducing but costly strate-
gies as the production of low-risk but less profitable food crops, such as local maize
and cassava, and the accumulation of assets that mainly serve precautionary savings
purposes but that may yield very poor or even negative returns (for example, keep-
ing cattle or cash).
Most rural financial sector strategies gave due recognition to the first pathway but
often neglected or completely ignored the other two. The vast majority of credit pro-
grams provided in-kind production credit at subsidized interest rates. And most of
them failed both to serve the rural poor and to remain sustainable credit institutions
(Adams, Graham, and von Pischke 1984; Adams and Vogel 1986; Braverman and
Guasch 1986). For example, the agricultural credit system in Malawi used to be a
2prime example within Africa of a successful government-supported credit program
because it was enjoying average repayment rates of over 97 percent from 1968 to
1991. The system collapsed in 1992 owing to a combination of severe drought and
political liberalization that caused the repayment rate to plummet to less than 25 per-
cent (Msukwa et al. 1994; Murotho and Kumwenda 1996).
In response to these failures and recognizing that traditional commercial banks
typically have no interest in lending to poor rural households because of their lack
of viable collateral and the high transaction costs associated with the small loans that
are best suited to them, innovative credit delivery systems are being promoted
throughout the developing world as a more efficient way of improving rural house-
holds’access to formal credit. Unlike commercial banks, these credit programs have
as their guiding principles not profit but rather accessibility and sustainability. Many
of them are group-based lending programs relying on joint liability and peer pres-
sure as substitutes for collateral, along with community-based delivery systems that
seek to exploit the social capital and information advantages of local communities
in screening and monitoring borrowers. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is a well-
known example with a proven record of reaching the poorest and simultaneously
achieving very high repayment rates.
Policy Relevance and Objectives of the Research
Community- and member-based microfinance programs have enjoyed considerable
political and financial support since the 1990s. Three basic premises explain the ren-
aissance of “rural credit”; the first is relatively recent, but the other two are deeply
rooted within development theory and strategy:
1. Member-based financial institutions have an advantage in transaction costs
over traditional forms of banking characterized by reliance on land collat-
eral and a large amount of paperwork. This perceived cost advantage can al-
low innovative rural financial institutions to become financially sustainable
in the long run. Initial subsidies by the state are deemed justified and are re-
quired to finance the development of the institution and to allow it to achieve
a scale at which it can cover its costs on its own.
2. With improved access to credit, poor rural households will be able to engage
in more productive farm and nonfarm income-generating activities to raise
their living standards.
3. The aggregate social benefits outweigh the opportunity costs of the public
funds used for developing rural financial institutions.
The research presented in this report focuses only on the investigation of the sec-
ond premise. It addresses a number of questions related to the provision of institu-
tional credit in the context of rainfed agriculture and poor market infrastructure: Do
households who participate in credit programs improve their living conditions? If
they do, in what ways does improved access to formal credit benefit these house-
holds? In particular, does access to formal credit contribute to raising farm and off-
farm income and household food security? For the particularly poor and disadvan-
3taged among the rural population, such as women (who are the target group of some
of these programs), does access to formal credit contribute to the desired goal of
poverty reduction?
Quantifying the impact of improved access to formal credit on different groups
of households is important for policy purposes for at least two reasons. First, it can
serve as guide for the allocation of scarce resources to the numerous development
programs competing for the same funds. Second, it establishes the relative impor-
tance of the various factors that permit certain households in a given socioeconomic
environment to achieve greater benefits from access to formal credit than others
(Zeller and Sharma 1998).
Furthermore, despite the increasing importance of microcredit programs in de-
veloping countries, most rural households continue to rely on the informal credit
market for their intertemporal transfer of resources. They rely on complex strategies
to increase their productive capacity, share risk, and smooth consumption over their
life cycles. These strategies generally work through self-enforcing informal contracts
among friends, neighbors, and members of extended families, and they are arranged
within networks of informal institutions of diverse types (Fafchamps 1992; Coate
and Ravallion 1993; Udry 1994, 1995b; Lund and Fafchamps 1997). One hypothe-
sis often advanced by researchers and policymakers is that government- and non-
governmental organization (NGO)–supported credit programs may crowd out the
financial services offered by these informal financial institutions. Therefore under-
standing how the informal institutions serve households’demand for financial serv-
ices and interact with the formal credit institutions set up by governments and NGOs
is critical in identifying policies, institutional designs, and financial services that can
expand and complement rather than substitute for the services offered by the exist-
ing informal credit market. An important step in obtaining this information is to
quantify the extent and determinants of households’access to both informal and for-
mal credit markets and the degree to which the two forms of credit are complements
or substitutes.
A Definition of Access to Credit
Access to formal credit is often confused with participation in formal credit pro-
grams. Indeed the two concepts are used interchangeably in many studies. However,
to analyze satisfactorily the socioeconomic determinants of both access to credit and
participation in formal credit programs and to assess their respective impacts on
household welfare outcomes, one needs to make the distinction between access to
credit (formal or informal), participation in formal credit programs or in the infor-
mal credit market, and being credit constrained.
A household has access to a particular source of credit if it is able to borrow from
that source, although for a variety of reasons it may choose not to. The extent of ac-
cess to credit is measured by the maximum amount a household can borrow (its credit
limit). If this amount is positive, the household is said to have access. A household
is said to be participating if it is borrowing from a source of credit. A household is
4credit constrained when it lacks access to credit or cannot borrow as much as it
wants. These distinctions are particularly important because, as discussed previously,
a household living in a risky environment may benefit from mere access to credit
even if it is not actually borrowing.
Structure of the Report
Chapter 2 gives a brief general description of the rural economy and the agricultural
policy environment. The main part of this chapter describes the credit programs stud-
ied. Chapter 3 covers the survey design and provides a descriptive and tabular analy-
sis of the socioeconomic characteristics and behavioral and welfare outcomes of the
households surveyed. This tabular analysis provides some indications of the effects
of access to credit on the outcomes studied, but of course it falls short of providing
statistically tested measurements. The chapter serves mainly to describe the observed
outcomes and to disaggregate them according to membership in particular credit pro-
grams and other socioeconomic characteristics. Chapter 4 describes the structure of
the econometric model and presents the estimation procedure that we use to meas-
ure access to credit and its effects on household welfare outcomes. Chapter 5 dis-
cusses the results of the econometric analysis of the determinants of households’
access to and participation in informal and formal credit markets, as well as the mar-
ginal impacts of access to formal credit on farm and nonfarm incomes, household
food security, and nutritional status. Chapter 6 considers implications for policy and
future research.
5CHAPTER 2
The Rural Economy and Microfinance
Institutions in Malawi
T
his chapter briefly outlines the main features of the rural economy and recent
changes in the agricultural policy environment. It then describes the credit pro-
grams studied.
The Rural Economy and Recent Policy Changes in Malawi
Rural poverty in Malawi is pervasive (United Nations and Government of Malawi
1993). The country’s nominal per capita income level of US$140 in 1994 is one of
the lowest in the world. Forty percent of gross domestic product and about 75 per-
cent of export earnings were accounted for by the agricultural sector during 1989–94
(IMF 1995). About 90 percent of the population of 11 million lives in rural areas, and
it is predominantly employed in small-scale farming activities (Chilowa and Chirwa
1997). Farms are very small. Seventy-two percent of smallholder farms cultivate less
than 1 ha (World Bank 1995). A single rainy season with erratic rainfalls, coupled
with a virtual absence of irrigation, makes crop production very risky. Malawi suf-
fered two major droughts during the 1990s, one in 1991/92 and one in 1993/94, fol-
lowed by a below-average maize crop in 1994/95. The latter two years were the re-
call periods for crop income in the DRD/IFPRI survey. The Government of Malawi
identifies drought risk as one of the major reasons for farmers’failure to adopt agri-
cultural innovations, as the profitability of these varies markedly with rainfall (Gov-
ernment of Malawi 1995a).
The Dualistic Structure of the Rural Economy in Malawi
The rural economy in Malawi is characterized by the coexistence of estate and small-
holder agriculture. Land cultivated by estates is privately owned (freehold land) or
leased from the state on long-term leases for 99 years (leasehold land). Land culti-
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Microfinance Institutions in Malawivated by smallholders is governed by customary laws that provide the farmer with
user rights. These rights can be passed on to children, and only in exceptional cases
do they deny traditional authorities the inheritance of user rights. The estate sector
is characterized by relatively capital-intensive production that concentrates on lu-
crative export crops, such as tobacco, sugar, tea, and cotton. In contrast, the small-
holder sector is to a large extent oriented toward subsistence production. It employs
and feeds most of the rural population. The share of land cultivated by estates has in-
creased since independence in 1964, and it reached about 12 percent of the total
arable area in the early 1990s (Harvard Institute for International Development
1994a,b). This trend was largely due to a policy framework that favored the estate
sector over the smallholder sector, in particular the policy that only estates were al-
lowed to grow tobacco, the major and most lucrative export crop of Malawi.
Recent Reforms in Agricultural Policy
Past policies in Malawi by and large favored the production of high-value cash crops
in the estate sector while the smallholder sector was encouraged to produce and sell
maize, the country’s food staple, through official market channels (Mtawali 1993).
Economic and agricultural growth in the 1960s and 1970s was driven mainly by a
prospering and expanding estate sector; however, external shocks, such as the dis-
ruption of trade routes and deteriorating terms of trade during the late 1970s, led to
a decline in gross domestic product and a serious economic crisis during the early
1980s. These problems also reflected basic structural weaknesses and policy distor-
tions in the economy that could be attributed to an inefficient production sector, re-
sulting from price controls and massive direct interventions by government in agri-
cultural input and output markets that favored the estate over the smallholder sector.
Since the early 1980s the Government of Malawi has gradually addressed these
policy distortions (Kherallah and Govindan 1997). However, major changes directly
affecting the smallholder agricultural sector were implemented only cautiously, be-
ginning with the liberalization of output markets during 1987–93, the dismantling of
credit subsidies in 1993/94, the abolition of fertilizer subsidies in 1995, and the grad-
ual relaxation of the tobacco quota system that eventually allowed smallholders (in
1996/97) to produce and market tobacco without any restrictions for the first time.
Developments in Smallholder Maize and Tobacco
Production during the 1990s
Maize is the major food and crop in Malawi. Tobacco is the major cash and export
crop. The reforms enacted during the 1990s brought about significant changes in the
production of these crops by smallholders (Chilima, Chulu, and Mataya 1998). To-
bacco and hybrid maize are also the major crops for which agricultural credit has
been given in Malawi during the 1990s. The recent developments in the two sectors
therefore have a direct bearing on the effect of access to credit on farm income.
7High (but Recently Declining) Reliance on Maize
During the 1980s about three-quarters of smallholders’ acreage was planted to
maize. This share declined somewhat during the 1990s. Other food crops include
cassava, sweet potatoes, groundnuts, and rice. Many of the two million smallholder
households are chronically food deficient because of small farm size and low yields
of the dominant local maize varieties. About 50 percent of smallholder households
are food insecure, and 60 percent of the rural and 65 percent of the urban popula-
tion earn incomes below the poverty line of US$40 per capita per year (Government
of Malawi 1994a).
Although the objective of macroeconomic reform and the liberalization of agri-
cultural and financial markets was to reduce discrimination against the smallholder
agricultural sector and to provide more opportunities for diversification of rural in-
comes, until 1992/93 the agricultural credit, input, and extension policy continued
to focus on the dissemination of a fixed input package of hybrid maize seed and
fertilizer that was delivered at subsidized interest rates and input prices to small-
holders.
The policy of massive distribution of maize credit to smallholders was success-
ful in increasing the share of higher-yielding hybrid maize in total smallholder hec-
tarage planted to maize from about 8 percent in 1985 to 25 percent in 1992, while
the overall share of maize in smallholder acreage increased from 73 percent to 80
percent. However, the concentration of the loan portfolio on one drought-sensitive
crop, combined with the droughts in 1992 and political promises to write off loan
debt during the election year, led to widespread loan defaults and eventually to the
collapse of the parastatal Smallholder Agricultural Credit Administration (SACA) in
1994. Although 400,000 farmers received credit in 1992, only 34,000 did so in 1994,
from the newly formed Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC), a state-owned fi-
nancial institution that seeks to offer agricultural credit on a national scale.
Following the major drought in 1992, the share of smallholder hectarage planted
to nonmaize crops, in particular cassava and pulses, increased. Farmers’ response
to the perceived advantages of drought-resistant crops, the sudden collapse of the
public system for distributing credit for maize production, and the policy reorien-
tation toward diversifying smallholder crop production may all have played a role
in this. Following a second drought in 1993/94, large-scale distribution of free fer-
tilizer and hybrid maize seed to drought-affected areas during 1994/95 and 1995/96
seems to have contributed to a revival of hybrid maize in smallholder farms despite
the unfavorable ratio between maize price and fertilizer price after the abolition
of fertilizer subsidies in 1995 and the devaluation of the Malawi kwacha during
1994/95 by about 300 percent. However, as Chilima, Chulu, and Mataya (1998) point
out in their analysis of smallholder maize production, the area cultivated under
drought-prone maize is slowly losing ground as the hectarage planted to more lu-
crative crops (mainly tobacco) and more drought-resistant crops (such as cassava)
expands.
8The Booming Smallholder Tobacco Sector
From the time that Malawi achieved independence until the early 1990s, smallhold-
ers cultivating customary land were squeezed out of the lucrative export market in
tobacco by a particular set of policies. The Special Crops Act of the Government of
Malawi allowed for cultivation of tobacco and other export crops only on leasehold
and freehold land (Sahn and Arulpragasam 1993; Sijm 1997). The production of bur-
ley and flue-cured tobacco on customary smallholder land was illegal until 1990.
Moreover, the system of allocation of tobacco production quotas to estates created
economic rents for the powerful landed elite and reinforced the will of political forces
to safeguard the country’s dualistic agricultural structure.
In 1990 the Government of Malawi initiated a policy of gradual liberalization
of the tobacco subsector in order to mitigate the structural constraints that had for
so long prevented smallholders from contributing to and earning their share from
the overall development of the agricultural sector. The production of burley to-
bacco by smallholders on customary land was first permitted on a pilot basis during
the 1990/91 growing season, when a total of 7,600 growers were registered to grow
burley tobacco with a quota of 3.0 million kilograms. Quantities allocated to each
grower were limited to a maximum of 300 kilograms. Smallholder tobacco had
to be sold initially to the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation
(ADMARC), a parastatal, at below-market prices. The evident success of the pilot
scheme, combined with the democratic election of a new government and the related
review of all policies implemented during the past three decades, led to a gradual in-
crease of the quota allocated to smallholders. By 1996 the size of the smallholder
quota had increased more than tenfold from its initial level.
In view of the success of the tobacco market reforms in encouraging widespread
participation of smallholders in direct competition with the estates, the Government
of Malawi repealed the Special Crops Act in 1996 and opened up the production of
burley tobacco to any grower in Malawi, regardless of whether or not he or she was
formally registered to produce the crop. The repeal abolished the system of produc-
tion quotas and special marketing rights, and thereby eliminated the rents of the es-
tates that for decades had benefited from them.
Rural Microfinance Institutions in Malawi
In common with many other developing countries, Malawi has over the past few
years seen the emergence of various rural credit programs. The four that are the fo-
cus of this research are MRFC, a state-owned and nationwide agricultural credit
program; Promotion of Micro-Enterprises for Rural Women (PMERW), a micro-
credit program targeted at women in support of nonfarm income-generating activ-
ities; the Malawi Mudzi Fund (MMF), a replica of the Grameen Bank; and the
Malawi Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (MUSCCO), a union of locally
9based savings and credit associations. Except for MUSCCO, all programs rely on
group lending.1
There are numerous other small credit programs run by various national and in-
ternational NGOs, which are often—but not always—implemented in collaboration
with a Malawi government institution (see Evans 1993, or more recently Chirwa et
al. 1996). However, of all these credit programs, only MRFC and MUSCCO can
claim to have national coverage. All the other programs operate in a few districts and,
in general, in conjunction with other noncredit developmental programs (Evans
1987, 1993; Government of Malawi 1994b).
In the research, we have focused on these four microfinance institutions as rep-
resentative of the spectrum of formal credit and savings options available to rural
households in Malawi. Furthermore, the structures, target clienteles, rules, and types
of loans of the four microfinance institutions are different enough to allow for a com-
parative study of the effects of alternative design characteristics on their performance
in terms of participation and effects on the livelihood of their clienteles.
Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC)
MRFC is a recent creation of the Government of Malawi, with funding from the
World Bank, following the collapse of SACA. SACA was a department of the Min-
istry of Agriculture that had provided seasonal agricultural loans to smallholder
farmers since its establishment in 1987 (on the history, operations, and performance
of SACA, see Murotho and Kumwenda 1996).
Although MRFC inherited the operations of SACA in October 1994 and absorbed
many of its staff, MRFC seeks to operate under commercial principles under a board
of directors independent of the Government of Malawi. In fact plans call for the com-
pany eventually to be privatized and transformed into a licensed rural bank (World
Bank 1993; Government of Malawi 1994b). Apart from its portfolio of loans to es-
tates, the target clientele of MRFC is smallholder farmers organized into joint lia-
bility credit groups of 5 to 10 members. MRFC provides mostly in-kind seasonal
agricultural loans for seed, fertilizer, and pesticides for hybrid maize and tobacco. It
also offers short-term (two-year) and medium-term (five-year) loans for farm equip-
ment, although these services play a negligible role in its overall loan portfolio to
smallholders.
The DRD/IFPRI survey data cover the 1993/94 and 1994/95 seasons. As such,
most of the smallholder loans from MRFC in our sample are for hybrid maize and
relatively few are for tobacco.2The data do not capture some of the more recent shifts
that MRFC has undertaken to develop credit services for off-farm micro-, small-, and
10
1 PMERW and MMF have since been incorporated into the MRFC.
2 For example, 50 percent of the chemical fertilizer acquired in 1994/95 by MRFC smallholder customers in our
sample was used on hybrid maize, compared with 11 percent used on tobacco and 39 percent used on local maize
(see Table 11). Most of the loans may have been for tobacco, but these figures indicate that MRFC smallholder cus-
tomers diverted most of their loan packages toward their food crops.medium-scale enterprises in rural areas and its shift away from hybrid maize loans
to tobacco loans. The latter shift, according to MRFC, was motivated by the below-
average loan repayment rates for hybrid maize loans in 1994/95 and 1995/96. In turn,
the low repayment rates appear to be strongly linked to the apparent risk and decline
in profitability of hybrid maize production because of the devaluation of the Malawi
kwacha and the abolition of fertilizer subsidies in 1994/95. The low profitability of
hybrid maize compared with tobacco and the high downside risk of achieving nega-
tive gross margins compared with the growing of low-input local maize varieties are
also confirmed in the DRD/IFPRI survey data, as will be shown in the next chapter.
During the 1994/95 season MRFC serviced 2,343 credit clubs, made of 81,075
smallholder farmers, and 4,394 estates, for a total of about 35 million Malawi kwacha
(MK) and an average loan size of MK 5,600 or approximately US$370 (MRFC 1994,
1995).3 Table 1 shows that the total amount of loans disbursed by MRFC reached a
total value of about MK 241 million in the 1995/96 season before declining to about
MK 166 million in the 1996/97 season. The share of the disbursed loans going to to-
bacco clubs has steadily increased during the three lending seasons: 41 percent in
1994/95, 45 percent in 1995/96, and 47 percent in 1996/97. The share of the loans
disbursed to the estates has also experienced similar growth (29 percent, 33 percent,
and 43 percent, respectively). In contrast, the share of the loans received by the other
clubs (mostly for maize) and individual customers has been declining (31 percent,
22 percent, and 10 percent, respectively).
As a consequence of its adherence to commercial lending practices, MRFC has
been charging relatively high interest rates. Indeed its loans carried annual interest
rates of 40 percent in 1994/95, 54 percent in 1995/96, and 37 percent in 1996/97.
These high rates have been justified by the fact that MRFC obtains its funds at mar-
ket rates from the Reserve Bank of Malawi and by the inflationary environment that
characterized Malawi during these three seasons. The inflation rate, for example, was
83 percent in 1995 (Reserve Bank of Malawi 1996). MRFC’s loan recovery rate in
1994/95 was good (95 percent), but it deteriorated sharply in 1995/96 (76 percent)
before rising again in 1996/97 (87 percent). The sharp increase in the size of the loan
portfolio in the 1995/96 season likely played a role in the deterioration that year of
the recovery rate, which, as shown in Table 1, was due to some extent to the very low
recovery rate of the loans given to the other clubs (about 54 percent compared with
about 91 percent in 1994/95). The 1995/96 recovery rates for tobacco clubs (82 per-
cent) and the estates (84 percent) were also significantly lower than those in 1994/95
(96 percent and 98 percent, respectively).4 The loan recovery rate has improved in
1996/97 for all cases (92 percent, 84 percent, and 82 percent, respectively). Accord-
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3 The exchange rate was US$1 for MK 15 in 1995. The average loan size for a smallholder farmer is much smaller
than the figure given because the loan is for the whole group.
4 When we adjust for their respective shares of the loan portfolio, tobacco clubs, estates, and other clubs are re-
sponsible for, respectively, 33 percent, 24 percent, and 43 percent of the 20 percent decline in the overall loan re-
covery rate (from 95 percent to 76 percent).ing to its internal records, the company earned profits from its lending in all lending
seasons (MRFC Corporate profile 1998).
Malawi Mudzi Fund (MMF)
MMF was created in 1987 as a pilot credit program and a separate component of the
World Bank–funded agricultural credit project that also supported SACA. The com-
ponent for MMF has been supported by the International Fund for Agricultural De-
velopment (IFAD). Its design was guided by the experience of the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh.
The objective of the MMF was to provide loans for nonfarm income-generating
activities to poor rural households with less than 1 hectare of land in two districts of
Malawi (Chiradzulu and Mangochi) during a pilot phase of five years (World Bank
1987). From the start of its lending operations in 1990 to April 1995 (the point at
which it was absorbed by MRFC), MMF granted 2,676 loans. The mostly female
borrowers (95 percent of the loans) were organized into 561 credit groups, each with
five members. The members were held individually and jointly responsible for the
repayment of all loans obtained by those in the group. A cumulative total of MK
841,000 was disbursed by MMF, with an average loan size of MK 300 or US$20
(Murotho and Kumwenda 1996). Most of the MMF loans were given for the sale of
produce (fish, maize, beans, and so forth) and other small-scale trading activities.
Few loans were given for crop production, and of those most were for growing hy-
brid maize (MMF 1994).
12
Table 1—Loan disbursements and recovery rates of the Malawi Rural
Finance Company
Total amount of loans
Type of Number of borrowers disbursed Percentage credit recovered
borrowers 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97
(1,000 MK)a (percent)
Total 6,207 13,946 11,003 34,941 240,882 166,203 95.13 76.29 87.16
Tobacco clubsb 1,407 3,476 2,968 14,452 107,491 77,638 96.24 81.74 91.71
(41%) (45%) (47%)
Estates 3,305 7,931 6,424 10,243 80,383 71,532 98.02 83.63 83.50
(29%) (33%) (43%)
Other clubsb and
entities 1,495 2,539 1,611 10,245 53,008 17,032 90.69 54.11 81.82
(31%) (22%) (10%)
Source: Malawi Rural Finance Company internal documents (various issues).
a The exchange rate was 1 U.S. dollar for 15 Malawi kwacha (MK) in 1995. The share of the total amount disbursed
is in parentheses.
b Each club has on average between 15 and 20 smallholder members who share a single loan issued to the club. Most
of the credit clubs are either tobacco or maize clubs.In the first two years of its operation MMF was lending to both male and female
borrowers. A very high default rate among male borrowers has since led MMF to
concentrate its lending on women only (MMF 1994). Owing to its pilot nature and
the close supervision and intensive training afforded credit recipients, MMF has been
characterized by high operating costs per borrower served. In April 1995, MMF’s
operation and groups were incorporated into MRFC. Under MRFC plans call for the
MMF program to receive national exposure and become MRFC’s tool for reaching
the poorest 25 percent in Malawi by providing them with loans for both nonfarm in-
come-generating activities and agricultural production (World Bank 1994; MRFC
Annual report 1996).
Malawi Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (MUSCCO)
MUSCCO is a federation of locally based savings and credit cooperatives (SAC-
COs). It was created in 1980 with financial and technical support from the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID). Its objective is to provide
credit and savings options to those low-income people not serviced by commercial
banks. This goal was to be achieved by promoting, organizing, and expanding the
number and membership of the very few savings and credit cooperatives that existed
at that time in Malawi (Reeser et al. 1989). Originally MUSCCO operated only in
rural areas, servicing the financial needs of the few relatively better-off farmers.
However, in 1985, with the response to its savings products by its rural clientele
deemed unsuccessful, it refocused its activities on urban areas. By 1993 160 SAC-
COs with a total membership of 23,000 were affiliated with MUSCCO. Of these 41
percent are located in urban areas and the remainder in rural towns (Evans 1993).
Following cooperative principles, MUSCCO members buy shares in their respec-
tive societies. For a member to qualify for a loan, he or she must have accumulated
MK 100 in shares and a minimum of MK 50 in savings (MUSCCO 1994). The loan
policies of the SACCO also stipulate that some form of collateral is required before a
loan can be given to a member. There were 12,750 borrowers in 1993 (over 80 percent
of whom were males) for a total of MK 7 million disbursed. On average the SACCO
loans ranged from MK 700 to MK 7,000 (that is, from US$50 to US$500), with a ma-
turity of between one and two years. The loans were used both for agricultural pro-
duction (43 percent) and for nonfarm income-generating activities (Evans 1993).
The Nafisi SACCO of Dowa, which was selected for this study, was created in
1990, initially capitalized by a US$12,300 grant from the Trickle Up Program of
New York. Its members are relatively poor farmers who obtain loans almost exclu-
sively for seasonal agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and seeds (VEZA Interna-
tional 1994). The functioning of the Nafisi SACCO was closely linked to a local
NGO, the Hills of Dowa Enterprise Zones Association (HODEZA). This NGO has
supported the SACCO through technical assistance and logistical support in its day-
to-day operations and in the marketing of its members’maize crop. HODEZA itself
is the local counterpart of a Chicago-based NGO called Village Enterprise Zone
Associations International.
13Promotion of Microenterprises for Rural Women (PMERW) Credit Program
The PMERW credit program was started in 1986 by the Ministry of Women and Chil-
dren’s Affairs and Community Services (MOWCACS) with the technical and finan-
cial support of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). The program
began as a multiservice developmental project with a small and loosely structured
credit component. It introduced small-scale nonfarm income-generating technolo-
gies to rural areas and provided business training and technical advice to women or-
ganized into group-owned enterprises.
The program was initially targeted to rural poor women with landholdings of less
than 0.5 hectare in rural growth centers in Dedza, Mangochi, Nkhotakota, and
Rumphi (Evans 1993). The program relied on the cooperation of the district com-
munity development officers (DCDO) and community development assistants
(CDA) of MOWCACS, who—apart from their other duties—organized and super-
vised the women’s groups and provided them with business training and advice. The
CDAs were also in charge of delivering and recovering the loans given individually
to the women. Owing to management and operational problems, which resulted
mainly from tying credit to developmental interventions, coupled with lax loan de-
livery and recovery procedures, the credit component did not meet its objectives dur-
ing the first phase of the project, which ended in 1989 (Zingani 1991; Evans 1993).
Learning from this failed experience, a new and well-structured group-based
credit program, separated from the small-scale technology development and busi-
ness training program, was designed and implemented in 1991 with the help of a
Kenyan NGO, the Undugu Society. The society trained the DCDOs and CDAs as
trainers in group-based lending and credit management concepts.
This new credit program, identified in this report as PMERW1, is a revolving fund
operated by MOWCACS that gives two-year loans of MK 1,000 (approximately
US$70) to savings-and-credit clubs, each made up of 10 to 15 poor entrepreneurial
women who have completed training courses, conducted by the CDAs, in credit
rules, management, and responsibilities.5 In order to be eligible for the MK 1,000
loan, the savings-and-credit club must have the equivalent of 60 percent of the loan
amount in a post office savings account. The MK 1,000 loan is in turn distributed to
half of the club’s members in smaller loans of two months’maturity not exceeding
MK 300 and carrying an annual interest rate of 30 percent. The other half of the club’s
members must wait until the first half have fully repaid their loans before they are
eligible for their own loans. Thus at any time during the two years only half of the
club can receive loans. In addition to this peer-pressure device, each member is re-
quired to have MK 20 of savings and two guarantors within her group before getting
a loan. The individual loans are exclusively for nonfarm income-generating activi-
ties that consist mostly of produce selling and beer brewing. It is expected that after
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5 All monetary figures regarding the loans quoted in this section are prior to the October 1994 devaluation of the
Malawi kwacha. As a general rule the PMERW program doubled all the amounts given in this section after the de-
valuation. For example, each savings-and-credit club received a MK 2,000 loan in 1996.two years the savings-and-credit club would reimburse the MK 1,000 loan and would
have generated enough funds through the savings and interest charges on the indi-
vidual loans to be self-financing thereafter, thus enabling the ministry to lend the re-
leased funds to newly formed clubs (PWRA 1993b). At the end of July 1994 there
were 34 savings-and-credit clubs operating in Mangochi (13), Nkhotakota (12), and
Rumphi (9), with a total of 506 women. At that time, the clubs’repayment rates were
over 95 percent. The average amount saved per club was MK 500, and 11 of the 14
clubs that were supposed to pay back their MK 1,000 loans had doubled the initial
amounts (Faltermeir 1994).
A second credit program, identified in this report as PMERW2, was started by
MOWCACS/GTZ in 1993 in collaboration with the Commercial Bank of Malawi
(CBM). The PMERW2 program is made of credit groups with 5 to 10 woman mem-
bers who are skilled in business activities (PWRA 1993a). The credit groups func-
tion more or less like the savings-and-credit clubs except that they receive their loans
directly from CBM and the individual members can borrow up to MK 1,000. Credit
group members are selected, as part of a loan graduation process, from among those
savings-and credit clubs members who have excellent credit and business manage-
ment skills. Successful women with business investments in the range of MK
300–1,000 and who live in the areas covered by the program can also be admitted as
credit group members even if they did not previously belong to a savings-and-credit
club. The loans given to credit groups by CBM are guaranteed up to 70 percent by a
MOWCACS/GTZ fund maintained in an account at CBM. As of October 1994 there
were 28 credit groups operating in the districts of Mangochi (10), Nkhotakota (10),
and Rumphi (8), with a total of 280 members (PWRA 1993a, 1995).
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Survey Design and Description of the
Data
T
o study the impact of household access to formal credit, one needs a sample
containing a sufficient share of households participating in the credit programs
operating throughout Malawi. The data used in this study come from a year-long,
three-round survey of 404 households in 45 villages in five districts of Malawi where
the four microcredit programs studied were operating. Figure 1 shows the location
of the survey sites.
Sampling Methodology
The first round of the survey took place in February-April 1995, the second round in
July-August 1995, and the last round in November-December 1995. Despite the fact
that there are numerous credit programs operating in various parts of the country,
credit program participation is still rare, occurring in only very few villages. Out of
4,699 households enumerated in the 45 villages covered in the village census un-
dertaken for the survey, only 12 percent were current members of a credit program.
Moreover, the 12 percent figure significantly overstates the likelihood of credit pro-
gram membership in Malawi because it represents the percentage of membership in
villages that are actually hosting the four credit programs studied, and the majority
of villages in Malawi do not host any credit program.
The very low density of program participation in Malawi alone rules out straight
random sampling at any geographic level above the village level. Since it was nec-
essary to include enough credit program participants for the study, the only feasible
alternative was to stratify along the program membership status variable with ran-
dom selection within each stratum. Thus about half of the sample members were se-
lected from participants in the four credit programs. The second half of the sample
was equally divided between past participants (mostly from SACA, the failed gov-
ernment credit program) and households who had never participated in any formal
credit program. To correct for the oversampling of credit program participants, the
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Survey Design and Description
of the Datasummary statistics in the tables have been weighted using the strata population
weights from the village census.6
Description of the Data
The information collected in the survey included data on household demographics,
land tenure, agricultural production, and livestock ownership; asset ownership and
transactions; food and nonfood consumption; credit, savings, and gift transactions;
wages, self-employment income, and time allocation; and the anthropometric status
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6 See Chapter 4 for the sample selection correction in the econometric analysis.
Figure 1—Location of the DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey sitesof preschoolers and their mothers. The agricultural data cover the 1993/94 and
1994/95 seasons.
Given the central importance of the credit limit variable for the methodology of
the study, we describe in greater detail how the data for this variable were collected.
The rationale behind the procedure described here and the issues involved in the in-
terpretation of the credit limit variable thus collected are discussed in Chapter 4.
The questionnaire on credit and savings was administered to all adult household
members (those over 17 years of age) in the sample. In each round respondents were
asked the maximum amount they could borrow during the recall period from both in-
formal and formal sources of credit.7 If the respondent was involved in a loan trans-
action as a borrower, the question was asked for each loan transaction (for both
granted and rejected loan demands). In this case the credit limit refers to the time of
borrowing and to the lender involved in that particular loan transaction. If the re-
spondent did not ask for any loan, the question was asked separately for formal and
informal sources of credit with no reference to particular formal or informal lenders.
Respondents who were granted loans were also asked the same general question (that
is, with no reference to particular formal or informal lenders) in a way that elicited
the credit limit they would face if they wanted further loans, not just from the same
lender but from the same sector of the credit market (formal or informal) within which
they had previously borrowed. Consequently, for both formal and informal credit, the
formal and informal credit limits of each adult household member were obtained in
each round, even if the respondent was not involved in any loan transaction.
Several other control questions were used to verify the consistency of the answers
given by the respondents to this question. Such control questions included the fol-
lowing: What was their program membership status? If they did receive a loan of the
same type, were they given a lesser amount than they had asked for, and, if so, how
much had they asked for? Had they asked for a loan and been rejected? Why did they
not ask for any (or any further) loans? In addition the enumerators were instructed
to use other control questions not included in the questionnaires whenever there
seemed to be inconsistencies in a respondent’s answers (such as, where could they
borrow a given amount). A good deal of time was further spent in the field and in the
office checking the consistency of answers to these questions and their relation to an-
swers given on other parts of the questionnaire. As a result of these checks, during
the first round of the survey most of the respondents were visited at least twice, in
order to verify their answers or clarify some of the apparent inconsistencies in their
answers. Most of the inconsistencies occurred during the first days of the survey and
resulted from some misunderstanding of a question that was often interpreted by ei-
ther the enumerator or the respondent as asking about “the maximum you would like
to borrow.” This misunderstanding was resolved by instructing the enumerators to
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7 Loans received prior to October 1994 were also recalled (up to three years prior to the 1994/95 season for formal
loans and up to 10 months prior to October 1994 for informal loans of more than MK 100).explain to respondents, before they answered the question, the difference between
the two questions.8
Demographic Characteristics of Households
We begin by presenting selected demographic characteristics of sample households.
Table 2 shows that 28 percent of the households in the sample are headed by women.
This figure is close to the widely cited figure of 30 percent for Malawi as a whole.
The table also shows that the average household size in the survey areas is 5 persons,
and that it is the same for both male- and female-headed households. However, with
an average dependency ratio of 0.5, female-headed households have slightly more
dependents than male-headed ones (0.4).9The average age of household heads in the
sample is 42, with female heads of households being, on average, four years older
than male ones (44 versus 40). Some 68 percent of household heads attended pri-
mary school, but only 17 percent of them have a primary school diploma. Overall,
female household heads tend to have a lower primary school attendance rate com-
pared with male heads (63 percent versus 71 percent).
Table 2 also shows the main occupation of household heads in the sample. Farm-
ing dominates as first occupation of most household heads (66 percent). This is true
for both male heads and female ones (62 percent and 74 percent, respectively). As
separate categories, wage laborer and trader come second as first occupation (8 per-
cent), while all the other self-employment income-generating activities grouped to-
gether constitute the first occupation for 10 percent of household heads. However,
female household heads are four times more likely than male heads to list trader as
their first occupation (16 percent compared with 4 percent). The opposite is true for
wage laborer (11 percent of male household heads versus 2 percent of female heads).
Only 7 percent of female household heads list household work as their first occupa-
tion. More than two-thirds of household heads have a second occupation, but fewer
than a quarter of them have a third occupation. Many of those with a third occupa-
tion are female household heads doing farming, household work, and trading.
Household Asset Ownership, Composition, and Distribution
Asset ownership is arguably an important determinant of access to credit, especially
if creditworthiness is judged on the basis of wealth or landed collateral alone. Land,
traditionally the most important form of collateral, has been recognized as one of the
major constraints in the agricultural sector of Malawi, one of the most densely pop-
ulated countries in Africa. Therefore we present data on households’ ownership of
19
8 Further details on the survey and the data collection methodology are reported in Diagne, Zeller, and Mataya (1996)
and Simtowe and Diagne (1998).
9 The household dependency ratio was calculated as the ratio of the household population younger than 15 or older
than 64 to the household size.various types of assets, including land, livestock, farm and nonfarm productive
equipment, and other nonproductive assets. Assets classified as nonproductive con-
sist of noncultivable land, buildings, furniture, and household utensils. The intra-
household distribution of ownership of assets and differences among credit program
participants and nonparticipants are also discussed because of their influence on the
control and allocation of household income.
Table 3 shows that the average total value of all household assets is approximately
MK 6,700 or approximately US$450. The average values of land and livestock are, re-
20
Table 2—Demographic characteristics of households
Male Female All
Sample size 291 (72%) 111 (28%) 402
Household size 5 5 5
Adult equivalent population 3.6 3.6 3.6
Dependency ratio 0.4 0.5 0.4
Mean age of head 40 44 42
(percent)
Head attended primary school 71 63 68
Head has primary school diploma 21 10 17
First occupation of head
Farming 62 74 66
Household work 0 7 3
Wage laborer 11 2 8
Trader 4 16 8
Other self-employment 14 1 10
Student 1 0 0
Unemployed 3 0 2
Other 5 0 3
Second occupation of head
Farming 37 9 28
Household work 27 13 22
Wage laborer 11 74 32
Trader 5 0 3
Other self-employment 6 3 5
Student 14 2 10
Unemployed 0 0 0
Other 1 0 0
Third occupation of head
Farming 79 75 78
Household work 2 5 3
Wage laborer 4 7 5
Trader 2 0 1
Other self-employment 4 10 6
Student 6 0 4
Unemployed 2 0 2
Other 2 3 2
Source: DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.21
Table 3—Asset ownership, composition, and distribution
Male-headed Female-headed Total
Sample size 291 111 402
Average value of: (MK)
All assets 7,551 4,841 6,681
Land 3,866 2,148 3,306
Productive assetsa 4,537 3,343 4,154
Livestock (total) 1,440 1,848 1,571
Nonproductive assetsb 3,014 1,498 2,528
Share of assets held in the form of: (percent)
Productive assets 57 58 57
On-farm assets 43 46 44
Livestock 11 12 11
Land 56 59 57
(hectares)
Average size of land holdings 1.8 1.4 1.7
Household with: (percent)
Less than 0.5 hectare 4 9 6
0.5–1.0 hectare 17 21 18
1–1.5 hectares 24 35 28
1.5–3 hectares 42 30 38
Over 3 hectares 12 5 10
Share of assets owned by:
Head 82 85 83
Spouse 14 3 11
Joint (head and spouse) 2 . . . 2
Other 2 12 4
Hectares of land owned by:
Head 76 90 80
Spouse 21 6 17
Joint (head and spouse) 2 0 2
Other 1 4 1
Share of on-farm assets owned by:
Head 68 92 73
Spouse 27 6 22
Joint (head and spouse) 1 . . . 1
Other 4 2 4
Share of cultivable land owned by:
Head 63 91 69
Spouse 29 6 24
Joint (head and spouse) 3 0 2
Other 5 2 4
Share of livestock owned by:
Head 85 73 81
Spouse 3 0 2
Joint (head and spouse) 12 0 7
Other 0 27 10
Share of cattle owned by:
Head 99 100 99
Spouse 1 0 1
Joint (head and spouse) 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0
Source: DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.
a Noncultivable land, buildings, furniture, and household utensils.
b On-farm assets (cultivable land, farm equipment, and oxen) and livestock.spectively, MK 3,300 and MK 1,600. In total the productive assets, including the ones
for off-farm income-generating activities, make up 57 percent of the value of house-
hold assets. The on-farm assets (cultivable land, farm equipment, and oxen) and live-
stock constitute, respectively, 44 percent and 11 percent of the total value of household
assets. There are noticeable differences between male- and female-headed households.
In particular the total value of all assets is significantly higher for male-headed house-
holds (MK 7,600) compared with female-headed ones (MK 4,800). Female-headed
households also own noticeably less land than male ones (an average of 1.4 hectares
versus 1.8 hectares, respectively). Overall, land is very scarce; more than half of all
households in the survey areas (52 percent) have landholdings of less than 1.5 hectares.
With regard to the intrahousehold ownership of assets, Table 3 shows that house-
hold heads own more than 80 percent of the total value of all household assets com-
pared with only 11 percent for spouses. The disaggregated figures show that, on av-
erage, 80 percent of households’land is owned by the household heads. Spouses own
only 17 percent of land, and only 2 percent of land is jointly owned by heads and
their spouses. Overall, spouses own 22 percent of households’on-farm assets, with
their shares for the different types of household assets being highest for cultivable
land (24 percent). On the other hand, they own, on average, only 2 percent of the
value of household livestock.10 The intrahousehold distributions of other household
assets show more or less the same pattern as that for land.
Table 4 differentiates the household asset ownership by participation in credit
programs. The average total value of household assets of current credit program par-
ticipants (MK 13,000) is more than twice the values for past participants and non-
participants, which are about MK 5,000. Nonparticipants also have noticeably lower
average landholding sizes (1.4 hectares) compared with current participants (2.3
hectares) and past participants (1.9 hectares). Moreover, 31 percent of nonpartici-
pants have landholdings of less than 1 hectare. However, household members of
PMERW and MMF are noticeably more likely to have landholdings of less than 1
hectare (about 20 percent of members) than those of MRFC (3 percent of members)
or of MUSCCO (10 percent of members). Hence, even if their members are relatively
wealthy in terms of assets compared with nonparticipants, these two programs still
have the highest proportion of landless among the programs studied.
Table 4 also shows that land ownership tends to be more evenly distributed be-
tween heads and spouses in MRFC member households than in households belong-
ing to any one of the other groups (including past participants and nonparticipants).
Heads and spouses of MRFC member households own, respectively, 50 percent and
43 percent of household total land, whereas in the other programs and for nonpar-
ticipants spouses own no more than 22 percent. In all cases joint ownership of land
does not exceed 4 percent except for PMERW1 members, for whom it reaches 16
percent. In MRFC member households spouses own even significantly more cul-
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10 The livestock ownership figures reflect cultural practices preventing women from owning cattle. Indeed virtually
all the cattle in male-headed households (99 percent) are owned by heads, and female-headed households have vir-
tually no cattle, although in terms of value they have more livestock (mostly poultry) than male-headed households.tivable land and on-farm assets than their husbands (53 percent and 50 percent, re-
spectively, for spouses versus 29 percent and 35 percent, respectively, for the hus-
bands). MMF member spouses in male-headed households also own up to 41 per-
cent of their households’ cultivable land and value of on-farm assets. On the other
hand, PMERW2 member spouses have the lowest shares of cultivable land (4 per-
cent) and value of on-farm assets (4 percent).
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of descriptive statis-
tics for asset ownership:
1. Even when credit is targeted to the poorest segment of rural households—
the approach taken in theory by the PMERW1 and MMF programs—the
value of household assets and household landholding size seem to be posi-
tively correlated with participation in formal credit programs.
2. The intrahousehold ownership distribution of assets, especially with regard
to land, confirms the widespread belief that women in general are in a very
weak position in terms of control of household resources. Furthermore, since
land is the most common asset pledged as collateral for credit (when it is re-
quired), one can conclude from these figures that women’s access to credit
may strongly depend on the will and priorities of their husbands. Therefore
PMERW, and to a lesser extent MMF, seem to have given access to credit to
a class of women living in relatively wealthy households in terms of assets
compared with nonparticipants, but who are in a very weak position in terms
of control of their households’resources. By providing loans for only non-
farm income-generating activities, the two programs are focusing on invest-
ment opportunities that are appropriate for their target clientele.
3. The apparent gender differences in the membership composition of MRFC
and the MUSCCO-affiliated Nafisi SACCO of Dowa (38 percent and 3 per-
cent of whose members, respectively, are women), both providing almost ex-
clusively seasonal agricultural loans, seem to be the result of the significant
differences in the intrahousehold land distribution figures between the two
programs. Hence, by giving out loans exclusively for agricultural production
purposes in an area characterized by a very unequal distribution of land be-
tween male heads of households and their spouses, the Nafisi SACCO is de
facto discriminating against women.
Structure of the Formal and Informal Credit Markets in Malawi
In this section we present evidence on the level of rural households’access to formal
and informal credit in Malawi. As discussed in the introduction, the credit limit is used
to assess the extent of that access as well as the proportion of households having a
binding credit constraint. Before presenting evidence on the level of access, we de-
scribe briefly the structure of the formal and informal credit markets and some of the
main attributes of the loan transactions recorded. The analysis distinguishes the for-
mal and the informal sectors of the credit market because they provide different types
of credit services. The formal sector comprises the government- and NGO-supported
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Table 4—Asset ownership, composition, and distribution by credit program membership
Current members
Past Never been
MRFC MMF MUSCCO PMERW1 PMERW2 Other All members members
Sample size 86 32 29 62 37 15 231 65 106
Average value of: (MK)
All assets 14,379 15,720 7,094 14,075 16,704 32,238 13,168 5,096 4,987
Land 9,578 8,213 3,263 7,974 6,616 35,733 7,840 2,857 1,919
Livestock (total) 1,381 169 1,539 3,120 3,861 2,399 1,720 1,199 1,608
Productive assetsa 7,936 7,003 4,861 6,806 9,875 17,125 7,454 3,442 3,270
Nonproductive assetsb 6,443 8,717 2,233 7,269 6,829 15,113 5,715 1,654 1,717
Share of assets held in the form of: (percent)
Productive assets 58 42 68 53 54 53 58 65 55
On-farm assets 40 32 52 37 32 39 41 49 44
Livestock 15 1 15 15 16 13 14 14 9
Land 54 61 60 61 43 58 54 60 57
(hectares)
Average 2.5 2.3 2.2 1.9 2.6 3.6 2.3 1.9 1.4
Household with size of landholdings: (percent)
Less than 0.5 hectare 0 6 0 0 13 1 2 1 8
0.5–1.0 hectare 3 14 10 23 6 20 8 14 23
1.0–1.5 hectare 34 11 22 22 26 14 32 29 26
1.5–3 hectares 28 36 51 40 27 43 32 47 38
Over 3 hectares 36 33 17 16 28 21 27 9 5
Share of assets owned by:
Head 69 81 94 66 81 49 71 84 93
Spouse 21 18 6 7 10 29 21 16 72
5
Joint (head and spouse) 4 0 1 26 9 10 4 . . . 0
Other 5 0 0 0 0 12 4 0 0
Hectares of land owned by:
Head 50 75 87 72 88 48 56 81 87
Spouse 43 22 12 12 10 25 38 19 11
Joint (head and spouse) 4 3 0 16 2 12 4 1 2
Other 3 0 0 0 0 15 2 0 0
Share of on-farm assets owned by:
Head 35 59 93 73 95 7 41 78 89
Spouse 50 41 7 9 4 64 46 22 10
Joint (head and spouse) 2 0 0 18 2 3 2 . . . 1
Other 14 0 0 0 0 26 11 0 0
Share of cultivable land owned by:
Head 29 57 92 63 94 6 35 76 87
Spouse 53 41 8 9 4 62 49 23 11
Joint (head and spouse) 4 2 0 27 2 7 5 1 2
Other 15 0 0 0 0 26 11 0 0
Share of livestock owned by:
Head 92 9 96 78 94 93 89 98 81
Spouse 4 83 2 12 6 4 6 2 1
Joint (head and spouse) 4 8 2 10 1 3 5 0 18
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Share of cattle owned by:
Head 100 . . . 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Spouse 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Joint (head and spouse) percent) 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.
a Noncultivable land, buildings, furniture, and household utensils.
b On-farm assets (cultivable land, farm equipment, and oxen) and livestock.credit programs, the microfinance institutions, and the commercial banks. The infor-
mal sector is made up of professional moneylenders, traders, and friends and relatives.
Table 5 shows that there were 364 formal and 212 informal loans granted during
the recall period. For formal loans, the recall period was chosen to begin with mem-
bership in the credit program (for SACA, only since 1992). Larger informal loans
(more than MK 100) were recalled from October 1993 until the time of the round,
with the last round ending on December 20, 1995. For informal loans of less than MK
15 and ones between MK 15 and MK 100, the recall period in each of the three rounds
was chosen as eight weeks and three months, respectively. A total of 121 demands
for loans were rejected, 56 percent of which were rejected by informal lenders.
In total 79 percent of adults in the sample did not ask for any loan during the three
rounds of the survey. The most common reason for not asking for a formal or infor-
mal loan was dislike or no need of borrowing (48 percent and 27 percent for infor-
mal and formal loans, respectively). Informal loans were mostly between friends and
relatives (93 percent). The majority of them did not have any due date (57 percent).
Virtually all informal loans were interest-free loans (98 percent) with an average size
of MK 76. In contrast, formal loans carried an average annual interest rate of 24 per-
cent before October 1993 and 39 percent after October 1993, and their average size
was MK 377 before October 1993 and MK 520 after October 1993. These figures
show that the credit market in Malawi is not as active as those in other Asian and
African countries.11
Distribution of Credit Limits and Unused Credit Lines
Table 6 presents the average informal and formal credit limits and unused credit lines
that were observed in the three rounds. This information is shown for the whole pop-
ulation and separately when a formal loan was granted, rejected, and not requested.
The average formal and informal credit limits for the population as a whole are MK
44 and MK 46, respectively (about US$3).12 To put these figures into perspective,
Malawi’s 1995 per capita GNP was US$170 or MK 2,550 (Word Bank 1997), and
the average per capita 1995 income in the sample was MK 1,190. The average for-
mal credit limit is significantly higher for cases in which formal loans were granted
(MK 679 on average) compared with cases in which informal loans were granted
(MK 35). One also notes that some rejected borrowers and respondents who did not
ask for loans could nevertheless borrow some positive amounts from both sectors.13
26
11 For comparison, 2,233 informal and 338 formal loans were recorded in Bangladesh in a similar IFPRI survey in
1994 involving 350 households (Zeller, Sharma, and Ahmed 1996). In another similar IFPRI survey of 189 house-
holds in Madagascar in 1992, there were 1,375 and 245 informal and formal loans, respectively (Zeller et al. 1994).
12 The exchange rate was US$1 for MK 15 at the time of the survey.
13 A small number of borrowers whose loan demands were rejected could borrow a lesser but positive amount from
the same lender but chose not to do so. The main reason why a rejected borrower chooses to forego a loan instead
of accepting a lesser amount is that the lesser amount is usually too small for the intended purpose of the loan. In
addition, when a loan demand is rejected by one sector of the credit market (formal or informal), the potential bor-
rower can often borrow at least some amount from another sector.27
Table 5—Loan transactions and their characteristics
Male Female All
Sample size 1,087 1,361 2,448
Informal credit granted 113 (60%) 99 (59%) 212 (59%)
Loan size (MK) 82 67 76
Loan maturity (weeks) 13 9 11
Loans with due date (percent) 48 36 43
Loans with no due date (percent) 52 64 57
Percent annual interest rate (percent) 6 2 4
Interest-free loans (percent) 97 98 98
Relation with informal lender
Friend or relative (percent) 95 92 93
Neighbor (percent) 2 3 3
None of the above (percent) 3 5 4
Formal credit granted 143 (40%) 221 (41%) 364 (41%)
Before October 1993
Loan size (MK) 456 161 377
Loan maturity (weeks) 42 41 42
Loans with due date (percent) 100 100 100
Percent annual interest rate (percent) 24 23 24
Loans with positive interests (percent) 96 100 97
After October 1993
Loan size (MK) 670 449 520
Loan maturity (weeks) 38 22 27
Loans with due date (percent) 100 100 100
Percent annual interest rate (percent) 37 40 39
Loans with positive interests (percent) 94 98 97
Loans rejected
Informal loans 49 (55%) 27 (58%) 76 (56%)
Formal loans 31 (45%) 14 (42%) 45 (44%)
No loan requested 751 (72%) 1,000 (85%) 1,751 (79%)
Reasons for not asking for informal loans
I did not need credit 27 23 24
I dislike any borrowing 29 20 24
Other loans are too expensive 14 16 15
I felt that lender would refuse because of:
My age 3 8 6
My health problem 5 6 6
Reasons other than above 16 18 17
Other 5 9 7
Reasons for not asking for formal loans (percent)
I did not need credit 19 19 19
I dislike any borrowing 8 8 8
Other loans are too expensive 16 14 15
I felt that lender would refuse because of:
My age 8 14 12
My health problem 7 6 6
Reasons other than above 23 24 24
Other 19 14 16
Source: DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.
Note: The percentage figures in the table are weighted using the strata population weights from the vil-
lage census (the count figures are not weighted).2
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Table 6—Distribution of formal and informal credit limits and unused credit lines, October 1993–December 1995
Credit limit and unused credit linea
Formal Informal
Standard Standard
Mean Median deviation Minimum Maximum Mean Median deviation Minimum Maximum
All respondents 44 0 248 0 10,000 46 0 188 0 12,000
(19) (0) (137) (0) (6,575) (36) (0) (112) (0) (5,000)
When formal loan was granted 679 500 911 13 10,000 95 20 500 0 12,000
(148) (0) (474) (0) (6,575) (69) (10) (202) (0) (4,000)
When informal loan was granted 35 0 149 0 1,000 127 50 369 5 12,000
(13) (0) (76) (0) (1,000) (52) (12) (134) (0) (4,000)
When loan demand was rejected 72 0 254 0 4,000 46 0 89 0 400
(53) (11) (215) (0) (4,000) (34) (0) (69) (0) (300)
When no loan was requested 12 0 88 0 5,000 32 0 104 0 5,000
(12) (0) (88) (0) (5,000) (32) (0) (104) (0) (5,000)
Source: DRD/IFPRI/Rural Finance Survey.
Notes: The exchange rate is US$1 = MK 15. Malawi’s 1995 per capita GNP is $170 (that is, MK 2,550; World Bank 1997).
a Unused credit line in parentheses.The distributions of the credit limits and unused credit lines presented in the Table
6 and in the box plot diagrams in Figures 2–6 give a better picture of the extent of
access to credit in Malawi. The median formal and informal credit limits in the pop-
ulation as a whole are both zero. Over 75 percent of the population can borrow at
most MK 50 (about US$3) from either sector of the credit market, and most often
they could obtain this amount only from the informal sector. The distributions of the
unused credit lines show that more often borrowers exhaust their credit lines in the
formal sector but not in the informal sector. This finding, taken together with the fact
that informal loan sizes and credit limits are significantly lower than the correspon-
ding formal values, suggests that the two types of credit are not perfect substitutes
for one another. Otherwise, since almost all informal loans do not carry any interest
rate, one would expect to see households reach their credit limits more frequently in
the informal sector than in the formal sector. One also notes that women in general
have lower formal and informal credit limits compared with men. They also appear
more likely to exhaust their formal credit lines than men. This finding provides some
justification for the targeting of formal credit to women.
Access to Credit and Participation in Formal Credit Programs
A household is said to have access to a type of credit if at least one of its members
has a strictly positive credit limit for that type of credit. Similarly a household is
classified as credit constrained for a type of credit if at least one of its members
is constrained for that type of credit. How do access to the two types of credit and
the likelihood of having a binding credit constraint differ between participants and
nonparticipants in credit programs? To answer this question, the households have
been classified according to the types of access to credit and the binding of the credit
constraints of their individual members.
Table 7 tabulates the credit limits and occurrence of credit constraints by program
membership. Consistent with our conceptual distinction between access to credit and
participation in a credit program, the table shows that 8 percent of households who
never participated in any credit program did have access to formal credit during the
first-round recall period (that is, they said they could obtain a formal loan if they
wanted to). Of households who never participated in a credit program 28 percent do
not have access to any type of credit, while 64 percent have access only to informal
credit. A different pattern of access to credit is shown for households who are no
longer participating in credit programs. Indeed, they are four times more likely to
have access to formal credit than those who never participated (32 percent compared
with 8 percent). Interestingly, up to 40 percent of the households currently partici-
pating in formal credit programs did not have access to formal credit during the first-
round recall period. This means that not only did they not receive any formal loan
during that period, they also could not borrow anything from a formal lender. Table
7 also shows that close to half of households participated in formal credit programs
during that recall period (with 15 percent having their formal and informal binding
and 34 percent having only their formal binding). This indicates that these house-
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Figure 2—Distributions of formal and informal credit limits and unused
credit lines for all respondents, October 1993–December 1995
A. Formal and informal credit limits for all respondents
B. Formal and informal unused credit lines for all respondents
Notes: The box plot diagrams are interpreted as follows. For each box, 50 percent of cases have values
within the box and the solid horizontal line inside it is the median. The length of the box is the interquartile
range and the lower boundary (resp upper boundary) of the box is the 25th (resp 75th) percentile. The cir-
cles are outliers and the stars are extreme values.
























Figure 3—Distributions of formal and informal credit limits and unused
credit lines when a formal loan was granted, October 1993–December 1995
A. Formal and informal credit limits when a formal loan was granted
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Notes: See notes to Figure 2.
holds could benefit by having their respective formal credit organizations increase
their credit limits.
The figures for the second and third rounds in Table 7 show a progressively de-
teriorating trend in household access to credit for participants and nonparticipants
alike. For participants, the deterioration resulted mainly from their programs’orien-
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Figure 4—Distributions of formal and informal credit limits and unused
credit lines when an informal loan was granted, October 1993–December
1995
A. Formal and informal credit limits when an informal loan was granted
B. Formal and informal unused credit lines when an informal loan was
granted
Notes: See notes to Figure 2.33
Figure 5—Distributions of formal and informal credit limits and unused
credit lines when a loan demand was rejected, October 1993–December 1995
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Notes: See notes to Figure 2.
program, with only 23 percent and 8 percent of its member households having access
to formal credit during the second and third rounds, respectively, the deteriorating trend
reflects its concentration on lending for seasonal agricultural production and should
have been anticipated by its members. MMF lends for nonfarm income-generating ac-
tivities, and all of its members completely lost access to formal credit in the third round,
which fell during the transition period when MMF was being absorbed by MRFC.3
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Table 7—Households with access to credit, by program membership and sector of the credit market
Current members
Past Never been
MRFC MMF MUSCCO PMERW1 PMERW2 Other All members members
Round 1 (October 1993–March 1995)
Access to credit
No access 10  (14%) 2 (2%) 1 (2%) 2 (11%) 0  (0%) 1 (10%) 13 (10%) 12 (17%) 27 (28%)
Informal  only 15 (37%) 1  (2%) 1 (0%) 6 (11%) 1 (1%) 4 (49%) 25 (30%) 33 (50%) 65 (64%)
Formal  only 14 (15%) 9 (60%) 2 (6%) 11 (24%) 9 (22%) 2 (15%) 40 (16%) 1  (0%) 0 (0%)
Informal  and  formal 57 (34%) 18 (36%) 25 (92%) 45 (55%) 27 (76%) 10 (27%) 161 (44%) 19 (32%) 7  (8%)
Total 96 (100%) 30 (100%) 29 (100%) 64 (100%) 37 (100%) 17 (100%) 239 (100%) 65 (100%) 99 (100%)
Binding credit constraint
Informal and formal 13  (16%) 8  (14%) 1 (2%) 7 (16%) 4 (9%) 2 (11%) 32 (15%) 14 (21%) 31 (33%)
Informal only 11  (12%) 4 (50%) 2 (6%) 7 (19%) 5 (13%) 1 (14%) 23 (12%) 1 (0%) 0 (0%)
Formal  only 17 (38%) 5 (10%) 2 (2%) 19 (20%) 8 (11%) 6 (50%) 54 (34%) 32 (50%) 61 (60%)
No binding constraint 55  (34%) 13 (26%) 24 (89%) 31 (45%) 20 (66%) 8 (25%) 130 (39%) 18 (29%) 7 (8%)
Total 96 (100%) 30 (100%) 29 (100%) 64 (100%) 37 (100%) 17 (100%) 239 (100%) 65 (100%) 99 (100%)
Round 2 (April–July 1995)
Access to credit
No  access 24 (37%) 17 (63%) 3  (0%) 10 (32%) 2 (8%) 3 (30%) 56 (34%) 15 (20%) 34 (48%)
Informal  only 39 (39%) 3  (4%) 4 (12%) 22 (33%) 14 (40%) 4 (37%) 75 (35%) 41 (69%) 58 (46%)
Formal only 4 (8%) 8  (33%) 2 (5%) 11 (20%) 5 (22%) 3 (4%) 28 (10%) 1 (0%) 1 (2%)
Informal and formal 27 (15%) 0 (0%) 20 (83%) 21 (16%) 15 (29%) 7 (30%) 75 (20%) 6 (11%) 2 (3%)
Total 94 (100%) 28 (100%) 29 (100%) 64 (100%) 36 (100%) 17 (100%) 234 (100%) 63 (100%) 95 (100%)3
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Binding credit constraint
Informal and formal 27 (46%) 24 (94%) 5 (7%) 17 (39%) 4 (18%) 6 (46%) 76 (44%) 16  (20%) 41  (53%)
Informal  only 2 (3%) 2 (4%) 1 (2%) 4  (13%) 3 (13%) 1 (1%) 11 (3%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%)
Formal  only 38 (36%) 2 (2%) 3 (8%) 24 (34%) 15 (41%) 4 (23%) 75 (33%) 41 (69%) 51 (41%)
No  binding  constraint 27 (15%) 0 (0%) 20 (83%) 19 (15%) 14 (28%) 6 (30%) 72 (20%) 6 (11%) 2 (3%)
Total 94 (100%) 28 (100%) 29 (100%) 64 (100%) 36 (100%) 17 (100%) 234 (100%) 63 (100%) 95 (100%)
Round 3 (July–December 1995)
Access to credit
No  access 43 (74%) 14 (73%) 11 (35%) 27 (53%) 15 (55%) 9 (57%) 103 (65%) 33 (58%) 58 (71%)
Informal only 16 (18%) 13 (27%) 4 (16%) 10  (10%) 6 (17%) 1 (24%) 49 (20%) 25 (38%) 31 (27%)
Formal only 21 (6%) 1 (0%) 2 (11%) 14  (27%) 4 (12%) 3 (18%) 39 (9%) 1 (0%) 3 (2%)
Informal and formal 14 (2%) 0 (0%) 10  (39%) 11 (10%) 9 (16%) 2 (1%) 37 (6%) 3  (4%) 1 (0%)
Total 94 (100%) 28 (100%) 27 (100%) 62 (100%) 34 (100%) 15 (100%) 228 (100%) 62 (100%) 93 (100%)
Binding credit constraint
Informal and formal 48 (75%) 14 (73%) 11 (35%) 34 (61%) 17 (61%) 10 (58%) 117 (68%) 33  (58%) 61  (73%)
Informal  only 17 (5%) 1 (0%) 2 (11%) 8 (19%) 2 (6%) 2 (17%) 27 (7%) 1 (0%) 3 (2%)
Formal  only 15 (18%) 13 (27%) 4 (16%) 10 (10%) 8 (20%) 1 (24%) 50 (19%) 25 (38%) 28 (25%)
No binding constraint 14 (2%) 0 (0%) 10 (39%) 10 (10%) 7 (13%) 2  (1%) 34  (6%) 3 (4%) 1 (0%)
Total 94 (100%) 28 (100%) 27 (100%) 62 (100%) 34 (100%) 15 (100%) 228 (100%) 62 (100%) 93 (100%)
Source: DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.The deteriorating trend in households’ access to credit illustrates the fact that,
even for participants in credit programs, continuous access to formal credit cannot
be taken for granted and should be considered (together with access to informal
credit) as subject to random events. Moreover, from the participating household’s
perspective, unforeseen fluctuations in its access to formal credit introduce a type of
uncertainty into its planning and decisionmaking process that can be more difficult
to cope with than the uncertainty faced when not participating in a credit program in
the first place. Indeed, unpredictable institutional changes or abrupt changes in the
policy of a credit program can wreak considerable damage on the operations of a
business or farm enterprise.
Household Crop Production and Incomes
Crop Production in the 1993/94 and 1994/95 Seasons. During the rainy seasons
1993/94 and 1994/95, 7 percent and 3 percent of rural households, respectively, did
not grow any crops at all, with male-headed households accounting for a slightly
higher share of nonagricultural households. Over 90 percent of households grew food
crops in both years, but only 7 percent in 1994 (11 percent in 1995) of them grew ex-
port crops, such as tea, tobacco, sugar, or cotton. Female-headed households, as ex-
pected, are underrepresented among those households growing export crops (Table
8). In 1995 51 percent of households grew local maize varieties, but 61 percent grew
hybrid maize. However, among female-headed households relatively more local
maize is grown compared with male-headed households. After maize, beans are the
36
Informal Formal


















Figure 6—Distribution of formal and informal credit limits when no loan was
requested, October 1993–December 1995
Notes: See notes to Figure 2.second most important crop, followed by groundnut and cassava. All other food
crops, except maize, are grown in only some 35 percent of rural households, indi-
cating the high specialization in maize and implying little diversity in diet if
households are not able to purchase other staple foods and relishes. Beans are grown
relatively more frequently in female-headed households than in male-headed house-
holds. Tobacco is of increasing importance as a cash crop; it is grown mainly in male-
headed households. While 2 percent of female-headed households grew tobacco in
1994, only 1 percent grew it in 1995. In comparison, the percentage of male-headed
tobacco-growing households increased from 5 percent in 1994 to 11 percent in 1995.
Overall, the number of tobacco-growing smallholders doubled from one year to
the next.
Table 9 shows the amount of cultivated land and share of land allocated to each
crop in the 1994/95 season, differentiated by program membership. On average, each
household in the survey area cultivated 0.7 hectare. Of cultivated land, 46 percent
was allocated to hybrid maize and 38 percent to local maize. Therefore 84 percent
of household cultivated land was devoted to growing maize, the main food staple. In
contrast, only 2 percent of the cultivated land was devoted to tobacco in 1994/95.
The remaining 14 percent of household cultivated land was devoted to the growing
of other crops (mostly cassava, beans, and groundnut). Differentiating by program
membership, members of the two PMERW programs had the lowest average amount
of cultivated land (0.6 and 0.7 hectare, respectively, compared with 0.9 for MRFC
members and 0.8 for MMF and MUSCCO members). Nonmembers and past mem-
bers also cultivated only 0.7 hectare. Of further note is that PMERW1 and MMF
households had a relatively high share of their cultivated land planted with hybrid
maize while PMERW2 households had a significantly higher share of land allocated
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Table 8—Major rainfed crops grown, by household
1994 1995
Male Female All Male Female All
Sample size 293 109 402 288 101 389
Number of crops 16 (9%) 4 (4%) 20 (7%) 13 (3%) 4 (2%) 17 (3%)
Food crops 277 (91%) 105 (96%) 382 (93%) 277 (97%) 96 (98%) 373 (97%)
Local maize 170 (56%) 63 (53%) 233 (55%) 148 (49%) 55 (56%) 203 (51%)
Hybrid maize 190 (63%) 64 (57%) 254 (61%) 210 (66%) 60 (51%) 270 (61%)
Other food crops 102 (35%) 33 (34%) 135 (35%) 96 (32%) 30 (36%) 126 (34%)
Cassava 20 (8%) 9 (9%) 29 (8%) 18 (7%) 7 (7%) 25 (7%)
Beans 39 (15%) 15 (17%) 54 (15%) 38 (16%) 16 (24%) 54 (18%)
Groundnut 45 (11%) 12 (12%) 57 (12%) 39 (11%) 8 (8%) 47 (10%)
Other food crops 21 (8%) 2 (0%) 23 (5%) 16 (3%) 3 (2%) 19 (3%)
Export crops 49 (9%) 5 (2%) 54 (7%) 80 (14%) 11 (2%) 91 (11%)
Tobacco 37 (5%) 5 (2%) 42 (4%) 70 (11%) 9 (1%) 79 (8%)
Other export crops 12 (5%) 0 (0%) 12 (3%) 14 (5%) 2 (1%) 16 (4%)
Source: DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.3
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Table 9—Household cultivated land and its allocation among crops in the 1994/95 season, by credit
program membership
Current members
All Past Never been
households MRFC MMF MUSCCO PMERW1 PMERW2 Other All members members
Average area of land
cultivated (hectares) 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.7 10.4 0.9 0.7 0.7
Proportion of land planted to:
Local maize (percent) 38 43 9 13 12 21 37 35 51 36
Hybrid maize (percent) 46 49 91 65 71 47 54 53 30 46
Tobacco (percent) 2 3 0 13 5 25 2 4 3 1
Other crops (percent) 14 5 0 9 12 7 7 8 16 16
Source: DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.to tobacco (25 percent compared with an average of 4 percent for all program mem-
bers). The most important result from this table is that nonmembers or past members
cultivated only 30–46 percent of their land with hybrid maize, while, on average, all
program members cultivated 53 percent.
Acquisition and Financing of Agricultural Inputs. Table 10 reports the preva-
lence of fertilizer and pesticide use in the 1994/95 season, differentiated by crop and
by program membership. Only 11 percent of program households did not apply
chemical fertilizer. In comparison, 53 percent of past members and 40 percent of
households that never belonged to a credit program did not use chemical fertilizers.
This result strongly suggests that participation in credit programs has a positive ef-
fect on the adoption of fertilizer. For pesticides, this pattern is similar but less clearly
accentuated. There were, however, differences in the prevalence of fertilizer use
among members of the different credit programs. While only 5 percent of MRFC
households did not use any chemical fertilizer, 29 percent of MMF and up to 16 per-
cent of PMERW members did not use chemical fertilizer. These latter two programs
target loans to off-farm enterprises, while MRFC gave in-kind input loans mostly for
hybrid maize and tobacco. Table 10 and especially Table 11 reveal an interesting pat-
tern regarding the allocation of chemical fertilizer among the different crops: chem-
ical fertilizer, when applied, is most frequently used for hybrid maize, followed by
local maize, and then tobacco. Very few other crops receive chemical fertilizer. It is
noteworthy that MRFC members exhibit the same pattern of fertilizer use despite the
fact that they are supposedly receiving more in-kind loans for tobacco than for hy-
brid maize (see Table 1). For example, 50 percent of the chemical fertilizer acquired
in 1994/95 by MRFC members was used on hybrid maize, compared with 11 per-
cent used on tobacco and 39 percent used on local maize (Table 11). The same pat-
tern applies for the 1993/94, 1994/95, and 1995/96 seasons. As shown in Table 11,
even smallholder tobacco farmers applied chemical fertilizer on tobacco and hybrid
maize in about equal amounts. This indicates that MRFC members are diverting a
large portion of their tobacco loan packages toward their food crops.
Table 10 also indicates the relative importance of the different methods of acqui-
sition and sources of financing of inputs. Inputs are mostly financed through small-
holders’ own resources. For both credit program members and nonmembers, over
two-thirds of total input value was financed without credit or gifts. Among the credit
programs, MRFC provides the largest flow of financing. In 1994/95 16 percent of
inputs were financed through MRFC credit. The other programs are limited in scale
and therefore achieve small shares when these are calculated as an average over the
survey areas. The informal market provides very little input financing.
The government’s programs to distribute free fertilizer and seeds under the
Drought Relief Program became an increasingly important source of input financing
between 1994 and 1995. The input distribution programs sought to target vulnerable
households that were adversely affected by the 1993/94 drought. However, the pro-
grams continued until mid-1996, as the harvest in 1994/95 was also below average.
In the 1994/95 season, households who never participated in a credit program re-
ceived 22 percent of their inputs as gift. But as the government programs attempt to
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Table 10—Fertilizer acquisition and relative importance of different methods of acquisition and source of financing of
inputs in the 1994/95 season, by program membership
Current members
Past Never been
MRFC MMF MUSCCO PMERW1 PMERW2 Other All members members
(percent)
Proportion of households using:
Chemical fertilizer in:
No crop 5 29 9 10 16 26 11 53 40
Local maize 54 11 2 11 22 42 40 19 12
Hybrid maize 72 67 91 82 76 74 71 35 45
Tobacco 14 0 32 9 36 2 13 12 5
Other crops 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0
Pesticide in:
No crop 92 100 86 86 84 99 92 96 100
Local maize 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hybrid maize 1 0 2 0 6 0 1 0 0
Tobacco 7 0 11 4 9 1 6 1 0
Other crops 0 0 0 10 2 0 2 4 04
1
Percent of the total inputs that was:
Purchased with own income 59 71 29 61 62 51 55 54 54
Part of a credit package 19 0 56 1 14 21 20 2 0
Single-item, in-kind credit 4 0 0 2 3 0 3 5 1
Purchased with cash credit 0 0 11 0 0 0 2 2 1
Received as a gift 2 12 0 12 3 0 4 7 26
Home-produced 15 17 3 24 18 28 16 30 19
Given by landlord 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
In-kind payment for work 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Percent of the total inputs from:
Self-financing 81 88 33 87 82 99 76 88 74
MRFC/SACA 16 0 7 2 13 1 11 1 0
MUSCCO 1 0 60 0 0 0 9 0 0
Other government program 2 12 0 9 5 0 4 8 22
Other NGO program 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
Relative/friend/neighbor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
Landlord/informal lender 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.4
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Table 11—Distribution of fertilizer among crops in the 1993/94, 1994/95, and 1995/96 seasons, by program membership
and type of farm
Type of farm Current program members
Past Never been
All Tobacco Nontobacco MRFC Mudzi Fund MUSCCO PMERW1 PMERW2 Other All members members
(Percent of MK value of total chemical fertilizer used)
1993/94 season
Local maize 30 1 34 31 3 1 9 4 . . . 27 25 42
Hybrid maize 64 52 66 66 97 75 83 65 91 70 65 55
Tobacco 5 47 . . . 2 0 24 8 32 9 4 9 4
Other crops 0 . . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 . . .
1994/95 season
Local maize 26 15 29 39 11 2 8 12 41 31 31 21
Hybrid maize 65 41 71 50 89 79 76 49 53 57 54 75
Tobacco 8 42 . . . 11 0 20 15 39 6 12 12 4
Other crops 0 1 0 0 . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . 0 2 . . .
1995/96 season
Local maize 28 4 30 30 . . . 3 . . . 2 58 26 31 29
Hybrid maize 67 46 69 63 90 33 81 47 25 66 68 67
Tobacco 5 50 . . . 7 . . . 64 19 52 18 8 1 3
Other crops 1 . . . 1 . . . 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . 2
Source: DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.target the poorer rural households, it is interesting to note that 9 percent of inputs in
PMREW1 households, 5 percent of inputs in PMERW2 households, and 12 percent of
inputs in MMF households are provided as gifts through government programs. Only
2 percent of inputs in MRFC households that have above-average wealth were given
by the government. On average for all program households, 4 percent of inputs were
obtained through government programs. The corresponding percentage for past mem-
bers was 8 percent. The increasing importance of the free distribution of inputs is, of
course, detrimental to the formation of private input and credit markets, especially to
the extent that wealthier households—who otherwise would have bought inputs on a
cash basis or on credit—are reached through the input distribution programs.14
Yield and Net Agricultural Income by Crop. Tables 12 and 13 present yields, in-
put expenditures per hectare, and financial indicators for different crop enterprises
during the 1994 and 1995 production years, respectively. The figures are shown for
all households and by program membership. Table 13 shows that tobacco had the
highest return in terms of net income per hectare with MK 3,104 in 1994 and MK
5,896 in 1995, followed by other crops (beans, cassava, and so forth) with MK 1,271
in 1994 and MK 2,030 in 1995, then local maize with MK 398 in 1994 and MK 851
in 1995, and last hybrid maize with MK 313 in 1994 and MK 615 in 1995. Owing
to high prices for seed and especially fertilizer, and to high interest rates, hybrid
maize has lost much of its relative profitability compared with local maize since the
predrought and pre–market reform years. Tobacco is by far the most competitive
smallholder crop. One also notes that the average net returns per hectare for all crops
in 1994, the drought year, are about half of those in 1995, demonstrating that the
profitabilities of all the crops cultivated by smallholder farmers in Malawi are equally
and highly vulnerable to drought.
Several general patterns can be identified when the results are differentiated by
program membership. First, current program members have lower hybrid maize
yields than past members, but higher yields compared with households that have
never been members. Second, given their higher input intensity but their lower hy-
brid maize yields, current program members have much lower per-hectare gross mar-
gins for local and hybrid maize crops in both years than households who were past
members of credit programs. Consequently their aggregate gross margin per hectare
for all crops combined was much lower in 1994 (MK 426) than that of past members
(MK 705) and that of households that have never participated (MK 715). Further-
more, despite spending, on average, twice as much on input per hectare in 1995 than
past members, their aggregate gross margins per hectare were only 22 percent higher
(MK 1,791 compared with MK 1,469). Those households that have never been mem-
bers had much lower gross margins per hectare in 1995 (MK 1,157).
These results raise concerns about the sustainability and household-level impact
of the agricultural credit services of MRFC, MUSCCO, and MMF. Although the first
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14 At the national level, free distribution of inputs constituted 14 percent and 50 percent of fertilizer and hybrid maize
use, respectively (APAP III Newsbriefs 1996).4
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Table 12—Average yield and net income per hectare for major rainfed crops, 1994 production year, by
program membership
Current members
All Past Never been
households MRFC MMF MUSCCO PMERW1 PMERW2 Other All members members
Yield (kilograms per hectare)
Local maize 586 663 519 469 587 905 358 620 724 529
Hybrid maize 828 520 143 1,373 418 930 973 697 1,229 782
Tobacco 861 998 . . . 782 809 1,188 1,423 863 684 1,117
Other crops 1,464 657 74 831 1,058 515 2,482 873 773 1,880
All crops 922 591 222 997 548 896 1,034 712 874 996
Chemical fertilizer
(MK per hectare) used in:
Local maize 247 251 130 106 169 201 . . . 226 345 210
Hybrid maize 320 231 182 366 238 284 360 265 453 302
Tobacco 445 520 . . . 427 522 712 559 418 483 417
Other crops 1,334 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,334
All crops 315 163 110 171 156 248 247 160 166 57
Total value of inputs per
hectare (MK per hectare)a
Local maize 114 227 119 52 162 165 185 189 133 91
Hybrid maize 287 354 258 395 362 533 661 381 450 212
Tobacco 566 811 . . . 819 700 1,313 1,656 644 564 501
Other crops 139 173 15 162 153 599 458 203 113 139
All crops 199 306 224 313 308 567 565 312 232 156
Gross margin per hectare
(MK per hectare)
Local maize 398 288 227 333 158 491 125 281 634 339
Hybrid maize 313 119 − 111 419 − 102 78 378 155 321 371
Tobacco 3,104 2,713 . . . 2,910 2,869 6,796 11,423 2,664 1,411 5,926
Other crops 1,271 1,082 106 1,079 688 130 1,423 1,028 967 1,451
All crops 664 382 − 35 787 139 1,021 844 426 705 715
Source: DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.
a US$1 = MK 15.4
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Table 13—Average yield and net income per hectare for major rainfed crops, 1995 production year, by program
membership
Current members
All Past Never been
households MRFC MMF MUSCCO PMERW1 PMERW2 Other All members members
Yield (kilograms per hectare)
Local maize 725 913 425 789 989 1,132 792 868 806 674
Hybrid maize 793 663 496 1,371 537 1,068 821 769 1,179 731
Tobacco 706 782 . . . 1,839 1,018 1,492 1,185 1,067 524 447
Other crops 1,232 561 . . . 1,336 1,537 1,135 1,935 1,155 603 1,446
All crops 884 724 489 1,378 791 1,171 967 879 818 904
Chemical fertilizer
(MK per hectare) used in:
Local maize 246 253 180 292 239 376 165 246 183 269
Hybrid maize 247 265 192 510 220 451 274 296 296 218
Tobacco 496 832 . . . 722 662 922 595 779 459 254
Other crops 510 509 . . . . . . 287 . . . . . . 427 524 . . .
All crops 275 268 154 429 182 416 213 267 130 102
Total value of inputs per
hectare (MK per hectare)a
Local maize 203 307 840 130 956 679 375 387 147 194
Hybrid maize 317 333 305 568 309 572 418 372 359 288
Tobacco 847 1,036 . . . 2,763 988 1,226 840 1,527 592 313
Other crops 179 329 . . . 152 372 483 280 301 141 175
All crops 273 416 355 823 413 707 405 497 224 229
Gross margin per hectare
(MK per hectare)
Local maize 851 1,034 − 260 977 373 1,014 922 871 1,109 757
Hybrid maize 615 377 83 1,102 258 749 612 495 1,025 585
Tobacco 5,896 9,826 . . . 9,105 10,211 23,932 21,747 8,669 3,838 4,278
Other crops 2,030 1,855 . . . 2,108 3,488 1,584 2,511 2,429 1,810 2,045
All crops 1,322 1,870 51 2,801 1,376 5,382 1,629 1,791 1,469 1,157
Source: DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.
a US$1 = MK 15.two institutions only lent for agriculture in 1995, MMF also provided off-farm loans.
However, whenever these programs lend for agriculture, they provide a prespecified
seed and fertilizer package, for either hybrid maize or tobacco. The amounts of seed
and fertilizer contained in the packages are standardized for a limited number of land-
holding sizes. Three potential hypotheses could explain the apparent negative effect
of credit program membership on gross margins:
1. Are current program members endowed with land of lower quality than non-
current members?
2. Or did the programs select for the disadvantaged, less skilled farmers, while
the past members are the better farmers, who chose to stay out of the agri-
cultural credit system after defaulting on previous loans to SACA?
3. Or, as already suggested by Msukwa et al. (1994), are the extension advice
and credit packages—especially those of MRFC, MMF, and MUSCCO—
suboptimal, encouraging the application of too much of fertilizer and seed
with a view to enhancing yield instead of profitability? In 1995, as in prior
years, the package for hybrid maize was not adapted to specific agroecolog-
ical conditions but instead followed the general recommendation of the Min-
istry of Agriculture for the nation as a whole, which was to apply 96 kilo-
grams of nitrogen and 40 kilograms of phosphate per hectare (Government
of Malawi 1994b). Table 14 shows the recommended levels of application
for different fertilizer compounds and the estimated average cost per hectare.
The costs of the recommended applications during the 1993/94 season were
MK 278 for local maize and MK 645 for hybrid maize. The costs for both
crops more than tripled during the 1994/95 season, following the devalua-
tion of the kwacha and the elimination of fertilizer subsidies.
The patterns in Table 13 and Figures 7–10 give more credibility to the third hy-
pothesis. In 1995 current members achieved gross margins per hectare of local and
hybrid maize of MK 871 and MK 495, respectively. They applied, on average, MK
246 and MK 296 of fertilizer per hectare, respectively, to the two crops. Past mem-
bers who applied the same level of fertilizer to hybrid maize but much less fertilizer
to local maize (MK 183 per hectare) earned 100 and 27 percent more per hectare, re-
spectively. Households that have never been members earned gross margins of MK
757 and MK 585 per hectare on local maize and hybrid maize by applying, respec-
tively, MK 269 and MK 218 of fertilizer per hectare to the two crops. Although one
may conclude that current members are inefficient hybrid maize farmers or have land
of lower quality, they are much better tobacco farmers than past members or than
households that have never been members. Indeed, current members achieve much
higher yields and gross margins (MK 8,669) per hectare of tobacco than past mem-
bers (MK 3,838) and households that have never been members (MK 4,278). There-
fore, given the fact that the quality of land is unlikely to have any significant differ-
ential impact on maize and tobacco and that the latter is a much more complex crop
to grow, the hypothesis of lower land quality and more disadvantaged, less skilled
farmers among current members seems to have little justification.
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Table 14—Fertilizer recommendations for maize and tobacco in Malawi
Local maize Hybrid maize Burley tobacco
Combination of Basal Top Basal Top Basal Top
fertilizer compounds dressing fertilizer dressing fertilizer dressing fertilizer dressing fertilizer dressing fertilizer dressing fertilizer
(kilograms/hectare)
Combination 1 22 kilograms DAP 78 kilograms urea 87 kilograms DAP 175 kilograms urea 450 kilograms 150–400 kilograms
Super C (8:24:20)
Combination 2 22 kilograms DAP 133 kilograms CAN 87 kilograms DAP 290 kilograms CAN 450 kilograms 150–400 kilograms
Super D (10.:24:20)
Combination 3 22 kilograms DAP 170 kilograms S/A 87 kilograms DAP 390 kilograms S/A 600 kilograms 150–400 kilograms
Ordinary C (6:18:15)
Combination 4 50 kilograms 23:21: 65 kilograms urea 200 kilograms 23:21: 107 kilograms urea 600 kilograms 150–400 kilograms
0+4S 0+4S Ordinary D (8:18:15)
Combination 5 50 kilograms 23:21: 110 kilograms CAN 200 kilograms 23:21: 185 kilograms CAN
0+4S 0+4S
Combination 6 50 kilograms 23:21: 150 kilograms S/A 200 kilograms 23:21: 238 kilograms S/A
0+4S 0+4S
Average estimated cost per hectare of recommended fertilizer
Local maize Hybrid maize
1994 season 1995 season 1994 season 1995 season
(Mk/hectare)
278 1,024 645 2,160
Source: Government of Malawi (1996).
Notes: Recommended combinations of fertilizer compounds are based on the recommended rate of 96 kilograms of nitrogen and 40 kilograms of phosphorus per
hectare.
Fertilizer compounds come in 50-kilgram bags. Fertilizer costs are estimated using ADMARC prices and prices in Benson (1997) for the compounds DAP,
CAN, urea, and 23:21:0+45.
S/A = sulfate of ammonia.Indeed, the hypothesis that credit program members have applied fertilizer be-
yond optimal levels is confirmed by the plots of local maize, hybrid maize, and to-
bacco yields and gross margins against fertilizer use and total input cost, which are
shown in Figures 7–10. All three crops show diminishing marginal returns on fertil-
izer use at all levels of application, with their yields (except those for hybrid maize)
peaking within the observed ranges of fertilizer application. Furthermore, the gross
margins per hectare for hybrid and local maize varieties are decreasing functions of
fertilizer use within the entire range of observed fertilizer application. The gross mar-
gin per hectare for tobacco shows a positive but diminishing marginal return on fer-
tilizer use. The same trends for yields and gross margins are exhibited when the to-
tal cost per hectare of all inputs is used in place of fertilizer cost per hectare, except
that tobacco yield peaks within the observed range of total input use while its gross
margin peaks outside the range.
Hence the yield and gross margin plots demonstrate that, at least for maize crops,
the recommended fertilizer package encourages the use of too much fertilizer at the
expense of the profitability of the crop enterprise.
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Figure 7—Yields of local maize, hybrid maize, and tobacco versus fertilizer useDespite having a much steeper positive yield slope than local maize, hybrid maize
shows a much steeper negative gross margin slope. This indicates that the unprof-
itability of hybrid maize in most parts of the observed range of fertilizer application
results from the high price ratio of fertilizer to maize. Benson (1997) arrives at the
same conclusion using data from farm trials at 1,600 sites across Malawi. A close
examination of the data reveals that the very high rates of fertilizer application shown
in Figures 7–10 occur on plots with a total size of less than 0.25 hectare. This sug-
gests that many smallholder farmers are attempting to make up for their scare land,
limiting the total output they can achieve, by applying as much fertilizer they can get
hold of. This is especially true for tobacco, which was allocated only 2 percent of the
average 0.7 hectare of land cultivated by smallholder farmers. Smallholder farmers
are devoting so little land to tobacco, which has a much higher gross margin per
hectare than maize, mainly because of their desire to be food self sufficient. Indeed,
in a study by Smale and Phiri (1998) 90 percent of smallholder farmers declared the
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Figure 8—Gross margins of local maize, hybrid maize, and tobacco versus
fertilizer useability to produce maize for consumption from harvest to harvest as their most im-
portant criterion of well-being.15 Smallholder farmers may also be trying to offset
yield declines in recycled hybrid maize seed by applying more fertilizer than neces-
sary (Smale and Phiri 1998). The combination of the fact that the fertilizer packages
are standardized for a limited number of landholding sizes with the fact that the fer-
tilizers come in 50-kilogram bags is also likely to have contributed to the problem of
excessive application. By encouraging the use of too much fertilizer on very tiny
plots, the scarcity of land is having an indirect negative effect on the profitability of
crop enterprises.
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Figure 9—Yields of local maize, hybrid maize, and tobacco versus total input
cost
15 Achieving food self-sufficiency at both the household and national levels is the objective set by the Ministry of
Agriculture in the Guide to Agricultural Production in Malawi (Government of Malawi 1996).The hypothesis that the amount of fertilizer recommended by the agricultural ex-
tension service for hybrid maize was excessive before, and more so after, the removal
of the fertilizer subsidy is supported by a number of studies during the 1990s. Byer-
lee (1992) observed that, whereas the official recommended fertilizer application
level would produce the highest yields, lower levels of fertilizer use are generally
more profitable for the farmer (cited in Simler 1994). A study by the Harvard Insti-
tute for International Development (HIID) in 1994 on fertilizer policy referred to the
findings of the national maize research program supported by the Centro Interna-
cional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo. In view of the constraints on resource-poor,
partially subsistence oriented farmers, in recent years this program released new hy-
brid semiflint varieties with superior pounding and on-farm storage characteristics
and shorter maturities, along with recommendations for lower fertilizer input.16 The
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Figure 10–Gross margins of local maize, hybrid maize, and tobacco versus
total input cost
16 On hybrid maize varieties and their adoption in Malawi see Smale, Heisey, and Leathers (1995).main conclusion reached by HIID was that the current single nationwide recom-
mendation for fertilizer application for maize meant that in many regions farmers
were asked to apply too much fertilizer (especially phosphate), and that region- and
soil-specific recommendations are urgently required (Harvard Institute for Interna-
tional Development 1994a). Consistent with this finding, the high cost of seed and
fertilizer was the major reason cited for not growing hybrid maize in a study under-
taken in the Zomba District in 1995/96. Cost as a barrier to use was seen not only for
fertilizer but also to a lesser extent for hybrid maize seed (Peters 1996; Smale and
Phiri 1998). In the study by Smale and Phiri 71 percent of smallholder farmers did
not plant first-generation (nonrecycled) hybrid maize seed because of cash con-
straints. In the sample investigated by Peters in the Zomba District 57 percent of
farmers used recycled hybrid maize seeds, which, according to the survey house-
holds, were preferable because of their shorter maturity compared with local maize
varieties (Peters 1996). Similar recent declines in fertilizer use, in response to the
abolition of fertilizer subsidies and the devaluation of the kwacha, which substan-
tially increased fertilizer prices, were found by Mangani and Chaweza (1998). An-
other study suggested that “more efficient production can be achieved with a lower
fertilizer application, an increase in the nitrogen-phosphate ratio, and use of fertil-
izer compounds that can be applied by resource-poor farmers in a single application
at planting” (HIID 1994b:6).
The findings of a comprehensive study of fertilizer use in Malawi are in line with
these recommendations. It draws on data from on-farm trials of fertilizer use in maize
from more than 1,600 sites. Gross margin calculations by Benson (1997) based on
this data have shown that fertilizer use in maize production is barely profitable ow-
ing to the very low price of maize compared with the very high price of fertilizer
(Benson 1997). As pointed out earlier, during both survey years the maize-fertilizer
price relationship significantly worsened owing to the devaluation of the kwacha by
300 percent and the dismantling of fertilizer subsidies. Benson (1997) further con-
cluded that the recommended levels of fertilizer use per hectare of maize were sub-
optimal even in years with above-average rainfall.
However, the production seasons 1993/94 and 1994/95, for which the survey re-
called crop data, saw rainfall that was far below average. The first year experienced
a drought in all areas, and some districts, such as Mangochi, again received little rain-
fall in the second year and experienced a complete failure of their crop, consisting
mainly of hybrid maize. In other words, in years of below-average rainfall, the rec-
ommended fertilizer package that comes with the hybrid maize seed credit implies
a considerable downside risk of low or even negative gross margins. Indeed, when
we average the results for the two production seasons (including the drought year),
the average gross margin per hectare of local maize is MK 627 and that for hybrid
maize is MK 491 for all households.
Without any doubt, these results raise questions about the farm-level profitabil-
ity of the credit services provided for growers of hybrid maize. This finding need not
to be in conflict with the hypothesis that improved access to credit in general can in-
crease productivity and gross margins per hectare—provided that agricultural loans
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of fertilizer and/or an improved maize-to-fertilizer price ratio, or given for growing
more profitable crops, such as tobacco. Yet, as most agricultural loans during the sur-
vey years were used for hybrid maize and fertilizer, and since these years experi-
enced below-average rainfall, their impact on the gross margins of the maize crop
clearly appears to have been detrimental.
In conclusion—and keeping in mind that a tabular analysis can only suggest
causal patterns but not confirm or reject them with statistical significance—partici-
pation in credit programs seems to induce growers to plant a higher share of hybrid
maize and tobacco and to use seed, fertilizer, and pesticides with greater intensity.
However, in the case of input-intensive hybrid maize in years of below-average rain-
fall, the recommended level of fertilizer use reflected in the credit package offered
to farmers does not seem to be profitable at all. In other words, those who did not
borrow seed and fertilizer for hybrid maize production did better than those who did
during the two survey years.
Moreover, the government’s input distribution programs during 1993/94,
1994/95, and 1995/96, offered as a response to the droughts in 1992/93 and 1993/94,
had a sizable influence on the availability of inputs. This raises questions regarding
the long-term sustainability of these efforts and their possible detrimental effects on
the sustainability of the rural financial institutions, especially MRFC. Indeed, if
households realize that they can get inputs for free, why should they get them with
loans carrying interest rates of over 40 percent, or why should they bother repaying
their loans? The negative and unintended effects of a policy of handouts of free fer-
tilizer of course affect not only financial institutions but also the possible market en-
try and sustainability of private traders in agricultural inputs and produce.
Total Household Crop and Nonfarm Incomes
Table 15 shows that the average per capita total household income in the survey ar-
eas was MK 776 for 1995 and MK 587 for 1994. The average per capita crop income
in the drought year of 1994 (MK 149) was less than half the average crop income for
1995 (MK 337). This shows the high income risk that agricultural households rely-
ing only on crop production must face in Malawi. On the other hand, nonfarm in-
come-generating activities, which are less dependent on weather than farming, not
only may be a less risky source of income but also seem to provide substantial in-
come to rural households (30 percent more than the average crop income). However,
there are large differences among rural households in their degrees of involvement
in nonfarm income-generating activities. Female-headed households are more in-
volved in such activities than male-headed ones (35 percent versus 27 percent of non-
farm incomes as a share of total household incomes, respectively). But their per
capita incomes (farm and nonfarm) are lower than male-headed ones in both years.
Table 15 also shows that the average per capita total incomes of credit program
participants in 1994 (MK 999) and 1995 (MK 1,308) are about twice as high as the
ones for past participants (MK 474 and MK 679, respectively) and the ones for
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All households
Current program members
Male- Female- Tobacco Nontobacco Past Never been




Gross 2,665 3,106 1,762 3,252 2,600 5,097 4,133 4,044 4,800 9,930 7,354 5,160 2,469 2,175
Per capita 587 690 377 635 582 1,007 918 862 781 1,606 1,478 999 474 526
Crop income
Gross 569 642 422 1,202 500 685 − 142 1,518 466 2,158 3,296 722 860 467
Per capita 149 165 115 242 139 137 − 63 310 75 346 725 141 170 146
1995
Total income
Gross 3,564 4,081 2,508 7,067 3,179 6,830 4,379 8,260 6,098 20,946 11,874 6,952 3,496 2,852
Per capita 776 860 602 1,254 723 1,319 993 1,535 960 3,160 2,260 1,308 679 684
Crop income
Gross 1,469 1,616 1,168 5,018 1,079 2,418 104 5,734 1,764 13,174 7,817 2,514 1,887 1,144
Per capita 337 335 340 862 279 449 11 983 254 1,901 1,507 450 375 304
Nonfarm incomeb
Gross 2,095 2,465 1,340 2,049 2,100 4,412 4,275 2,526 4,334 7,772 4,057 4,437 1,609 1,708




(percent) 29 27 35 34 29 41 47 31 78 62 63 52 29 25
Source: DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.
a US$1 = MK 15.
b Data on 1994 nonfarm income were not collected, but they are assumed to be the same as in 1995.households who never participated in any credit program (MK 526 and MK 684, re-
spectively). There are, however, significant differences among participants in the dif-
ferent credit programs in both years. In fact the MK 3,160 average per capita total
income of PMERW2 participants in 1995 is more than twice as much as the ones for
MRFC and MUSCCO and about three times the ones for MMF and PMERW1. Al-
though the average per capita income of PMERW2 members in 1994 (MK 1,606)
was about half of that in 1995, it was still significantly higher than that for members
of the other programs. The lower average per capita incomes for MMF participants
are, however, largely due to their negative or extremely low average per capita crop
incomes (MK –63 in 1994 and MK 11 in 1995).17
The MUSCCO participants have the lowest average nonfarm income as a share
of total household income (31 percent). The MRFC participants have the second low-
est average share of nonfarm income (41 percent), which is lower than that of MMF
participants (who receive loans for nonfarm income-generating activities) by only 6
percentage points. The average share of nonfarm income for MRFC participants
challenges the conventional wisdom that views them as agriculture-focused house-
holds who earn most of their incomes from farming. On the other hand, the greater
than 50 percent average share of nonfarm income for PMERW1 and PMERW2 mem-
bers (78 percent and 62 percent, respectively) is consistent with the fact that they re-
ceive loans exclusively for nonfarm income-generating activities. The PMERW2
participants’ lower average share of nonfarm income compared with PMERW1
members is largely due to their particularly high 1995 per capita crop income (MK
1,901), which, in average per capita terms, is more than seven times the income for
PMERW1, about twice that for MUSCCO, four times that for MRFC, and more than
170 times that for MMF participants. This suggests that part of the profits from the
nonfarm businesses created by PMERW2 participants may have been reinvested in
their farm businesses. This hypothesis seems to be confirmed by the fact that not only
did they have the highest average input expenditures per hectare among all partici-
pants in credit programs (Table 13), but most of their input expenditures (over 80
percent of total values in 1994/95) are self-financed out of their savings (Table 10).
This finding about the probable positive impact of loans for nonfarm income-gen-
erating activities on the profitability of farm businesses has implications for MRFC’s
loan policy toward smallholder farmers. The policy implications are even clearer
when one considers the other findings that MRFC’s participants earn, on average, 41
percent of their incomes from nonfarm income-generating activities, and that 81 per-
cent of their agricultural input expenditures in 1994/95 were self-financed, compared
with only 16 percent financed through in-kind loans from MRFC (Table 10). By giv-
ing its smallholder household participants loans for nonfarm income-generating ac-
tivities, MRFC could enable them to diversify their farm and off-farm enterprises.
This would reduce the smallholder farm’s exposure to the unprofitable maize crop
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17 The negative and extremely low crop incomes for MMF participants included in the survey are due to the fact
that they are all from Mangochi, where, because of the drought in 1994 and 1995, many households did not harvest
any crops.enterprise and consumption risks, and therefore increase its resilience and its ability
to adopt new crops and technologies, which—as the data suggest—are largely fi-
nanced by equity capital. MRFC’s continued provision of in-kind loans instead of
cash loans for farm and nonfarm activities at present leaves households little choice
in finding out for themselves what is optimal for them given their specific constraints.
Household Consumption Expenditures and Calorie Intake
Table 16 presents data on average household consumption expenditures, calorie in-
take, and nutritional status. The total food expenditure figures include the imputed
value of food out of home production. The average household per capita monthly
consumption expenditure is MK 148. The average monthly expenditures for nonfood
items are very low when compared with the corresponding values for food expendi-
tures. Eighty-eight percent of consumption expenditure is, on average, for food, a
clear reflection of the extreme poverty of many rural households in Malawi. Food as
an average share of total cash expenditure in the survey areas is 70 percent. The av-
erage per capita daily intake in the sample is 2,199 kilocalories, which is almost the
same as the 2,200 kilocalories per person per day recommended for Malawi (United
Nations and Government of Malawi 1993). Daily calorie intake is noticeably lower
for female-headed households than for male-headed ones.
Table 16 also shows that households who are members of formal credit programs
have higher gross consumption expenditures compared with nonparticipants (MK
695 versus MK 568) but lower average per capita consumption expenditures (MK 136
versus MK 160), a finding that may be explained by the lower per capita expenditure
levels of MRFC, MUSCCO, and PMERW1 member households relative to those of
nonparticipants. In contrast, participants in PMERW2 and MMF have significantly
higher average per capita consumption expenditures despite having relatively larger
household sizes. The past participants have the lowest average per capita total ex-
penditure (MK 107). However, their average per capita daily caloric intake is essen-
tially the same as that of participants (1,895 kilocalories). At 2,336 kilocalories, the
average per capita daily caloric intake of households who never participated in any
credit program is higher than that of participants in any of the credit programs, in-
cluding those in PMERW2, whose value of 2,077 kilocalories is second only to that
of MUSCCO participants (2,145 kilocalories). These findings indicate that some of
the participants may not be spending their increased income on food, or that, if they
are, they are spending it on luxurious foods with relatively lower calorie content.
Household Nutritional Status
The prevalence of malnutrition among households’preschoolers is presented at the
bottom of Table 16. The Z-score deviations from the median of the World Health Or-
ganization population reference for height-for-age and weight-for-age are used to
measure malnutrition. Height-for-age is a measure of chronic malnutrition (stunt-
ing), while weight-for-age is a measure of acute or short-term malnutrition.
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chronically malnourished. This is close to the 48.6 percent of stunted children under
five years of age found in the 1992 Demographic and Health Survey (United Nations
and Government of Malawi 1993). As measured by weight-for-age, 14 percent of
preschoolers are acutely malnourished. Preschoolers from male-headed households
seem to be more likely to be chronically malnourished than those from female-
headed households (46 percent versus 37 percent).
Table 16 also shows that preschoolers in households who never participated in a
credit program have the lowest prevalence of chronic and acute malnutrition (37 per-
cent and 11 percent compared with averages of 47 percent and 17 percent for all par-
ticipants, respectively). Past participants have the highest prevalence of both chronic
and acute malnutrition (60 percent and 20 percent, respectively). The fact that par-
ticipants in formal credit programs have a significantly higher prevalence of chronic
malnutrition than households who never participated is probably due to self-selec-
tion. Indeed, chronic malnutrition or stunting, as measured by low height-for-age, is
more than anything else a reflection of the effects of cumulative past nutritional de-
ficiencies that could have mostly occurred before the households joined the programs
(most current participants joined only within the past three years). Among partici-
pants, MMF members have the lowest prevalence of chronic malnutrition (41 per-
cent) while PMERW1 ones have the highest (54 percent). MMF participants also
have the lowest prevalence of acute malnutrition, along with PMERW2 participants
(13 percent).
A notable and surprising finding from Table 16 is that households that grow to-
bacco appear to be more food insecure despite having significantly higher average
per capita annual total income (MK 1,254 compared with MK 723; Table 15). In-
deed, they have significantly lower average 1995 per capita daily caloric intake
(1,769 kilocalories) compared with nontobacco households (2,235 kilocalories).
They also have a higher prevalence of both chronic and acute malnutrition (68 per-
cent and 15 percent compared with 40 percent and 14 percent, respectively). One
may think that this is because income from tobacco is likely to be controlled by
males, who may spend most of it on things not related to household food security.
This hypothesis appears to be confirmed by the significantly lower average per capita
food expenditure in tobacco households compared with nontobacco ones (MK 95
versus MK 131). However, the average monthly nonfood expenditure of tobacco
households is significantly lower than that of nontobacco ones in both per capita and
total terms (MK 12 versus MK 21 and MK 60 versus MK 73, respectively). Fur-
thermore, the total household food expenditure is higher in tobacco households (MK
568) than in nontobacco ones (MK 505). The total monthly maize consumption is
also higher (65 kilograms versus 53 kilograms), although there is practically no dif-
ference between the two types of households in per capita terms (12 kilograms ver-
sus 13 kilograms, respectively).
The most plausible explanation for the food insecurity and malnutrition of to-
bacco households seems to be a combination of lager than average household sizes
because of the labor-intensive nature of tobacco growing and the high relative cost
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All households Current program members
Male- Female- Tobacco Nontobacco Past Never been
All headed headed farmers farmers MRFC MMF MUSCCO PMERW1 PMERW2 Other All members members
Total expenditure (MK)a
Gross 582 597 552 629 579 616 743 643 773 1,115 1,047 695 543 568
Per capita 148 159 126 107 151 126 164 122 131 175 216 136 107 160
Nonfood expenditure
(MK)
Gross 72 83 51 60 73 103 173 72 122 223 218 112 57 67
Per capita 20 24 12 12 21 23 43 13 22 36 46 23 12 21
Food expenditure
(MK)a
Gross 510 514 500 568 505 511 569 571 651 892 828 582 486 500




Gross 53 52 55 65 53 64 62 76 71 73 51 64 66 48
Per capita 13 13 13 12 13 12 13 14 12 11 11 12 13 14
Daily calories per
capita (kilocalories) 2,199 2,256 2,082 1,769 2,235 1,797 1,940 2,145 1,942 2,077 2,044 1,895 1,895 2,336Food self-sufficiency
(percent) 43 44 41 50 43 37 29 61 33 30 38 39 52 42
Maize self-sufficiency
(percent) 61 65 54 86 59 50 39 84 43 55 39 54 73 60
Food as average share
of budgeta (percent) 88 86 90 89 88 85 78 87 85 83 80 85 91 88
Food as average share
of total cash








(percent) 43 46 37 68 40 45 41 52 54 45 49 47 60 37
Weight-for-age
(percent) 14 14 14 15 14 20 13 17 19 13 5 17 20 11
Household size 5 4 5 6 4 6 6 5 7 7 5 6 6 4
Adult equivalent
population 3.5 3.6 3.5 4.3 3.5 4.8 4.3 4.3 5.7 5.8 3.9 4.8 4.3 3.5
Source: DRD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey.
a Total food expenditure includes the imputed value of food out of home production.of buying maize for consumption. Indeed, the average household and adult popula-
tion sizes of tobacco farmers are 6 and 4.3 compared with, respectively, 4 and 3.5 for
nontobacco farm households. Furthermore, the self-sufficiency indexes for both to-
tal food and maize consumption are higher in tobacco households (50 percent and
86 percent compared with 43 percent and 59 percent, respectively, for nontobacco
households). This indicates that, despite their higher per capita income, tobacco
households have greater difficulties buying enough of the additional maize they need
to satisfy their consumption requirements. These difficulties result from maize mar-
kets that are thin because of a lack of surplus maize from smallholder farmers and
an inadequate transportation infrastructure. The unreliability of the market for maize
and its consequences for the food security of tobacco farmers seem therefore to jus-
tify the reluctance of smallholder farmers to allocate more land to tobacco at the ex-
pense of maize crops, despite its much higher gross margin per hectare.
Summary of Results from Tabular Analysis
To conclude this tabular analysis of the data and set the stage for the econometric
analysis, we summarize the main findings.
Household asset ownership, especially land, is positively correlated with partic-
ipation in credit programs, even though two of the programs (MMF and PMERW1)
target poorer segments of the population. As the coverage of all microfinance insti-
tutions in the rural areas is quite low, the vast majority of rural households have no
access to formal credit. The informal credit market appears very inactive compared
with empirical evidence from other countries. Furthermore, borrowers tend to ex-
haust their formal credit lines more often than their informal ones, although the for-
mer are significantly higher. This finding suggests that the two forms of credit are
imperfect substitutes since informal credit almost never carries any interest rate and
appears to be the cheaper source of capital, if one ignores for the moment the possi-
bility of nonpecuniary costs associated with the exchange of informal credit.
The descriptive analysis suggests that participation in nonagricultural and agri-
cultural credit programs alike induces growers to plant a higher share of hybrid maize
and tobacco, and to use seed, fertilizer, and pesticides more intensively, leading to
higher yields for all crops. However, the higher agricultural productivity in partici-
pating households does not necessarily increase their gross margins and net crop in-
come per hectare on average for all crops, and certainly not for hybrid maize in par-
ticular. This finding questions the optimality of the in-kind input package for hybrid
maize as it is provided by MRFC, MUSCO, and MMF.
We do not detect any positive association between participation in credit pro-
grams and either household food security or household nutritional status. On the con-
trary, households who never participated in any formal credit program are revealed
to be more food secure and less chronically and acutely malnourished. However, the
evidence on the malnutrition side may be the result of self-selection and does not
preclude the possibility that participation in formal credit programs has a positive
60nutritional impact by improving the short-term nutritional status of households with
chronically malnourished children.
In conclusion, from the tabular analysis we obtain mixed results regarding the as-
sociation of improved access to credit and household welfare outcomes. Moreover,
even obvious patterns of descriptive analysis would not yield a sufficient answer, for
these patterns could be driven by socioeconomic characteristics of households other
than membership in a credit program. The econometric analysis in the next chapter
should enable a more definitive assessment of the relationship between access to
credit and household welfare in Malawi.
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Econometric Analysis of the Impact of
Access to Credit on Household Welfare
T
he question of how access to credit or its improvement translates into change in
such household outcomes as agricultural output, income, and food security is
central in many decisions regarding government- and NGO-supported credit pro-
grams. The standard practice in previous studies on the impact of access to formal
credit has been to take the estimated marginal effects of either the amount of credit re-
ceived or membership in a credit program as measures of the impact of access to credit
on various household welfare outcomes. The shortcomings of this standard practice
have been discussed elsewhere (see, for example, David and Meyer 1980; Feder et al.
1990; Zeller et al. 1996; Diagne 1999; Diagne, Zeller, and Sharma 2000). The short-
comings arise because of the fungibility and substitutability of credit from different
sources and the endogeneity of credit demand and membership in credit programs.
The policy usefulness of using the credit-received variable to assess the impact
of access to formal credit is limited unless one assumes that (1) all households in the
program were credit constrained when they were receiving credit, (2) the program is
their only source of credit, and (3) they cannot use own resources to finance their in-
vestments even partially (Feder et al. 1990). However, most households have access
to some form of informal credit and use various savings options to transfer resources
across time. Furthermore, the different sources of credit and ways of financing in-
vestments are likely to be substitutable to some degree. Therefore the amount of for-
mal credit they are demanding, when it becomes available, is likely to reflect (at least
partially) substitution away from the other sources of investment funds. These sub-
stitution effects alone make it inappropriate to identify the impact of access to for-
mal credit with effects due to changes in formal loan size, even if the endogeneity of
the latter has been appropriately dealt with.
There are two other reasons why it is inappropriate to use the amount borrowed
to assess the impact of access to formal credit:
1. Some households may have access to sufficient credit lines from a program
but may have decided not to borrow because it was not optimal for them to
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households may still have a positive effect on their household outcomes (by
allowing them not to engage in unproductive precautionary savings, for ex-
ample), which would not be accounted for.
2. Some households may have received large amounts of credit with little or no
marginal impact on their household outcomes because, at that level of credit
use, the marginal impact of additional credit received may be negligible. But
this negligible impact does not account for the positive effects of the
“shields” and flexibility provided by the sufficient credit lines that allowed
them to make optimal borrowing choices.
The same criticism applies to the common practice of identifying the effects of
membership in a credit program on household welfare outcomes as the impact of ac-
cess to formal credit on those welfare outcomes. The wider literature on program
evaluation demonstrates that if the survey design, sample selection, and economet-
ric analysis are appropriately carried out to resolve the problem of endogeneity of
membership status and credit program placement, then the estimated partial effects
of the membership status variable should correctly measure the average impacts of
the program on the welfare outcomes (see, for example, Moffit 1991; Heckman and
Smith 1995; Morduch 1997; Pitt and Khandker 1998). In fact, most of the recent lit-
erature on the difficulties of measuring the impacts of credit programs follows the
program evaluation literature and concentrates on the statistical problems related to
survey design, sample selection, and endogeneity of program placement. But the
studies that emphasize the statistical problems that complicate the identification of
program impacts usually neglect the substitution and fungibility issues that are to
some extent specific to credit programs.
The program impacts measured through the membership status variable, how-
ever, do not measure the impacts of access to formal credit on the same welfare out-
comes, and they may not even correlate with access to formal credit. There are at
least two reasons why this is so:
1. Most microcredit programs provide an array of additional services besides
credit (literacy classes, business training, family planning education, and so
forth). Therefore, for these programs the measured “program impacts” on
the welfare outcomes include the impacts due to change in behavior as a re-
sult of these educational services (Pitt and Khandker 1998).
2. Membership in a credit program does not guarantee access to its credit, es-
pecially when it is most needed. In fact, many group-based microcredit pro-
grams (including two of the five studied in the report) stipulate explicitly that
at any point in time only half of the group members can have access to their
credit.18 Even in microcredit programs that do not have this rule, but oper-
ate within ad hoc or continuously evolving institutional arrangements (es-
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18 This is an incentive repayment device aimed at inducing the half that are not receiving loans to put pressure on
the recipients to repay their loans. The nonrecipients will be able to borrow only once all recipients have fully re-
paid their loans, implying that nonrecipients will be waiting indefinitely in case of default.pecially those that depend on short-term donor funding), members’ access
to credit is most of the time uncertain.19
In summary, because both the partial effects of credit received and membership
status do not necessarily correlate with the benefit derived from gaining access to
formal credit, they cannot be taken as measures of the effect of access to formal credit
on household welfare outcomes. Therefore, to assess satisfactorily the impact of ac-
cess to credit, the analysis departs from the standard practice and makes the distinc-
tion between access to credit(formal or informal) and participation(in formal credit
programs or in the informal credit market). A household has access to a particular
source of credit if it is able to borrow from that source, although for some reasons it
may choose not to. The extent of access to credit from a given source is measured by
the maximum amount a household can borrow (its credit limit or credit line) from
that source. A household is participating if it is borrowing from a source of credit.
The distinction between access and participation is also important because a house-
hold may benefit from mere access to credit even if it does not borrow. Indeed, with
the option of borrowing, it can do away with risk-reducing but inefficient income di-
versification strategies (Eswaran and Kotwal 1990) and precautionary savings with
negative returns (Deaton 1991).
Since within this framework access to credit and its improvement are identified
respectively with a strictly positive and increasing credit limit, measuring the impact
of access to credit reduces to measuring the effects of an increase in the credit limit
on household behavioral and welfare outcomes. The marginal effects of the credit
limit variable for formal credit on household welfare outcomes, controlling for the
credit limit from informal sources as well as the credit demanded from both sources,
measure the marginal impacts of access to formal credit. Furthermore, by control-
ling for both the level of access to credit and the amount of credit demanded from
formal and informal sources, the changes in the welfare outcomes due to changes in
the formal credit limit variables can be separated from the ones due to the substitu-
tion effects that arise when formal and informal credit are substitutable to some de-
gree. Similarly, the direct effect of access to credit (that is, the effect arising from
merely having access to formal credit) is separated from the indirect effect that arises
when households exercise their options to borrow.
The Contract-Theoretic Framework of the Credit Market
Because the credit limit is the central concept in our methodology for quantifying
the extent of household access to credit and the impacts that access has on its wel-
fare outcomes, a model of loan transaction focusing explicitly on the concept is pre-
sented. The model follows the contract-theoretic view of loan transaction (see, for
example, Freixas and Rochet 1997). We restrict ourselves to heuristic arguments be-
cause a complete and rigorous mathematical presentation and analysis are beyond
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19 As an example, members of one of the microcredit programs studied here, MMF, could not borrow from their or-
ganization for several months during 1995 because it was being incorporated into MRFC (see Chapter 3).the scope of this report. Essentially the lender chooses the credit limit and the amount
he wants to be repaid. The borrower then chooses the amount to be borrowed within
the range set by the lender. The borrower also chooses ex post (that is, once the loan
has been disbursed) whether and when to pay back the loan.
More precisely the lender chooses the pair (bmax, Rl(.)), where bmax is the maxi-
mum amount he is willing to lend and Rl is a repayment function Rl: [0, bmax] → 
that specifies how much, when, and under what conditions he wants to be repaid for
any given loan size b∈ [0, bmax].20The lender then lets the potential borrower choose
the optimal amount b* ∈ [0, bmax] he wants to borrow. In other words, the lender of-
fers the contract (bmax, Rl(.)) to the borrower, who accepts or rejects it by his choice
of b* ∈ [0, bmax]. The contract is accepted if b* is strictly positive and rejected if
b* = 0.21 Once the loan has been disbursed, the borrower chooses the timing and
amount(s) of the actual repayment(s) Rb. Default occurs when 0 ≤ Rb <  Rl(b*).22 Of
course, in his choice of bmax the lender is constrained himself by the maximum
amount he is able to lend to any borrower, b a
max.23
We note that because of the possibility of default and the lack of effective con-
tract enforcement mechanisms, lenders have incentives to restrict the supply of credit
even if they have more than enough to meet a given demand and the borrower is will-
ing to pay a high enough interest rate (Avery 1981; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). There-
fore from the borrower's point of view the relevant limit on supply is not the maxi-
mum the lender is able to lend, b a
max, but rather the maximum the lender is willing to
lend, bmax.24 This maximum amount the lender is willing to lend is the borrower's
credit limit and is the focus of our methodology for quantifying the extent of house-
hold access to credit and its impact.
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20 Owing to fixed transaction costs, lenders in the formal and semiformal credit markets also have minimum loan
sizes. That is, the amount to be borrowed is restricted to within an interval of the form [bmin, bmax] with bmin > 0.
Extension to this case is straightforward and there is no loss of generality in using 0 as a lower bound for loan sizes.
21 We have abstracted from issues regarding collateral in order to simplify the exposition. One specification for Rl
is the linear repayment function: Rl(b) = (1 + r)b, where r is the interest rate endogenously chosen by the lender. A
more general specification for Rl that allows state-contingent repayment of loans is Rl(b,ω ) = (1 + r)b + η (ω ), where
ω is an element of the set of possible states of nature, Ω , and η : Ω→  is an exogenous real-valued random vari-
able. State-contingent repayment of loans is also a very important feature of the informal credit market as docu-
mented by Udry (1995b).
22 Note that this is only a sufficient condition for breaching the terms of the contract. Even if Rb = Rl(b*), breach
of contract may still have occurred if the timing of the repayment (possibly in partial amounts) does not correspond
to what was specified in the contract. To simplify the notation we did not include the timing issues in the specifica-
tion of the repayment function Rl(.).
23 Some may argue that in reality it is the borrower who first asks for the loan. Then the lender, after having received
the loan application, decides whether to grant the amount asked or offer a lesser amount. Furthermore, one can ar-
gue that a loan transaction often involves some bargaining. However, the sequence in which the loan transaction is
initiated and whether or not bargaining is involved in the loan transaction are details that are not important for the
characterization of the outcome of the loan transaction. What is important is that at the end it is the lender who of-
fers a contract to the borrower who, according to his free will, decides to accept or reject the contract.
24 The wedge between the maximum a lender is willing to lend to a given borrower and the maximum he is able to
lend (that is, the difference ba
max −  bmax) represents the extent of the credit rationing that arises because of informa-
tion asymmetry and contract enforcement problems.Of course the lender's optimal choice of credit limit bmax, which is interpreted
here as the supply of credit, is a function of the maximum he is able to lend, b a
max.25
It is also a function of the lender's subjective assessment of the likelihood of default
and of other borrowers' characteristics. However, this function is not a supply-for-
credit function in the traditional sense of the term; under the assumption of price-
taking behavior, the supply-for-credit function represents the schedule of what the
lender is willing to lend as the market interest rate varies. This traditional supply
function for credit is not defined in this context, in which the lender himself chooses
the interest rate. Similarly, the optimal interest rate r chosen by the lender is a func-
tion of b a
max, the lender's subjective assessment of the likelihood of default, and of
other borrowers' characteristics. The reader is referred to Avery (1981) and Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981), respectively, for an empirical and a formal analysis of how the
lender's assessment of the likelihood of default affects the optimal choice of both
bmax and r.26 On the other hand, the function defining the borrower's optimal choice
of loan size b* is a demand-for-credit function in the traditional sense of the term
(that is, the schedule of what the borrower is willing to borrow when the interest rate
varies). The fact that b* is a function of bmax in addition to being a function of the
interest rate is merely a reflection of the borrowing constraint and of imperfect in-
formation. However, because of imperfections in the enforcement of the loan con-
tract and the resulting adverse selection, the demand for credit need not be a
downward-sloping function of the interest rate. Hence, as pointed out by Stiglitz and
Weiss, lenders cannot use the interest rate as a way of rationing credit.
Observability of the Credit Limit and Expectations of Borrowers
The foregoing observations suggest that the credit limit a borrower faces depends on
both the lender’s and the borrower’s characteristics and actions. But it also depends
on random events that affect the fortune of lenders and other potential borrowers
(who may compete with the borrower for the same possible credit). For example, one
can expect the occurrence of drought in a rural agriculture-based economy to reduce
the supply of informal credit while also increasing the number of people looking for
loans. Hence the credit limit facing a potential borrower is a random variable whose
value is determined by a number of events, some under the borrower’s control, oth-
ers under the lender’s control, and still others outside the control of both.
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25 For simplicity we are abstracting from issues related to how ba
max for formal loans is determined by conditions in
the market for on-lending funds (the possibility of raising capital from savers and/or the central bank, the determi-
nation of interest paid on savings, regulations of the central bank, and so forth).
26 Within the framework of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the optimal interest rate r (r ˆ* in their notation) is the interest
rate that maximizes the lender's expected return from lending to a borrower, taking into account the possibility of
default. It is this expected return that determines bmax (for a given level of ba
max). Avery (1981) also uses the same
expected return concept to justify the existence of credit limits for borrowers. His arguments and his econometric
specification of the determinants of borrowers' credit limits were based mostly on interviews with loan officers in
New Jersey.The fact that bmax depends on random events also implies that its realized value
at the times when borrowing actually takes place cannot be known exactly in advance
by either the lender or the borrower. The fact that it cannot be known in advance by
the borrower is clear since it will ultimately be the result of the lender’s choice (al-
though the borrower can influence that choice to some extent). The borrower can
only form expectations about the likely value of bmax at the time of actual borrow-
ing. But formal lenders usually provide enough information about their loan policy
(eligibility criteria, types of projects funded, collateral and down payment require-
ments, and so forth) to enable potential borrowers to form reasonably accurate ex-
pectations about their bmax from each source of formal credit. In the cases of NGO-
and government-supported credit programs, they usually even set and announce
fixed credit limits for all potential borrowers.
Furthermore, at the time of borrowing it is only the lender who observes the re-
alized value of bmax (which he himself determines), and he may or may not have the
opportunity to reveal it to the borrower. For example, if the borrower’s realized op-
timal choice of loan size is strictly positive but strictly less than the realized value of
bmax, then the lender may never have the chance to tell the borrower his actual real-
ized choice of bmax. Clearly, if at a particular time a borrower does not ask for a loan
from a given source of credit, he will never learn, even in retrospect, about his real-
ized bmax from that source of credit at that time (there may be exceptions in the cases
of NGO- and government-supported credit programs that set and announce fixed
credit limits for all potential borrowers). However, the potential borrower will always
have expectations as to what would have been the likely value of bmax at that time.
In fact it is precisely the borrower’s prior expectations about the likely value of bmax
and its variability that influence his behavior and make him decide whether or not to
seek a loan from that particular source of credit. For example, in the direct method
of detecting credit constraint used by Feder et al. (1990), Jappelli (1990), and Zeller
(1994), the classification of borrowers usually includes a class of “discouraged bor-
rowers.” These discouraged borrowers did not seek any loan because either they ex-
pected to face a zero or very low bmax or they expected a relatively high cost (in-
cluding transaction costs) for getting loans. The discouraged borrowers may have
been wrong in their expectations and could perhaps obtain worthwhile loans at rea-
sonable costs. But, whether they are wrong or right, in the end it is those expecta-
tions about their bmax that have determined their behavior, not the realized values of
their bmax that will remain unknown to them. Even when a borrower seeks a loan
from a given source of credit, the realized value of the optimal loan size is largely
determined by his expectations about his bmax (especially if he has reasonably ac-
curate information that allows him to predict well the location of bmax).
The arguments in the previous paragraphs imply that in the analysis of the de-
mand for credit the borrower’s expectations about bmax are more important than the
realized values of bmax in determining the amounts of credit actually demanded.
However, from a policy point of view, what might be of interest is not the borrower’s
response to change in his expectations about bmax but his response to change in bmax
itself, since it is the variable under the lender’s control and which determines access
67to credit. It is the borrower’s expected bmax from different sources of credit that is
used in our analysis because the survey did not collect the realized values of bmax,
which only lenders could provide with reasonable accuracy. The survey was focused
on the demand side of the credit market, and for a relatively large survey it is not fea-
sible to interview the lender for each loan transaction. Moreover, borrowers may not
be willing to identify their informal lenders or may refuse to be interviewed if they
know that the latter are going to be interviewed as well. However, with an econo-
metric analysis it is possible to estimate and evaluate the impact of bmax on b* and
other household choice or outcome variables based solely on expected bmax. For this
to be possible it is necessary to assume that the realized b* and other household
choice or outcome variables depend only on expected bmax and not on higher mo-
ments of bmaxand its realized value. This restriction is plausible if bmaxdoes not vary
much (so that its variance and higher centered moments are close to zero) and the
borrower has reliable information that allows him to predict the location of bmaxwith
reasonable accuracy (so that the realized value of bmax will have little influence on
realized optimal choices). Under this restriction, the assessment of the impacts of
bmax on household choice and outcome variables is the same as that of the impacts
of expected bmax because of the linear property of the mathematical expectation op-
erator that, as usual, is identified with the borrower’s expectation process.27
Specification of the Econometric Model
Following the methodology described previously, the impacts of access to formal
credit on household welfare outcomes are estimated using an econometric model of
the determination of (1) the household’s credit limits from formal and informal
sources of credit, (2) the household’s demand for formal and informal credits, and
(3) the household’s welfare outcomes of interest. The report focuses on three house-
hold welfare outcomes: income, food security, and nutritional status of children. Im-
provement of one or more of these outcomes is often the stated objective of micro-
credit programs. Food security is measured by daily calorie and protein intake, and
the nutritional status of children is measured by their height-for-age and weight-for-
age Z-scores. The determinants of farm and nonfarm incomes and of food expendi-
tures are also estimated as part of the econometric model.
The equations for the credit limits, demands for credit, and income postulated be-
low can be rationalized by a household utility maximization model in which the con-
tractual relationships between the household and its lenders and the (imperfect) sub-
stitutability between formal and informal credit are explicitly recognized. The
equations for the determination of calorie intake, protein intake, and nutritional sta-
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27 One can avoid making this restrictive assumption by using identification methods based on covariance restric-
tions to deal with the problem of unobserved bmax (Chamberlain and Griliches 1975; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1994,
1995). This more elaborate econometric method for dealing with the problem of an unobserved variable, as in this
situation, is not pursued here because of the already complicated estimation procedure implied by our sampling pro-
cedure and the model presented subsequently.tus can be then deduced by extending the basic household utility maximization model
into a Becker-type household production framework (see, for example, Alderman
and Garcia 1994; Pitt and Khandker 1998). However, the lender-borrower contrac-
tual relationship described previously must be modeled within a dynamic framework
that accounts for asymmetry of information in order for the expectation issues dis-
cussed earlier to be relevant and for the credit demand equations derived from the
model to depend explicitly on the credit limits as specified subsequently. As already
explained, a rigorous formal presentation and mathematical analysis of such a model
is beyond the scope of this report. The formal and informal lenders’optimal choices
for the credit limit and the borrower’s optimal demanded credit derived from such a



















max, bF, and bI are the credit limits and amounts borrowed for formal
and informal credits, respectively, and fF,fI,g F, and fI are real-valued functions. The
xis i =  1 ,  2 ,...,  4  represent for each i a vector of household demographics and as-
sets, community characteristics, and prices. The zF and zIs are vectors of formal and
informal lender characteristics, and rFand rIare the interest rates charged by the for-











are the optimal amounts borrowed in the formal and informal credit markets when
the borrower’s respective credit constraints are ex post not binding. Note also that,
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28 Note that, because the credit limit is viewed as a random variable, the dependence of the functions in (3) and (4)
on the expected credit limits is implicit. In other words, the optimal choice b*(ω ) ≡ g(.,bmax,ω ) is a function of the
random variable bmax, not of its possible realized value bmax(ω ). This allows the borrower’s optimal credit demand
to be determined not only by the realized value bmax(ω ) at time of borrowing (which he may not know) but also by
his expectations about the likely value of bmax and its variability, formed well in advance of the time of borrowing.
But, as previously explained, what we end up estimating are equations of the form b*(ω )  ≡ g(.,bmax,ω ) ≡
g ˜(.,Ebmax,ω ), where E is the expectation operator. For ease of notation and simplicity, we will continue to use in the
econometric analysis bmax instead of Ebmax and still refer to it as the credit limit. The assumption made previously
provides another justification for this practice. However, the theoretical explanations regarding borrower behavior
still refer to bmax viewed as a random variable.unless perfect information is assumed, these optimal ex post credit demands, which
are sometimes called “latent” credit demands, depend explicitly on the two credit
limits.29 Indeed, as explained previously, the credit limit facing a potential borrower
is a random variable. Therefore, the borrowing constraint is a stochastic constraint
that depends on the prevailing state of nature. This implies that whether and where
the credit constraint will bind cannot be known for certain in advance. Thus forward-
looking households may anticipate possible binding of their credit constraints and
take precautionary measures (saving and income diversification, for example) to en-
sure that their consumption and/or production plans will not suffer unduly when this
occurs (Deaton 1991). The household’s expected credit limits dictate the nature and
magnitude of the precautionary measures taken in anticipation of the possible bind-
ing of the credit constraints. The precautionary measures that are taken would in turn
influence the amounts households end up borrowing.30For example, in a simple two-
period decision framework in which borrowing takes place in the second period,
lower expected second-period credit limits should be associated with more precau-
tionary savings in the first period, which in turn should lead to less need for bor-
rowing.31
Based on the model and the foregoing arguments, we postulate without loss of
generality the following linear functions to facilitate the remainder of the discussion.
The equations estimated in the econometric analysis are, however, nonlinear:
bF
max =α 1x1 + β F
1z1
F +ε F, (5)
bI
max =α 2x2 + β I
1z1
I +ε I, (6)




α 3x3 + β 2
Fz2




max + uF, (7)




α 4x4 + β 2
Iz2




max + uI, (8)
y =α 5x5+β yzy
F + γ F
ybF
max + γ I
ybI
max + π FbF +π IbI + v, (9)
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29 A reviewer suggested that we might have called these credit demands constrained latent demands because they
are constrained by the asymmetry of information that makes them dependent on the future credit limits.
30 The discussion in the previous section regarding the behavior of discouraged borrowers suggests that the actual
amount borrowed b should in fact be given by a function of the form b ≡ min{bmax,b*} if Ebmax > k(bmax,r,x,z) ≥ 0
and b ≡ 0 otherwise. Here k is a real-valued function of its arguments that defines a threshold value for the expected
credit limit below which the household will not seek a loan (that is, b = 0) even if it has a positive latent credit de-
mand and might have obtained a loan if it had sought one (that is, b* > 0 and bmax(ω ) > 0 for some ω ).
31 As pointed out by one reviewer, one could imagine situations in which more borrowing can take place in the firstwhere y is a generic household welfare outcome variable and x5 is a vector of house-
hold demographics and assets, community characteristics, and prices; and r is the
(transaction cost-adjusted) formal interest rate.32 The α s, β s, γ s, δ s, and π s are the
parameters to be estimated, and ε , u, and v are error terms.
Equations (5)–(9) constitute a recursive system of simultaneous equations. The
necessary identifying restrictions and choice of instruments for each equation are dis-
cussed subsequently. Using equations (9), (7), and (8), one can obtain the total mar-
ginal effect of access to formal credit on any household welfare outcome, y, and its
different components (direct effect, substitution effect, and indirect effect through
borrowing):




y +π Fγ F
1 +π Iγ F
2 if b*F < bF





y +π F+π Iγ F
2 if b*F ≥ bF
max and b*I < bI
max. (10)
=γ F
y +π Fγ F
1 +π I if b*F < bF
max and b*I > bI
max
=γ F
y +π F +π I if b*F ≥ bF
max and b*I > bI
max
As can be seen from equation (10), γ F
y measures the direct marginal effect on y
of merely having access to formal credit. It is important to note that γ F
y can be dif-
ferent from zero for households whose credit constraints are not ex post binding.33
Having a positive bmaxis like having insurance against a binding liquidity constraint.
The effects of this insurance should apply to both ex post constrained and uncon-
strained households.
It is hypothesized that this direct effect is positive for most welfare outcomes be-
cause, as argued previously, the option to borrow, even if not exercised, should re-
duce the household’s (low- or negative-return) precautionary savings and needs for
risk-reducing but inefficient income diversification strategies. However, gaining and
maintaining access to a source of credit is rarely free of cost, as potential borrowers
are often involved in gift-giving or bribing, or are required by group-based lending
programs to attend regular and time-consuming meetings just to be eligible. There-
fore, if these costs outweigh the direct benefits γ F
y may end up being negative.
71
period in anticipation of an expected tighter second-period credit limit. First-period borrowing can also be lower if
the return to savings is raised as a result of an expected tighter second-period credit limit. Only a fully worked-out
mathematical model can clarify the exact relationship between the credit limit and borrowing in different periods.
What we are trying to stress here is that the amount borrowed in a given period (possibly zero) depends on prior ex-
pectations about the credit limit faced in that period (even if the borrower ends up not knowing the realized value of
that credit limit).
32 The interest rate for informal credit is not included in the model because 97 percent of recorded informal loans
did not carry any interest rate.
33 Note that equations (3)–(5) apply to both ex post constrained and unconstrained households and that the estimated
coefficients will measure average marginal effects across both types of households.The product π F γ F
1 measures the marginal effect of access to formal credit on y
when the household exercises its option to borrow under an ex post nonbinding for-
mal credit constraint. The parameter π F measures the same effect, but when the for-
mal credit constraint is ex post binding. Since γ F
1 is less than one, the effect is higher
in absolute value in the latter case.
Under either borrowing condition, and assuming that the loan thus obtained is
used in a productive investment, one can expect π F to be positive for most welfare
outcomes (at least in the long run). However, π F may be negative in the short run for
some welfare outcomes. For example, if the loan obtained is not enough for the in-
tended investment, then the household may reduce its consumption to make up for
the shortfall. This can lead to a negative π F for calorie intake, for example.
The parameter π I and the product π I γ 2
F measure the marginal effects of access to
formal credit on y owing to substitutability between formal and informal credit un-
der ex post nonbinding and binding formal credit constraints, respectively. They are
gross substitution effects obtained without holding the household utility (or overall
welfare) constant when access to formal credit is changed. Therefore, they include
both the pure substitution effects (obtained by holding utility constant) and the in-
come or welfare effects. By definition, the pure substitution effects do not have any
(overall) welfare impact.34 But, in this reduced form specification, they cannot be
separated from the income or welfare effects.35 Therefore, these gross substitution
effects can be different from zero, but their signs in any welfare outcome equation
can be either positive or negative depending on whether informal credit and formal
credit are (gross) substitutes or complements (that is, the sign of γ 2
F) and how infor-
mal credit is related to the welfare outcome in question (that is, the sign of π I).
Equation (10) shows directly the shortcomings of the standard practice of using
the amount borrowed to measure impact. Indeed, if the amount borrowed was used
to measure the marginal impact of access to credit on y, then one would obtain π F.
This is seen to imply the restrictions that (1) γ 1
F = 1 (that is, households are always
credit constrained and would borrow the full amount of any increase in their
credit lines),36 (2) γ 2
I = 0 or π I = 0 (that is, formal and informal credit are not substi-
tutable or households do not use informal credit even if they have access to it), and (3)
γ y
F = 0 (that is, there is no benefit from merely having access to formal credit without
borrowing). Similarly, the use of the membership status variable (which is implicitly
part of zF, the vector of formal lender characteristics) to measure the impact of access
to credit on y implies the same restrictions along with the restriction that π F = 0.
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34 What is referred to here as the household overall welfare is the indirect utility or its money-metric equivalent; it
is not affected, by definition, by the pure substitution effect. Household income, although treated here as a welfare
outcome, is merely an input toward this overall household welfare and can be affected by the pure substitution ef-
fect. The other measures of household welfare used in the study (food security and nutritional status) can also be af-
fected by the pure substitution effect because they constitute only part of the overall household welfare that includes
the satisfaction derived from the consumption of nonfood commodities. However, the pure substitution effects on
these three components of overall welfare should compensate each other so as to sum to zero.
35 The two effects could be separated only if the equations were explicitly derived from a utility maximization model.
36 That is, the probability for them to face a binding credit constraint is one.Estimation of the Model under Choice-Based Sampling
If the sample were drawn randomly, given the foregoing identifying restrictions, the
system could be estimated using standard simultaneous equation estimation meth-
ods in combination with Tobit estimation methods to take care of the censoring prob-
lem in the loan demand equations (Maddala 1983; Amemiya 1985). However, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, the sample selection was carried out by stratifying along the
program membership status variable with random selection within each stratum. This
amounts to choice-based sampling because the stratifying variable is endogenous.
Under the circumstances discussed in Chapter 3, not only is choice-based sampling
more cost efficient than straight random sampling, it also (provided the appropriate
estimation methods are used) yields estimates with better statistical properties than
those obtained under straight random sampling (Cosslett 1981, 1993; Manski and
McFadden 1981; Amemiya 1985). The importance of correcting for choice-based
sampling is documented in the literature (Cosslett 1993), and our own descriptive
analysis and early regressions showed very significant differences between the cor-
rected and uncorrected results.
It is shown in the appendix that the choice-based corrected equations for the credit
limits, credit demands, and outcomes, allowing for truncated and censored depend-
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y,z2i,z(ji);θ y) i = 1, . . . , n, (13)
where K ∈ {Formal, Informal}. The G(.;θ ) are nonlinear functions that are linear in
the parameter θ with squared and cross-product terms for a limited number of vari-
ables (credit limits, amounts borrowed, and landholding); θ Kmax, θ K, and θ y are the
vectors of parameters to be estimated in the respective equations; bi
Kmax and bi
K are,
respectively, the credit limit and the amount borrowed by household i in the K sec-
tor of the credit market; y is one of the outcome variables (total income, net crop in-
come, nonfarm income, food expenditure, calorie intake, protein intake, weight-for-




_F is the interest rate
associated with bi
F;z (ji) is the vector of credit program dummy variables; zK
1vi is the
vector of characteristics of all sector Kpotentiallenders present in village viof house-
hold i; z1vi ≡ (zF
1vi,zI
1vi)37; zK
2i is a subvector of the vector of characteristics of sector
K lenders who gave loans to household i; z2i ≡ (zF
2i,zI
2i); x1i,x 2i, and xi
y are sub-
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37 We note that some of the unobserved formal lender characteristics are being absorbed into the vector of program
dummy variables z(ji), which is household and alternative specific. In other words, ji or the corresponding programvectors of household i’s vector of demographics, assets, and community character-
istics variables (including prices); and xy
ieis a subvector of the vector of outcome vari-
ables in the system excluding y (xy




jic,and wjiterms in the equations are the probability weights that
correct for the choice-based sampling and, in the case of the credit limits and the
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p(ji xi,rF,zi,z(ji);θ 1 )
Q(ji) nji wjic
K ≡  wjic
K (xi,zi,z(ji);θ 1 ) ≡  ,  and (16)
J H(j) njc
K
Σ p(j xi,rF,zi,z(j);θ 1 )
j= 1Q(j) nj
H(ji)
p(ji xi,rF,zi,z(ji);θ 1 )
Q(ji) 
wji ≡  wji(xi,zi,z(ji);θ 1 ) ≡  ,  (17)
J H(j)
Σ p(j xi,zi,z(j);θ 1 )
j= 1Q(j)
where H(j) ≡ nj/n and Q(j) ≡ Nj/N, with nj (resp Nj) being the size of the sample (resp
population) stratum defined by program j, and n and N being, respectively, the total
sample and population sizes; nK
ja/nj is the sample proportion of households in stra-





dummy variable stands for both the alternative choice of household i and the identity of the formal lender defining
stratum j, including all of its unobserved attributes (see the following discussion on identification).75
Table 17—Regressors used in equations
z(ji) = {MRFC, MMF, MUSCCO, PMERW1, PMERW2, past member}
Z1vi
F = {Number of years of operation in the area for each program (MRFC, MMF, MUSCCO,
PMERW1, and PMERW2)}
Z1vi
I = {Proportion of area male-headed households, area average household adult population size,
proportion of adult wage laborers in area, average years of schooling of adults over 17 years
of age, area average landholding size, area average value of total household assets, number
of wholesale buyers coming to village, proportion of area heads of households who
migrated from another village}
Z2i
F {Formal loan weeks of delay before receipt, no conditions on formal loans dummy
variable}
Z2i
I = {Informal loan weeks of delay before receipt, no conditions on informal loans dummy
variable, informal loans with fixed due dates dummy variable}
{xi,x i
y} = {Tobacco household status dummy variable, formal loans past default status dummy
variables, accumulated outstanding amounts of formal loans (MK), accumulated
outstanding amounts of informal loans (MK), total hectares of household land, square
of total hectares of household land, household cultivated land of total land owned, total
value of all assets owned, share of value of assets held as land, share of value of assets
in livestock, age of household head, male-headed household dummy variable, years of
schooling of head, years of schooling of spouse, adult population between 15 and 64,
dependency ratio (household size divided by population ages less than 15 or over 64),
distance from village of parents of head, southern region dummy variable, 1994/95 recall
period dummy variable, price of maize (MK/kilogram), price of cassava (MK/kilogram),
price of beans (MK/kilogram), weighted price index of vegetables (MK/kilogram),
weighted price index of meat/fish (MK/kilogram), weighted price index of drink, 1995
tobacco producer price (MK/kilogram), 1995 chemical fertilizer price (MK/kilogram),
1995 tobacco seed price (MK/kilogram), 1995 local maize seed price (MK/kilogram),
1995 hybrid maize seed price (MK/kilogram), no access to clean water dummy variable,
ownership of latrine dummy variable, distance from house to under-five clinic, number
of positive events in household, number of illnesses/accidents in household, number of
deaths in household within last three years, number of illnesses and accidents in household
in last three years, average number of weeks of sickness in household in last 12 months,
distance to home of credit officer or extension worker, distance to post office, distance to
trading center}
sample proportions of households in stratum j with binding and nonbinding sector K
credit constraints, respectively (that is, with bi
*K ≥ bi
Kmax and 0 ≤ bi
*K, < bi
Kmax,re-
spectively); p(j|xi,zi,rF,z(j);θ 1) is the conditional probability of household i choos-
ing alternative j, with xi ≡ (x1i,x2i); rF = (r1
F, ...,   rF
Jp) with rj
F being the interest rate
charged by the credit program defining strata j; and zi ≡ (z1vi,z2i). The complete list
of all the regressors in xi,x i
y, and zi is given in Table 17.Identification of the Equations in the System
The credit limit, credit demand, and outcome equations previously presented con-
stitute a recursive system of simultaneous equations with the exogenous variables
constituted by the household demographics, assets, community characteristics, and
lenders’characteristics appearing in all of the equations. Hence exclusion restrictions
on these variables are needed for the system to be identified. As already discussed,
the simultaneity of the credit limit variables (which are choice variables for lenders,
not for borrowers) results from the fact that they are likely to be correlated with un-
observable household characteristics absorbed into the error terms, u and v (the
household’s likelihood of default, for example). It is clear that any household demo-
graphics, community characteristics, and prices observed by the econometrician can
be reasonably expected to be observable by informal lenders. The same is true to
some extent for formal lenders, especially those that use group-based lending tech-
nology. In addition, these observables are likely to determine both the lenders’
choices of credit limits and the borrowers’choices of loan sizes. Therefore, as argued
by Udry (1995a), one should not expect to be able to find exclusion restrictions on
the vector xi to identify the credit demand equations. Pitt and Khandker (1998) also
argued for the same lack of plausible exclusion restrictions on xi for the purpose of
identifying the outcome equations. They noted that in principle the interest rate on
formal credit could be used as an identifying instrument for formal credit. But the
lack of variations in the interest rate charged by the credit programs precluded such
use. Therefore, they relied on a quasi-experimental sampling scheme that was de-
signed to enable them to identify the marginal impact of formal credit received on
various household welfare outcomes.
The main argument we use in this study to identify the credit demand equations
is that not all relevant lender characteristics variables enter directly into the deter-
mination of the amount borrowed. In other words, some of the lender characteristics
variables influence the amounts borrowed only through the effects they have in de-
termining the borrower’s credit limit, his decision to seek a loan, and his likelihood
of having a binding credit constraint. Therefore, in the foregoing equations we have
partitioned the full vector of lender characteristics in each sector K of the credit mar-
ket into two subvectors: zi
K ≡ (zK
1vi,zK
2i). The vector zK
2i that appears in the credit de-
mand equation is household specific and represents the relevant characteristics and
actions of sector K lenders who were engaged in loan transactions with household i
(including rejected loan applications). On the other hand, the vector zK
1vi appearing
in the credit limit equation is not household specific and represents a subset of rele-
vant lender characteristics patterning to all sector K potential lenders that are in








In our earlier analysis we used the program dummy variables z(ji) as identifying
instruments for the formal credit demand equations. But the program dummy vari-
ables play a dual role in the model. Indeed, they stand at the same time for the ob-
jects of choice for households and for the respective identities of formal lenders (and
76for a way of capturing their unobserved attributes). In fact both roles are present in
the estimation of the probability choices p(j|xi,zi,rF,z(j);θ 1), where the program
dummy variables z(j) are used as alternative-specific regressors to control for unob-
served attributes specific to each alternative and which can explain why a household
prefers one alternative over another (for the justification of such use see, for exam-
ple, Cosslett 1981, 1993; Manski and McFadden 1981).
The program dummies are also used as regressors in all the equations in the sys-
tem to control for unobserved characteristics and practices of the programs that di-
rectly influence the behavior and welfare of their respective members. Indeed, credit
programs usually provide additional educational services aimed at inducing behav-
ioral changes that are thought to directly improve household welfare outcomes.
These behavioral changes include alterations in the credit market behavior of house-
holds. For example, credit programs usually advise their members not to borrow
from money lenders or from any other source.38 However, the estimated effects of
the program dummies in these equations also reflect the effects of the programs be-
ing targeted to particular segments of the population and the effects of self-selection
of households into the programs of their choice. These three effects cannot be sepa-
rately identified because our sample households have not been allocated randomly
across the programs and they all had the choice to participate or not to participate in
a program.39 But, more importantly, the fact that the programs are objects of choice
for the households means that the program dummies are potential sources of simul-
taneity bias that should disqualify them for use as instruments. In our earlier analy-
sis we also used a subset of the household-specific lender characteristics vector zI
2i
to identify the informal credit demand equation. But, as pointed out by a reviewer,
zK
2iis also source of simultaneity bias because households choose their lenders.40Fur-
thermore, since observing zK
2i is conditional on household i having been involved in
a loan transaction, its values are missing for households who did not seek loans.41
The rationale behind the use of zK
1vi for identification is that all households living
in the same village, whether borrowing or not, face the same group of poten-
tial lenders in that village. This fact is not invalidated by the existence of three
types of households in the village: those that sought and obtained loans (that is, those
with bi * > 0 and bi
max > 0), those that sought loans but were rejected (that is,
those with bi * > 0 and bi
max = 0), and those that did not seek loans either because they
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38 Numerous studies have also reported that participants in credit programs borrow frequently from informal lenders
just to meet the inflexible repayment schedules of their organizations (see, for example, Hossain 1988 and Sinha
and Matin 1998).
39 Note that this would still be a problem if we used a random sampling scheme instead of the endogenous stratifi-
cation. Indeed, the main problem is the self-selection of households in the population into the programs of their
choice. Solving this problem would require a quasi-experimental sampling scheme including sample households
who would be eligible to participate in the programs but would not be given the choice (Pitt and Khandker 1998).
40 It is also more difficult to find exclusion restrictions within zK
2i because all of its elements may influence directly
the size of the loan sought by a borrower.
41 We set their values to zero for the nonborrowing households in our earlier analysis (all of them were in the form
of dummy variables).did not want them or were discouraged (that is, those with bi * = 0 or with low ex-
pected bi
max). It is also not invalidated by the fact that households borrow from dif-
ferent lenders and the fact that some potential lenders may not be involved in any
loan transaction. Indeed, households may face the same group of potential lenders
but end up borrowing from different lenders in that group (or not borrowing at all)
precisely because of (1) differences in their perception and appreciation of the char-
acteristics of each potential lender and (2) the actions of some potential lenders (also
determined by the characteristics of the latter).42 Hence, zK
1vi would still be a deter-
minant of the behavior of household i in sector K of the credit market even if we ex-
clude from zK
1vi the characteristics of those lenders who had loan transactions with
that household. Moreover, since zK
1vi is not affected by household i’s choice of which
potential lender to seek a loan from (which is not the case for zK
2i), it satisfies the non-
simultaneity criterion for a valid instrument.
To satisfy our exclusion restriction we include in zK
1vi only those characteristics of
potential lenders that affect the size of bi only through the credit limit bi
Kmax and
through household i’s decision to participate in sector K of the credit market (that is,
through wK
jic and wK
jinc). The formal lender characteristics included in zF
1vi are the num-
ber of years each one of the credit programs has been operating in village vi (with a
zero value for a program not operating in that village). Indeed, most credit programs
start with the same low credit limit for all borrowers. However, the credit limits of bor-
rowers who repay on time are usually increased as time goes by while defaulters are
excluded from the programs. It is only through these effects on the credit limit and the
participation decision of households (initially and subsequently) that the age of a credit
program in a village affects the amounts borrowed by households in that village.
For informal loans, we take all the adult population of the village as potential
lenders. Indeed, the community survey showed that there are very few moneylend-
ers in Malawian villages. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 3, 93 percent of the infor-
mal loan transactions recorded in the survey were between friends and relatives, with
almost all living in the same village (76 percent of cases). The characteristics of a
village adult population that we consider to be most relevant and appropriate for in-
clusion in the informal lender characteristics profile zI
1vi are the proportion of adult
wage laborers, the proportion of tobacco-growing households, the proportion of
heads of households who migrated from another village, the proportion of male-
headed households, the average household adult population size, the average years
of schooling of adults over 17 years of age, the average landholding size, and the av-
erage total value of household assets.43 To limit further the potential for simultane-
ity bias we computed n area averages for each lender characteristic with each aver-
age i excluding the corresponding values for household i.44
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42 The choice of credit limits and interest rates is a part of those actions.
43 In fact, the proportions and averages are taken across the cluster of villages (between 1 and 5) that make up what
we call an area in the geographical stratification used in the survey. The areas were constructed so as include all the
members that belonged to the same credit group.
44 In practice the differences from the averages that include the values from all households go to zero as the area
sample size increases (except for large outliers).The same exclusion restrictions on the formal and informal lender characteris-
tics variables are used to identify the outcome equations. In other words, the vil-
lage-level lender characteristic variables zF
1vi and zI
1vi are considered to affect house-
hold welfare outcomes only through the respective credit limit variables. The
vectors zF
1vi and zI
1vi are also used as instruments for the program dummy variables
in the estimations of the informal and formal credit limit equations, respectively.45
Since these restrictions alone are not enough to identify the outcome equations, we
use additional reasonable exclusion restrictions on xi, the vector of household de-
mographic, community characteristic, and price variables. Instead of discussing
here the restrictions on xiused in each outcome equation and in the credit limit equa-
tions, for details we refer the reader to the list of variables used in each equation and
to the tables of results.
Two-Step Limited Information Maximum
Likelihood Estimation of the Identified System
With each equation in the system of equations (11)–(13) identified as discussed pre-
viously, a two-stage estimation method similar to Heckman’s two-step procedure for
Tobit models is used to estimate the parameters in the system. In the first stage the
Manski-Lerman weighted maximum likelihood estimator is used to consistently es-
timate θ 1 and the conditional probability choices p(j xi,zi,rF,z(j);θ 1) that are used to
construct estimates of the probability weights wK
jia,w K
jinc,w K
jic, and wji. In the second
stage the estimated probability weights are used in (11)–(13) to estimate each re-
sulting equation using Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) methods.
The first stage of the estimation uses a four-alternative two-level nested multin-
omial logit model (see the appendix for details). However, the model allows the vec-
tor of parameters to be different across the four alternative choices (Schmidt and
Strauss 1975; Maddala 1983; Judge et al. 1985). At the first level of the nesting, the
choice is between participation and nonparticipation in a credit program. At the sec-
ond level, which is reached only if participation is the chosen alternative, the choice
is between (1) joining and remaining a member of MRFC, (2) joining and remain-
ing a member of the second program, and (3) joining either MRFC or the second pro-
gram and then dropping out of the program (that is, becoming a past member). The
classification defined by the four mutually exclusive alternative choices corresponds
exactly to the stratification used in selecting the households. In each village there are
at most two credit programs operating: MRFC and one of the other three programs
that, as the choice variable, is generically called the second program in the model.
However, the program dummy variables (MMF, MUSCCO, and PMERW) were used
as alternative-specific regressors instead of the generic label. As usual in a multi-
nomial discrete choice model, these dummy alternative-specific variables control for
unobserved attributes specific to each alternative that can explain why a household
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45 No element of the household-specific lender characteristic vectors zF
2i and zI
2i was used in our final specification
owing to identification and multicollinearity problems.prefers one alternative over another.46 In fact, for PMERW, its two sister programs
(designated here as PMERW1 and PMERW2) are differentiated by their attributes
and target groups.
Finally, the estimation procedure followed McFadden’s (1981) sequential maxi-
mum likelihood estimation for nested multinomial logit models. Because of the se-
quential nature of McFadden’s procedure, the usual maximum likelihood standard
errors are not valid. Therefore, the bootstrap method (Efron and Tibshirani 1993;
Jeong and Maddala 1993), implemented by replicating (with replacement) exactly
the sampling procedure used to select the households, was used to calculate standard
errors for all the estimated conditional probability choice parameters and the ones
for the subsequently estimated system of simultaneous equations. To account for the
possibility of the instruments being only weakly correlated with the endogenous vari-
ables, for each equation the relevant F statistics and exogeneity and overidentifica-
tion test statistics were computed following Staiger and Stock (1997).
The estimations of the probability choice model and that of the system of equa-
tions as well as the computations of the partial effects were programmed using
GAUSS. The partial effects were first calculated for each household before taking
weighted averages across all households. This is preferable to evaluating partial ef-
fects at the means because of the nonlinearities in the probability choices and the
equations in the system. If the functional dependence of a right-hand-side variable y
in the system on another continuous variable x in the system includes a functional
dependence through another dependent variable z in the system, then the partial effect
on y resulting from a marginal change in x, ∂ E(y x,.)/∂ x, includes the partial effect
from the induced change in zcalculated as (∂ E(y z,.)/∂ z)×(∂ E(z x,.)/∂ x).This induced
partial effect, which we call indirect effect in the discussion of the results, is calcu-
lated and shown separately in the tables of results before being added to the direct
effect resulting from the eventual direct dependence of y on x (that is, not through
another variable). For a dummy variable d, the partial effect for the ith household is
calculated as E(yi di=1) − E(yi di=0) (p(ji di=1) − p(ji di=0) for the program partic-
ipation probabilities), holding all the other independent variables constant at their
observed values. But, when dis one of the program dummies, the values for the other
program dummy variables are all set to zero to respect the mutual exclusivity of pro-
gram participation (otherwise some of the households would be made to belong to
more than one program).47
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46 Again see Cosslett (1981, 1993) and Manski and McFadden (1981).
47 The calculation of the partial effects, while conceptually straightforward, has not been easy to implement. Writ-
ing the GAUSS codes for its implementation has been the most time-consuming part of the estimation, owing to the
multiple levels of nesting in the model and to the need to have the program automatically make the distinction be-
tween a continuous variable and a dummy variable and do what is required for the program dummy variables. A
manual distinction between a continuous variable and a dummy variable using the variable names is not feasible be-
cause of the large number of variables involved and the numerous changes in model specification usually required
before one arrives at a final specification.CHAPTER 5
Results of the Econometric Analysis
T
he system of equations (5)–(9) was estimated using the two-stage methodology
outlined in Chapter 4. The data used in the econometric analysis are aggregated
household-level data. The credit limit and the credit demand equations are based on
four recalled periods (see Chapter 3); this is the reason that the number of observa-
tions in Table 18 is given as 1,508. The income equations are based on annual
(1994/95) data. The other equations are based on the three recalled periods defined by
the three rounds of the survey. The results of the estimation are presented in Tables
19–32. The estimates of the parameters in the system are included in the presentation
of the results but are not discussed; the discussion focuses instead on the partial mar-
ginal effects of the variables of interest that are more readily interpretable because of
the nonlinear nature of the equations. Moreover, owing to space limitations not all the
variables included in the estimation are included in the tables of results.
For each equation, the relevant F statistics and exogeneity and overidentification
test statistics are presented in the relevant table of results. We note in particular that
the F statistic for the joint significance of the formal lenders’ characteristics in the
formal credit limit equation (F5,1503 = 3.21) and that for the joint significance of the
informal lenders’characteristics in the informal credit limit equation (F5,1503= 2.72)
are both relatively low. Hence the formal and informal lenders’ characteristic vari-
ables may be sources of bias in the LIML and two-stage estimates and diagnostic test
statistics owing to their weak correlations with the credit limits (Staiger and Stock
1997). Therefore, as recommended by Staiger and Stock (1997), we use the Durbin
and Basmann tests for testing the exogeneity and overidentification restrictions, re-
spectively. As the tables show, the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the presumed en-
dogenous variables was rejected by the Durbin test in all the equations except that
for the informal credit demand. The overidentifying restrictions are also rejected by
the Basmann test in all the equations except that for the formal credit limit. Hence
the ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares (TSLS), and LIML meth-
ods are all likely to yield biased estimates in most equations. All the equations were
estimated using all three methods. But because the differences among the three
sets of results were not substantial and because of the number of equations and vari-
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Table 18—Definition and summary statistics of variables used in the model
Standard
N Minimum Maximum Mean deviation
1994/95 recall period dummy variables 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.43
1995 hybrid maize seed price (MK/kilogram) 1,508 0.70 7.00 3.88 1.36
1995 local maize seed price (MK/kilogram) 1,508 0.33 2,000.00 16.97 105.63
1995 chemical fertilizer price (MK/kilogram) 1,508 0.94 6.67 2.13 0.84
1995 tobacco producer price (MK/kilogram) 1,508 2.00 30.00 12.17 3.99
1995 tobacco seed price (MK/kilogram) 1,508 0.12 4.50 1.40 0.41
Accumulated outstanding amount of informal
loans (MK) 1,508 0.00 580.00 2.64 28.34
Accumulated outstanding amount of
formal loans (MK) 1,508 0.00 6,767.00 86.82 343.92
Adult population between 15 and 64 years
of age 1,508 0.00 8.00 2.53 1.24
Age of household head 1,508 20.00 86.00 45.82 13.76
Area average value of total household assets 1,508 82.44 838.64 269.18 181.10
Area average landholding size 1,508 1.00 2.33 1.75 0.34
Area average household adult population size 1,508 1.46 2.79 2.23 0.36
Average number of weeks of sickness in
household in the last 12 months 1,508 0.00 17.33 1.01 1.92
Average years of schooling of adults over
17 years of age 1,508 0.86 6.64 3.79 1.64
Daily wage contract dummy variable 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.29
Dependency ratio (household size divided
by population ages less than 15 or over 64) 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.22
Distance to home of credit officer or
extension worker 1,508 0.00 15.00 2.33 3.75
Distance to post office 1,508 0.00 26.00 6.64 7.70
Distance to trading center 1,508 0.00 15.00 5.04 5.16
Distance from house to under-five clinic 1,508 0.00 19.00 3.72 3.46
Distance from village of parents of
household head 1,508 0.00 700.00 30.03 94.02
Fixed work contract dummy variable 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.29
Formal loans past default status dummy
variables 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.32
Household per capita daily protein intake 1,508 6.08 751.67 79.15 57.89
Household per capita crop income in
1994/95 season (MK) 1,508 − 161.00 10,985.00 571.79 1,089.67
Household per capita total formal loans
received (MK) 1,508 0.00 9,025.00 160.56 546.13
Household per capita daily calorie
intake (kilocalories) 1,508 241.18 9,654.11 2,033.16 934.87
Household per capita informal credit
limit (MK) 1,508 0.00 5,200.00 127.14 268.24
Household per capita informal loans
received (MK) 1,508 0.00 1,000.00 13.57 60.90
Household per capita nonfarm income in




N Minimum Maximum Mean deviation
Household per capita total income in
1994/95 season (MK) 1,508 − 29.00 13,413.00 1,187.84 1,549.23
Household per capita monthly food
expenditure (MK) 1,508 0.30 23.68 3.91 2.92
Household per capita formal credit
limit (MK) 1,508 0.00 11,000.00 336.10 824.78
Index of crop risk (1–9) 1,508 5 10 7.78 1.53
Male-headed household dummy variable 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.72 0.45
MRFC program dummy variable 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.42
MMF program dummy variable 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.25
MUSCCO program dummy variable 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.26
No access to clean water dummy variable 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.49
Number of years of MRFC operation in area 1,508 1.40 14.80 7.00 4.89
Number of years of MMF operation in area 1,508 0.00 3.80 0.42 1.02
Number of years of MUSCCO operation
in area 1,508 0.00 6.50 1.52 2.29
Number of wholesale buyers coming
to village 1,508 0.00 4.00 0.98 1.22
Number of deaths in household within last
three years 1,508 0.00 2.00 0.27 0.46
Number of years of PMERW2 operation
in area 1,508 0.00 3.00 1.04 1.13
Number of illnesses and accidents in
household 1,508 0.00 4.00 0.18 0.49
Number of positive events in household 1,508 0.00 8.00 0.39 0.80
Number of years of PMERW1 operation
in area 1,508 0.00 3.90 1.71 1.77
Number of illnesses and accidents in
household in last three years 1,508 0.00 5.00 0.17 0.51
Ownership of latrine dummy variable 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.81 0.39
Past member 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.42
PMERW1 program dummy variable 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.36
PMERW2 program dummy variable 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.29
Price of beans (MK/kilogram) 1,508 3.70 25.00 8.21 2.90
Price of cassava (MK/kilogram) 1,508 0.55 6.45 2.79 1.52
Price of maize (MK/kilogram) 1,508 0.08 6.16 1.56 0.91
Proportion of area male-headed households 1,508 0.31 0.93 0.68 0.15
Proportion of area heads of household who
migrated from another village 1,508 0.03 0.62 0.23 0.15
Proportion of adult wage laborers in the area 1,508 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.05
Share of value of assets in livestock 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.20
Share of value of assets held as land 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.51 0.25
Share of household cultivated land out of
total land owned 1,508 0.00 100.00 81.35 19.02
Share of value of household productive
assets owned by spouse 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.46
(continued)ables involved, the results reported and discussed here are based only on the LIML
parameter estimates in order to save space.48
Determinants of Participation in Credit Programs
The predicted conditional probability choices are presented in Table 19, and the pa-




N Minimum Maximum Mean deviation
Share of acres of household land owned
by spouse 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.46
Southern region dummy variable 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.43
Tobacco household status dummy variable 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.39
Total hectares of household land 1,508 0.10 13.20 1.96 1.41
Total value of assets owned 1,508 130.00 79,991.00 2,172.11 4,444.17
Transaction cost–adjusted formal interest rate 1,508 0.00 2.96 0.34 0.20
Transaction cost–adjusted average interest
rate of MRFC/SACA 1,508 0.24 0.43 0.35 0.05
Transaction cost–adjusted average interest
rate of other programs 1,508 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.01
Weekly/monthly wage contract dummy
variable 1,508 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.32
Weighted price index of drink 1,508 2.08 53.60 12.39 9.52
Weighted price index of meat/fish
(MK/kilogram) 1,508 0.75 16.01 8.40 3.04
Weighted price index of vegetables
(MK/kilogram) 1,508 0.11 6.89 2.20 0.98
Weighted price index of oxen 1,508 450 3,000 1,832.27 519.53
Weighted price index of cattle 1,508 95 3,000 814.67 497.28
Weighted price index of goats 1,508 26 255 90.53 38.25
Weighted price index of chickens/ducks 1,508 5 5,106 234.40 764.16
Years of schooling of household head 1,508 0.00 12.00 4.20 3.32
Years of schooling of spouse 1,508 0.00 10.00 3.14 3.05
Note: All the data are aggregated household-level data. The credit limit and the credit demand equations are
based on four recalled periods (see Chapter 3). This is the reason for the 1,508 number of observations
shown in the table. The income equations are based on annual (1994/95) data. The other equations are
based on the three recalled periods defined by the three rounds of the survey.
48 In many cases there was no difference at all in the estimated parameters. Furthermore, there are no qualitative
differences in the interpretation of the results and conclusions derived using the LIML, OLS, or TSLS sets of esti-
mates. We also estimated all the equations using the total household amounts instead of the per capita amounts for
the credit limits and credit received by the households, as suggested by a reviewer, but we found no qualitative dif-
ferences between the two sets of estimates. The reported results are based on the per capita amounts because they
are easier to interpret.changes in the probability choices are presented in Table 20. Table 19 shows that
there is a 66 percent chance that a household will participate in a credit program.
Once a household has decided to participate, the chances are 36 percent that it will
join and stay with MRFC, 28 percent that it will join and stay with one of the other
four programs (MMF, MUSCCO, PMERW1, or PMERW2), and 36 percent that it
will join a credit program and then drop out (either voluntarily or by defaulting).
Table 20 shows the absolute partial changes in the four probability choices after
marginal changes in the independent variables. First, controlling for all other factors,
the unobserved specific program attributes picked up by the program dummies have
statistically significant influences on the average household’s decision to participate.
However, it is the ones for MRFC that have the greatest influence (11 percent ab-
solute increase in the probability of participating compared with 7 percent for
PMERW, 6 percent for MMF, and 3 percent for MUSCCO).49 Once the decision to
participate has been made, the unobserved specific program attributes have statisti-
cally significant effects on the choice of a specific program to join or to leave after
joining. Everything else being equal, MRFC’s unobserved specific attributes in-
crease the probability of joining and staying with MRFC by 27 percent in absolute
terms and reduce that of joining a second program and that of leaving MRFC by 12
percent and 15 percent in absolute terms, respectively. The corresponding figures for
the second program choice are generally lower. For example, PMERW’s attributes,
which have the strongest effects, increase the probability of joining and staying with
the second program (instead of MRFC) by 20 percent in absolute terms and reduce
(in absolute terms) that of joining MRFC by 10 percent and that of leaving the sec-
ond program by 10 percent. The opposite directions of these effects are reflections
of the mutual exclusivity of the three choices. Table 20 also shows that, at current
levels of participation, the longer presence of a program in an area does not increase
the likelihood of households joining it. On the contrary, except for the PMERW2 pro-
gram, there is a negative (though not statistically significant) correlation between the
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Table 19—Predicted conditional probability choices
Conditional probability of:
Not participating 0.34 (0.020)
Participating 0.66 (0.020)
Conditional on participating, probability of being:
A member of MRFC 0.36 (0.015)
A member of MMF, MUSCCO,
PMERW1, or PMERW2 0.28 (0.03)
A past member 0.36 (0.019)
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.
49 Note that the partial effects for the participation decision are opposite to the effect of “never been members”
status.8
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Table 20—Determinants of program participation: Parameter estimates and partial changes in probability of
participation resulting from marginal changes in selected independent variables
Partial changes in the probability
Parameter estimates
of participation (∂∂ Prob(j|x)/∂∂ x)
Second Past Never been
Independent variable ββ 0 ββ 1 ββ 2 MRFC program member member
Constant term 1.650 1.927 1.007 . . . . . . . . . . . .
(− 3.83) (1.02) (4.11) . . . . . . . . . . . .
MRFC program dummy variable 1.193 . . . . . . 0.2702 − 0.1162 − 0.1540 − 0.1089
(20.03) . . . . . . (17.82) (− 13.23) (− 17.31) (− 16.73)
MMF program dummy variable . . . 1.012 . . . − 0.0906 0.1712 − 0.0806 − 0.0606
. . . (2.90) . . . (− 4.53) (3.56) (− 2.79) (− 2.41)
MUSCCO program dummy variable . . . 0.607 . . . − 0.065 0.108 − 0.043 − 0.030
. . . (6.04) . . . (− 8.18) (6.37) (− 4.23) (− 3.96)
PMERW1 program dummy variable . . . 1.177 . . . − 0.1004 0.1953 − 0.0948 − 0.0731
. . . (21.00) . . . (− 12.37) (12.13) (− 9.24) (− 8.40)
PMERW2 program dummy variable . . . 1.181 . . . − 0.1006 0.1958 − 0.0952 − 0.0734
. . . (21.03) . . . (− 12.52) (12.29) (− 9.32) (− 8.49)
Number of years of MRFC operation in the area − 0.004 . . . . . . − 0.0007 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005
(− 0.14) . . . . . . (− 0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Number of years of MUDZI Fund operation in area . . . − 0.577 . . . 0.0390 − 0.0901 0.0512 0.0339
. . . (− 1.87) . . . (1.92) (− 1.88) (1.85) (1.86)
Number of years of MUSCCO operation in area . . . − 0.080 . . . 0.0054 − 0.0125 0.0071 0.0047
. . . (− 1.19) . . . (1.21) (− 1.18) (1.15) (1.16)
Number of years of PMERW1 operation in area . . . − 1.255 . . . 0.0848 − 0.1961 0.1113 0.0737
. . . (− 1.13) . . . (1.16) (− 1.13) (1.11) (1.12)
Number of years of PMERW2 operation in area . . . 1.092 . . . − 0.0738 0.1707 − 0.0969 − 0.0641
. . . (0.84) . . . (− 0.86) (0.84) (− 0.83) (− 0.83)
Transaction cost–adjusted average interest rate of
MRFC/SACA 0.748 . . . . . . 0.1494 − 0.0506 − 0.0989 − 0.05908
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(0.39) . . . . . . (0.40) (− 0.40) (− 0.41) (− 0.40)
Transaction cost–adjusted average interest rate of
other program . . . − 2.375 0.1605 − 0.3713 0.2108 0.1395
. . . (− 0.59) . . . (0.60) (− 0.59) (0.58) (0.59)
Total hectares of household land 0.011 − 0.005 − 0.019 0.0026 − 0.0016 − 0.0010 − 0.0066
(0.80) (− 0.74) (− 1.34) (0.93) (− 1.11) (− 0.51) (− 1.31)
Share of household cultivated land out of total
land owned 0.000 0.001 − 0.002 0.0000 0.0001 − 0.0001 − 0.0007
(0.28) (0.93) (− 1.57) (0.09) (0.70) (− 0.57) (− 1.55)
Total value of assets owned 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(− 0.43) (− 0.33) (− 1.77) (− 0.42) (0.20) (0.45) (− 1.73)
Share of value of assets held as land − 0.039 0.080 − 0.006 − 0.0132 0.0151 − 0.0019 − 0.0020
(− 0.50) (1.57) (− 0.05) (− 0.88) (1.75) (− 0.16) (− 0.05)
Share of value of assets in livestock 0.046 0.073 0.198 0.0043 0.0083 − 0.0126 0.0654
(0.35) (1.03) (1.11) (0.17) (0.63) (− 0.65) (1.11)
Age of household head − 0.001 0.001 0.000 − 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 − 0.0001
(− 0.67) (0.57) (− 0.14) (− 0.82) (0.94) (0.37) (− 0.14)
Male-headed household dummy variable 0.103 − 0.015 − 0.030 0.0214 − 0.0092 − 0.0122 − 0.0136
(2.03) (− 0.41) (− 0.47) (2.15) (− 1.39) (− 1.66) (− 0.91)
Years of schooling of household head 0.010 − 0.001 − 0.005 0.0020 − 0.0008 − 0.0012 − 0.0015
(1.16) (− 0.22) (− 0.53) (1.28) (− 1.04) (− 0.87) (− 0.52)
Years of schooling of spouse − 0.013 0.000 − 0.001 − 0.0026 0.0009 0.0017 − 0.0005
(− 1.23) (0.04) (− 0.15) (− 1.32) (0.88) (0.98) (− 0.15)
Adult population between 15 and 64 years of age − 0.049 0.021 − 0.121 − 0.0111 0.0065 0.0046 − 0.0420
(− 1.96) (1.31) (− 4.88) (− 2.34) (2.51) (1.15) (− 4.55)
Dependency ratio (household size divided by
population ages less than 15 or over 64) − 0.059 0.033 − 0.485 − 0.0141 0.0091 0.0050 − 0.1686
(− 0.61) (0.53) (− 4.19) (− 0.75) 0.93) (0.32) (− 3.99)
ρ : 0.89 (0.03)
McFadden’s pseudo R-squared: 0.57
Cragg and Uhler’s pseudo R-squared: 0.28
Note: t-Values are given in parentheses.longer presence of a program in an area and the marginal probability of participation
of households in that program. This can be explained by the fact that in each area
programs tend to reach their maximum membership sizes in their early years of
operation, with some members dropping out and few new members joining in later
years.
We can also note from Table 20 that the transaction cost–adjusted interest rates
charged by MRFC and the second program do not have statistically significant ef-
fects on the program membership decisions. But this insignificance may be due to a
lack of sufficient variation in the two transaction cost–adjusted interest rate series.
Three other important variables have statistically significant effects on program
membership decisions. Being a male-headed household increases the probability of
joining MRFC but decreases the probabilities of joining the second program and of
being a past member. This is not surprising because female-headed households are
more likely to be landless and therefore would prefer to join credit programs that
lend for nonfarm businesses rather than MRFC, which gives only seasonal agricul-
tural loans. In contrast, a higher dependency ratio or a higher adult population size
increases the probability of joining the second program and decreases the probabil-
ity of joining MRFC.
Determinants of Household Access to Formal and Informal Credit
Tables 21 and 22 present the results of the determinants of the extent of household
access to formal and informal credit as measured by household credit limits in each
market, respectively. The extent of household access to formal and informal credit
was significantly higher before October 1994. For formal credit, this result reflects
partly the longer recall period for loans before October 1994 and the fact that MRFC
only began its lending in October 1994, following the collapse of the previous state-
owned agricultural credit program. As for informal credit, the preceding crop year
(1992/93) was one with a good harvest, which may have had a positive effect on the
availability of informal credit in the 1993/94 season. As the 1993/94 season was a
drought year, the drop in the availability of informal credit following the drought, as
shown in the descriptive and econometric analysis, is plausible.
As expected, all five credit programs contribute statistically significantly to the
access to formal credit of their member households, with differences compared
with noncurrent members ranging from as low as MK 9 per capita per season for
MMF to as high as MK 155 per capita per season for MRFC. Furthermore, except
for MRFC and PMERW1, the number of years of operation of a program in an area
is positively correlated with access to credit for both participants and nonpartici-
pants. The negative correlation between the extent of the general population’s ac-
cess to credit and the length of MRFC presence in the village can be explained by
two facts:
1. MRFC is considered a continuation of the SACA program that was operat-
ing in the survey areas for more than a decade (compared with less than five
years for the other programs).
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Table 21—Formal credit limit equation: Estimated parameters and partial
effects of marginal changes in selected independent variables
Parameter estimates Partial effectsa
Independent variable (θθ Fmax)( ∂∂ E(bF Fmax|x)/∂∂ x)
Constant term 115.50 56.4
(1.71) (1.68)
MRFC program dummy variable 174.70 154.61
(5.87) (5.57)
MMF program dummy variable 8.78 9.49
(0.20) (0.23)
MUSCCO program dummy variable 68.41 65.49
(1.52) (1.55)
PMERW1 program dummy variable 71.16 69.31
(2.77) (2.81)
PMERW2 program dummy variable 154.80 149.30
(3.91) (3.90)
Past member status dummy variable − 50.16 − 24.51
(− 1.98) (− 1.98)
Number of years of MRFC operation in area − 3.75 − 1.83
(− 2.24) (− 2.23)
Number of years of MUDZI Fund operation in area 82.08 38.78
(3.72) (3.61)
Number of years of MUSCCO operation in area 6.29 2.89
(0.77) (0.73)
Number of years of PMERW1 operation in area − 84.98 − 44.41
(− 2.70) (− 2.88)
Number of years of PMERW2 operation in area 174.00 87.52
(3.04) (3.12)
Number of wholesale buyers coming to village − 40.44 − 21.37
(− 3.69) (− 3.95)
1994/95 recall period dummy variable − 16.51 − 8.07
(− 3.25) (− 3.31)
Total hectares of household land 13.13 5.06
(0.90) (1.44)
Square of total hectares of household land −0 .64 . . .
(− 0.29) . . .
Share of household cultivated land out of total land owned 1.03 0.51
(2.89) (2.90)
Total value of assets owned 0.00 0.00
(1.01) . . .
Share of value of assets held as land − 98.54 − 47.93
(− 3.43) (− 3.38)
Share of value of assets in livestock − 49.59 − 24.12
(− 1.43) (− 1.41)
Years of schooling of household head − 1.25 −0 .62
(− 0.49) (− 0.50)
Years of schooling of spouse 6.33 3.11
(2.85) (2.83)
Adult population between 15 and 64 years of age − 37.75 − 18.35
(− 5.28) (− 5.21)
(continued)90
Table 21—Continued
Parameter estimates Partial effectsa
Independent variable (θθ F Fmax)( ∂∂ E(bFmax|x)/∂∂ x)
Dependency ratio (household size divided by population − 206.50 − 100.75
ages less than 15 or over 64)
(− 5.07) (− 5.05)
Age of household head −0 .67 −0 .33
(− 1.53) (− 1.51)
Male-headed household dummy variable − 32.85 7.66
(− 2.34) (0.30)
Distance from village of parents of head 0.01 0.01
(0.21) (0.22)
Southern region dummy variable − 174.30 − 85.19
(− 2.53) (− 2.51)
R-squared: 0.29 F-statistic for formal lender characteristics: F(5,1503) = 3.21
F-statistic (all coefficients): F(35,1472) = 8.67 Wu-Hausman chi-squared statistics for exogeneity:
F-statistic for regressors used as instruments χ (7) = 7178
in other equations: F(14,1494) = 5.48 Durbin chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (7) = 7 1240
Basmann chi-squared statistics for overidentifying
restrictions: χ (39) = 23.6
Note: t-Values are given in parentheses.
a Including the effects resulting from the induced change in the program participation probability weight.
2. A large number of past SACA members are barred from obtaining MRFC
loans for refusing to repay their SACA group loans.
For PMERW1 the negative correlation can be explained by the fact that the pro-
gram operates as a revolving fund and is an entry point for its members, who are ex-
pected to graduate to the PMERW2 program if they require higher credit limits than
they are offered. Hence, if PMERW1 members who graduate to PMERW2 are fewer
than those who remain in the program or drop out, and if there are fewer new mem-
bers in subsequent years, then a negative correlation is likely between access to credit
and the number of years of operation of PMERW1 in an area.
Credit program membership is negatively correlated with access to informal
credit. This is likely to be a reflection of the self-selective nature of program partic-
ipation: households who lack access to informal credit are more likely to join credit
programs. But an increase in the number of years of operation of MMF, MUSCCO,
or PMERW1 in an area significantly increases access to informal credit in that area.
This results from the negative correlations between program participation and access
to informal credit and between the former and the length of operation of a program
in an area, as discussed earlier (Table 20). As shown in Table 22, the characteristics
of informal lenders are all significant determinants of access to informal credit ex-
cept for the proportion of area male-headed households and the area average land-91
Table 22—Informal credit limit equation: Estimated parameters and partial
effects of marginal changes in selected independent variables
Parameter estimates Partial effectsa
Independent variable (θθ Imax)( ∂∂ E(bImax|x)/∂∂ x)
Constant term 217.90 110.07
(4.28) (4.24)
MRFC program dummy variable − 21.20 − 28.03
(− 2.23) (− 3.16)
MMF program dummy variable − 80.04 − 74.93
(− 4.36) (− 4.24)
MUSCCO program dummy variable − 11.90 − 9.95
(− 0.77) (− 0.67)
PMERW1 program dummy variable − 71.68 − 66.72
(− 6.72) (− 6.54)
PMERW2 program dummy variable − 52.71 − 48.26
(− 4.12) (− 3.90)
Past member status dummy variable 29.05 14.67
(2.64) (2.65)
Number of years of MRFC operation in area . . . 0.00
. . . (0.04)
Number of years of MUDZI Fund operation in area . . . 0.65
. . . (5.62)
Number of years of MUSCCO operation in area . . . 0.09
. . . (3.76)
Number of years of PMERW1 operation in area . . . 1.42
. . . (3.38)
Number of years of PMERW2 operation in area . . . − 1.23
. . . (− 2.41)
Proportion of area heads of households who migrated from − 69.69 − 35.20
another village
(− 3.58) (− 3.55)
Proportion of area male-headed households − 7.61 − 3.84
(− 0.32) (− 0.32)
Area average household adult population size − 50.17 − 25.34
(− 3.99) (− 3.96)
Proportion of adult wage laborers in area − 239.20 − 120.81
(− 3.88) (− 3.85)
Average years of schooling of adults over 17 years of age 15.77 7.97
(4.22) (4.20)
Area average landholding size 24.78 12.51
(1.94) (1.91)
Area average value of total household assets 0.08 0.04
(3.99) (3.97)
Number of wholesale buyers coming to village 7.18 4.37
(2.15) (2.52)
1994/95 recall period dummy variable − 3.35 − 1.69
(− 1.96) (− 1.96)
Total hectares of household land − 0.92 1.82
(− 0.14) (1.29)
(continued)holding size.50 But only the average years of schooling of the adult population and
the average value of total household assets in an area have positive effects on house-
hold access to informal credit. As can be expected, a higher proportion of nonnative
heads of households in an area significantly decreases access to informal credit. The
area average household adult population size and the proportion of wage laborers in
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Table 22—Continued
Parameter estimates Partial effectsa
Independent variable (θθ Imax)( ∂∂ E(bImax|x)/∂∂ x)
Square of total hectares of household land 1.08 . . .
(1.04) . . .
Share of household cultivated land out of total land owned − 0.19 − 0.10
(− 1.39) (− 1.40)
Total value of assets owned 0.00 0.00
(0.77) (0.77)
Share of value of assets held as land − 40.94 − 20.77
(− 3.84) (− 3.83)
Age of household head − 0.20 − 0.10
(− 1.11) (− 1.11)
Male-headed household dummy variable − 14.77 − 37.12
(− 2.60) − 3.88)
Share of value of assets in livestock − 58.04 − 29.33
(− 4.18) (− 4.18)
Years of schooling of household head 1.15 0.58
(1.36) (1.35)
Years of schooling of spouse 0.39 0.20
(0.42) (0.42)
Adult population between 15 and 64 years of age − 1.13 − 0.63
(− 0.52) (− 0.58)
Dependency ratio (household size divided by − 26.66 − 13.67
population ages less than 15 or over 64)
(− 2.16) (− 2.18)
Distance from village of parents of head − 0.01 − 0.01
(− 0.39) (− 0.42)
Southern region dummy variable 33.37 16.85
(2.24) (2.22)
R-squared: 0.05 F-statistic for formal lender characteristics: F(7,1501) = 2.72
F-statistic (all coefficients): F(37,1470) = 4.71 Wu-Hausman chi-squared statistics for exogeneity:
F-statistic for regressors used as instruments χ ( 7) = 484
in other equations: F(16,1492) = 3.19 Durbin chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (7) = 2898
Basmann chi-squared statistics for overidentifying
restrictions: χ (39) = 49
Note: t-Values are given in parentheses.
a Including the effects resulting from the induced change in the program participation probability weight.
50 The area average landholding is, in fact, significant at the 10 percent level.the area population are also negatively correlated with access to informal credit.
These negative correlations imply that the supply of informal loans in an area de-
creases significantly with the number of people earning—or having the potential to
earn—income. This result seems counterintuitive unless most of the adult popula-
tion does not earn income and wage laborers are found in the poorest segment of the
areas’populations.
The landholding size and the total value of assets possessed by a household have
no significant effects on access to both formal and informal credit. But the share of
cultivable land out of total household land has a positive effect on access to formal
credit. This positive effect can be attributed to the fact that the seasonal agricultural
loans come as part of input packages corresponding to acreage. The more land a
household plants to crops, the higher its credit limit for seasonal crop loans. On the
other hand, the marginal effect of the value of land as a share of the total value of
household assets is negative and statistically significant for access to both formal and
informal credit. The share of livestock out of the total value of household assets also
has a negative and statistically significant effect on access to informal credit. Over-
all these results suggest that the composition of household assets is much more im-
portant than their overall value in determining household access to formal credit in
Malawi. In particular, except for the case of seasonal crop loans, formal lenders are
willing to lend less to households whose assets consist mostly of land and livestock,
preferring to lend to households with greater diversification in their asset portfolios
and therefore their income sources.
Among the other demographic variables that have statistically significant ef-
fects on the extent of access to credit are the number of adults in the household and
the dependency ratio, which negatively affect access to formal credit. Since the
credit limit as a dependent variable is measured in per capita terms, this result is
likely driven by the fact that credit programs usually allow only one member per
household. We may also note the number of years of schooling of the spouse, which
positively affects access to formal credit; the number of wholesale buyers coming
to the village, which positively affects access to informal credit and negatively af-
fects access to formal credit; being a male-headed household, which negatively af-
fects access to informal credit; and living in the southern region of Malawi, which
positively affects access to informal credit and negatively affects access to formal
credit.
Determinants of Demand for Formal and Informal Credit
The estimation results for the determinants of the demand for formal and informal
loans are reported in Tables 23 and 24, respectively. Table 23 shows that when the
formal credit constraint is binding the estimated average marginal propensity to bor-
row out of every additional kwacha of formal credit made available is MK 0.5. When
the formal credit constraint is not binding, the estimated average marginal propen-
sity to borrow is negative but not statistically significantly different from zero. Table
24 shows similar results for informal credit with the difference that the estimated
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Table 23—Formal credit demand equation: Estimated parameters and direct and indirect partial effects of marginal
changes in selected independent variables
Partial effectsa (∂∂ E(bF|x)/∂∂ x)
When the formal credit
constraint is not binding
Because of the Because of the
induced change induced change When the formal
Parameter in the formal in the informal credit constraint Sum of
Independent variable estimates (θθ F) Directly credit limit credit limit is binding partial effects
Constant term − 6.21 − 2.95 . . . . . . . . . − 2.95
(− 0.06) (− 0.06) . . . . . . . . . (− 0.06)
Household per capita formal credit − 0.15 − 0.06 . . . . . . 0.50 0.44
limit (MK) (− 0.59) (− 0.62) . . . . . . (34.28) (4.39)
Squared household per capita formal 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
credit limit (MK) (0.31) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita informal credit − 0.36 − 0.16 . . . . . . . . . − 0.16
limit (MK) (− 1.45) (− 1.56) . . . . . . . . . (− 1.56)
Squared household per capita informal 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
credit limit (MK) (0.56) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MRFC program dummy variable 2.20 − 0.32 − 5.25 5.05 26.14 25.62
(0.11) (− 0.03) (− 0.84) (2.77) (4.50) (3.07)
MMF program dummy variable − 55.80 − 24.89 − 0.66 5.93 5.57 − 14.04
(− 1.59) (− 1.57) (− 0.12) (3.11) (0.47) (− 0.93)9
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MUSCCO program dummy variable − 32.82 − 14.42 − 2.80 0.13 16.95 − 0.14
(− 1.11) (− 1.10) (− 1.27) (0.06) (2.81) (− 0.01)
PMERW1 program dummy variable − 45.24 − 20.16 − 3.25 5.27 21.94 3.80
(− 2.01) (− 2.03) (− 0.82) (3.68) (3.47) (0.40)
PMERW2 program dummy variable − 108.10 − 48.74 − 7.14 3.63 48.17 − 4.07
(− 2.61) (− 2.57) (− 1.02) (2.08) (3.91) (− 0.25)
Past member status dummy variable 4.26 2.03 1.34 − 3.01 − 12.14 − 11.79
(0.23) (0.23) (0.79) (− 1.65) (− 1.96) (− 1.01)
Transaction cost–adjusted formal interest rate 21.51 10.23 . . . . . . . . . 10.23
(0.72) (0.72) . . . . . . . . . (0.72)
Price of maize (MK/kilogram) 11.55 5.53 − 0.21 0.02 3.44 8.78
(1.56) (1.56) (− 0.98) (0.22) (2.56) (2.20)
1995 tobacco producer price (MK/kilogram) − 1.15 − 0.55 − 0.07 0.04 1.19 0.61
(− 0.49) (− 0.50) (− 1.00) (1.27) (1.70) (0.45)
1995 tobacco seed price (MK/kilogram) 22.42 10.67 . . . . . . . . . 10.67
(0.98) (0.96) . . . . . . . . . (0.96)
1995 chemical fertilizer price (MK/kilogram) 8.97 4.27 . . . . . . . . . 4.27
(1.25) (1.24) . . . . . . (1.24)
1995 local maize seed price (MK/kilogram) − 0.05 − 0.03 . . . . . . . . . − 0.03
(− 0.10) (− 0.10) . . . . . . . . . (− 0.10)
1995 hybrid maize seed price (MK/kilogram) − 4.34 − 2.07 . . . . . . . . . − 2.07
(− 0.95) (− 0.96) . . . . . . . . . (− 0.96)
R-squared: 0.18 Wu-Hausman chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (12) = 124
F-statistic (all coefficients): F(40,1467) = 5.46 Durbin chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (12) = 1042
F-statistic for regressors used as instruments in other equations: F(11,1497) = 5.59 Basmann chi-squared statistics for overidentifying restrictions: χ (46) = 38
Note: t-Values are given in parentheses.
a Including the effects resulting from the induced change in the program participation probability weight.9
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Table 24—Informal credit demand equation: Estimated parameters and direct and indirect partial effects of marginal
changes in selected independent variables
Partial effectsa (∂∂ E(bF|x)/∂∂ x)
When the formal credit
constraint is not binding
Because of the Because of the
induced change induced change When the informal
Parameter in the formal in the informal credit constraint Sum of
Independent variable estimates (θθ I) Directly credit limit credit limit is binding partial effects
Constant term − 7.77 − 9.97 . . . . . . . . . − 9.97
(− 0.90) (− 0.90) . . . . . . . . . (− 0.90)
Household per capita formal credit limit (MK) − 0.02 − 0.02 . . . . . . . . . − 0.02
(− 1.60) (− 1.84) . . . . . . . . . (− 1.84)
Squared household per capita formal credit 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
limit (MK) (− 0.03) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita informal credit limit (MK) − 0.10 − 0.15 . . . . . . 0.49 0.34
(− 1.35) (− 2.10) . . . . . . (30.90) (4.86)
Squared household per capita informal credit 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
limit (MK) (− 0.39) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MRFC program dummy variable 1.52 1.29 − 0.62 2.22 − 16.25 − 13.35
(0.74) (1.40) (− 2.57) (4.15) (− 6.73) (− 6.12)
MMF program dummy variable − 1.63 − 0.99 − 0.11 2.15 − 15.35 − 14.30
(− 0.57) (− 0.74) (− 0.37) (3.70) (− 5.86) (− 5.15)9
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MUSCCO program dummy variable − 2.60 − 1.31 − 0.37 0.01 0.49 − 1.19
(− 0.68) (− 0.74) (− 3.63) (0.01) (0.11) (− 0.28)
PMERW1 program dummy variable − 3.98 − 2.14 − 0.46 1.92 − 13.46 14.14
(− 1.87) (− 2.12) (− 2.47) (4.43) (− 4.81) (− 5.48)
PMERW2 program dummy variable − 4.81 − 2.53 − 1.03 1.33 − 8.80 − 11.02
(− 1.50) (− 1.68) (− 2.96) 2.69) (− 2.94) (− 3.59)
Past member status dummy variable − 0.94 − 1.20 0.41 − 4.17 7.13 2.16
(− 0.43) (− 0.42) (2.39) (− 2.57) (2.65) (0.64)
Transaction cost–adjusted formal interest rate 0.30 0.39 . . . . . . . . . 0.39
(0.07) (0.07) . . . . . . . . . (0.07)
Price of maize (MK/kilogram) − 0.46 − 0.58 − 0.22 0.05 − 0.14 − 0.89
(− 0.52) (− 0.52) (− 3.03) (0.25) (− 0.30) (− 0.77)
1995 tobacco producer price (MK/kilogram) − 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.07 0.10 − 0.27 − 0.25
(− 0.04) (− 0.04) (− 2.33) (1.30) . . . . . .
1995 tobacco seed price (MK/kilogram) − 0.69 − 0.88 . . . . . . . . . − 0.88
(− 0.58) (− 0.58) . . . . . . . . . (− 0.58)
1995 chemical fertilizer price (MK/kilogram) 0.81 1.04 . . . . . . . . . 1.04
(0.87) (0.88) . . . . . . . . . (0.88)
1995 hybrid maize seed price (MK/kilogram) 0.06 0.08 . . . . . . . . . 0.08
(0.16) (0.16) . . . . . . . . . (0.16)
R-squared: 0.43 Wu-Hausman chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (12) = 0.03
F-statistic (all coefficients): F(39,1468) = 16.686 Durbin Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (12) = 0.08
F-statistic for regressors used as instruments in other equations: F(11,1497) = 1.95 Basmann chi-squared statistics for overidentifying restrictions: χ (49) = 63
Note: t-Values are given in parentheses.
a Including the effects resulting from the induced change in the program participation probability weight.negative average propensity to borrow when the informal credit constraint is not
binding is statistically significantly different from zero. Hence when their credit con-
straints were binding households would borrow, on average, about half the amount
of any increase in their credit limits. But when they were not binding the imperfect
information about their credit limits caused decreases in their demands for credit in
response to changes in their credit limits, which are significant only for informal
credit. The significant decrease in the amount of informal loans demanded in re-
sponse to increases in the informal credit limit when the informal credit constraint is
not binding can be explained as follows. When the informal credit constraint is not
binding an increase in the informal credit limit raises its relative value for use in
smoothing consumption and thus encourages households to keep more of it available
for future, uncertain times in order to be able to better smooth consumption ex post.
The average marginal increases in the formal and informal credit demanded across
states of both binding and nonbinding credit constraint are MK 0.44 and MK 0.34,
respectively. Since these average marginal increases are statistically significantly dif-
ferent from one (and from zero), one of the restrictions implied by the practice of us-
ing loan size to measure the impact of access to credit (that is, that households are
always credit constrained and would borrow the full amount of any increase in their
credit lines) is not satisfied (see Chapter 4).
With regard to the substitutability between formal and informal sources of credit,
Table 23 shows that the availability of informal credit has a negative but not statisti-
cally significant effect on the demand for formal credit. Similarly, as can be seen in
Table 24, the availability of formal credit induces a very small and not statistically
significant reduction in the demand for informal credit. The insignificant coefficients
indicate that the substitutability between formal and informal credit is limited. This
is explained by the fact that informal and formal loans differ in many characteristics,
such as conditions for loan use, collateral requirements, transaction costs for the bor-
rower, and implicit insurance services expressed by the fact that informal loans
mostly do not have a due date. We note that the amounts of informal loans demanded
by participants in the credit programs other than MUSCCO are significantly lower
than those demanded by nonparticipants. Much of the difference occurs, however,
when the informal credit constraint is binding (Table 24). This is not surprising given
the finding, mentioned earlier, that program participation is negatively correlated
with access to informal credit. In contrast, despite their better access to formal credit,
the average amounts of formal loans demanded across the two states of binding and
nonbinding credit constraints by participants in the credit programs other than
MRFC are not statistically different from those of nonparticipants. This is explained
by the fact that the significantly higher amounts of formal credit demanded by par-
ticipants in those programs when their formal credit constraint is binding correspond
to significantly lower amounts of formal credit demanded when their formal credit
constraint is not binding (Table 23).
The transaction cost–adjusted interest rate for formal credit has no statistically
significant effect on the demand for either formal or informal credit. This lack of sta-
tistical significance of the interest rate for formal credit may, however, be due to its
98lack of significant variability during the period of time considered and its possible
correlation with the program dummy variables.51 We expect that an increase in out-
put prices for major crops increases the demand for seasonal crop loans, while prices
for inputs have an opposite effect. Indeed, increases in the price of maize signifi-
cantly increase the demand for formal loans. Higher maize prices make maize more
profitable compared with other crops and induce households to increase maize pro-
duction. As the amount of land is largely fixed, production increases can come about
only by increasing yields through use of hybrid seed, fertilizer, or both. This in turn
increases the demand for seasonal agricultural loans, if households’ own resources
are insufficient or committed elsewhere in the household economy.52 The producer
price of tobacco has no statistically significant effect, owing to tobacco income’s low
share of total income for the average household and to the specific regulations in the
tobacco market in effect during the survey years. Prior to 1996 tobacco was produced
in Malawi under a quota system, and few smallholder farmers in Malawi were al-
lowed to grow it. Therefore, higher tobacco prices would not increase the small-
holders’ demands for formal loans since their total tobacco production was con-
strained by quota.53
With respect to changes in loan demand due to increases in input prices, we ob-
tain negative and insignificant effects for the prices of seed for hybrid maize and for
local maize. The fact that prices for both types of maize seed have no statistically
significant effect on credit demand can be explained by seed expenditure’s low share
of total input costs for maize production. Furthermore, when seed prices increase
farmers can substitute recycled seed taken from their own production. This substitu-
tion entails less need for cash and therefore less demand for loans. In fact more than
40 percent of the seed used by the sampled households was from their own produc-
tion (Diagne, Zeller, and Mataya 1996). Such a substitution is not possible for to-
bacco seed. However, the signs for the price of tobacco seed and of fertilizer have a
positive but insignificant effect on loan demand. We explain these unexpected signs
as follows. Seasonal agricultural loans almost always come in the form of fixed in-
put packages designed to match the size of the borrower’s cultivated area devoted to
maize or tobacco. During the two survey years, none of the agricultural credit insti-
tutions had adjusted the amount of tobacco seed and fertilizer in the package. As in-
put prices increase, the value of the package and the amount of the loan simply in-
crease. Thus the programs give the farmers little choice in varying their demand for
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51 The majority of borrowers interviewed did not know the actual interest rates they were paying. They knew only
the sizes of their loans (in monetary terms or in kind) and the amounts they had repaid or had yet to repay. For this
reason we calculated the interest rates for each loan transaction using these two numbers. Dropping the interest rate
variable does not make any difference in the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the other variables. We
therefore decided to leave it in the equations.
52 This is consistent with the finding in Zeller, Diagne, and Mataya (1997) that participation in the programs that
provide seasonal agricultural loans increases significantly the share of total land allocated to hybrid maize.
53 The tobacco quota system was lifted in 1996; see Zeller (1998) for more details on the restrictions on tobacco
production and marketing prior to 1996.inputs and loans in response to changes in input prices; rather, it is a choice between
taking the loan package or doing without it.54
Marginal Impact of Access to Formal Credit on Household Incomes
The estimated marginal impacts of access to formal and informal credit on total
household annual income, crop income, and seasonal nonfarm income are reported
in Tables 25–27.
For all three types of income and for both formal and informal credit, the direct
marginal effects resulting from mere access to formal credit are positive and the in-
direct marginal effects resulting from exercising the option to borrow are negative.
They are both not statistically significantly different from zero, however. The indi-
rect effects resulting from the substitutability between formal and informal sources
of credit are also positive but not statistically significantly different from zero. As a
result, for the average household, the total marginal impacts of access to formal credit
on all three types of income, although positive and quite sizable (MK 0.59, MK 0.53,
and MK 0.26, respectively, for every additional kwacha of credit limit), are not sta-
tistically significantly different from zero.
The substitution away from informal sources of credit, made possible by access
to formal credit, has a positive and statistically significant effect on the annual in-
comes of participants in credit programs other than MUSCCO. As shown in the ta-
bles, this beneficial substitution effect is the result of the negative correlation be-
tween borrowing from informal sources and household crop incomes. The negative
correlation also applies to formal credit. Therefore it is the mere act of borrowing,
whether from informal or from formal sources, that has a negative impact on crop
incomes. The beneficial substitution effect of informal credit for formal credit is
therefore merely a reflection of the fact that the reduced borrowing from informal
sources results in informal loans playing a lesser role in the negative impact that bor-
rowing in general has on net crop incomes.
For the reasons mentioned, substitution away from informal sources of credit by
credit program members was beneficial to their crop incomes but detrimental to their
nonfarm incomes, with no compensating beneficial effects from the increased re-
liance on formal loans. Consequently, after controlling for all other factors, the crop
incomes of participants in the credit programs are not statistically significantly dif-
ferent from those of nonparticipants. Moreover, the nonfarm incomes of MRFC and
MMF members are significantly lower than those of nonparticipants. As a result, the
total household incomes of MRFC, MMF, and PMERW1 participants are signifi-
cantly lower than those of nonparticipants while those of PMERW2 and MUSCCO
participants are not statistically significantly different from those of nonparticipants.
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54 The positive correlation between the price of fertilizer and the demand for formal credit can also be explained by
an inelastic demand for fertilizer, as pointed out by a reviewer.The negative correlation between borrowing and crop income, as is already ap-
parent from the descriptive analysis in Chapter 3, has several causes:
1. A large share of formal loans in 1993/94 and 1994/95 were used in hybrid
maize production, and less so in other more profitable crops, in particular to-
bacco. The in-kind loan package of hybrid maize and fertilizer, as already
argued in Chapter 3, was not adequately reduced to take into account the
large decline in the ratio of maize prices to fertilizer prices following the de-
valuation of the Malawi kwacha and the dismantling of fertilizer subsidies.
Instead the agricultural credit programs, including MRFC, continued to base
the composition of the in-kind loan package on recommendations for hybrid
maize production by the agricultural extension service. These recommenda-
tions were standardized for the whole country, irrespective of local agroe-
cological and socioeconomic conditions. As Benson (1997) could show with
gross margin calculations using on-farm trial data from more than 1,600 sites
in Malawi, even in years of relatively favorable climatic conditions, grow-
ing maize—the major crop in Malawi—is barely profitable owing to the very
low producer price of maize compared with the very high price of fertilizer.
Benson’s analysis strongly suggests that the recommended fertilizer levels
would need to be reduced, and also adapted to specific agroecological re-
gions, in order for maize to be a profitable cash crop for farmers.
2. The two survey years were below-average years for maize as the major crop.
While 1993/94 was a severe drought year, the yields in several survey dis-
tricts were also negatively affected by low rainfall in 1994/95. In years with
below-average rainfall, the response of maize yield to fertilizer is less pro-
nounced, making it more economical to apply less. However, farmers do not
know in advance whether or not it will rain sufficiently, so the application of
fertilizer always runs the risk of creating financial losses in drought-prone
areas.
3. Our descriptive and econometric analysis takes into account the full cost of
the inputs; that is, it assumes full reimbursement of the principal and inter-
est of the agricultural loan even if the loan package turns out to have created
losses because of low rainfall and lack of adjustment in input intensity.55
The combination of these three effects explains the finding of the descriptive and
econometric analysis that farmers who borrowed for maize production in these two
years were worse off than those who did not. We note further that, as shown in the
columns for the direct effects, the mere access to credit (formal or informal) is pos-
itively correlated with crop income and with nonfarm income. It is the farmers’
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55 That is, the calculated gross margins and net crop income include the cost of the inputs acquired through bor-
rowing even if the loans were not repaid. About 20 percent of the sample households had a negative net crop income
for the 1994/95 season. Furthermore, half of the sample households in one of the districts surveyed (Mangochi) ex-
perienced a complete crop failure (that is, no harvest).1
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Table 25—Annual income equation: Estimated parameters and partial effects of marginal changes in selected
independent variables
Partial effectsa (∂∂ E(bF|x)/∂∂ x)
Because of induced change in
Parameter Formal Informal Formal Informal Sum of
Independent variable estimates (θθ F) Directly credit limit credit limit loan demanded loan demanded partial effects
Constant term − 2,081.00 − 1,050.25 . . . . . . . . . . . . − 1,050.25
(− 0.93) (− 0.92) . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 0.92)
Household per capita formal credit limit (MK) 2.25 0.90 . . . . . . − 0.40 0.09 0.59
(0.84) (1.43) . . . . . . (− 1.74) (1.19) (1.25)
Squared household per capita formal credit 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
limit (MK) (− 0.25) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita informal credit limit (MK) 5.75 2.30 . . . . . . 0.14 − 1.31 1.12
(1.66) (1.65) . . . . . . (1.25) (− 1.25) (0.87)
Squared household per capita informal credit − 0.01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
limit (MK) (− 1.44) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total formal loans − 4.46 − 1.80 . . . . . . . . . . . . − 1.80
demanded (MK) (− 1.57) (− 2.00) . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 2.00)
Squared household per capita total formal loans 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
demanded (MK) (0.68) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total informal loans − 16.82 − 7.64 . . . . . . . . . . . . − 7.64
demanded (MK) (− 1.19) (− 1.25) . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 1.25)
Squared household per capita total informal 0.10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
loans demanded (MK) (0.69) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MRFC program dummy variable − 1,178.00 − 813.52 69.14 − 86.02 − 21.57 86.03 − 765.95
(− 2.12) (− 3.03) (1.29) (− 3.11) (− 0.21) (2.58) (− 2.66)
MMF program dummy variable − 2,226.00 − 929.44 10.92 − 93.02 21.25 85.42 − 904.87
(− 2.72) (− 2.49) (0.18) (− 3.09) (0.27) (3.03) (− 2.41)
MUSCCO program dummy variable − 187.00 − 35.34 39.43 − 2.06 − 9.56 2.71 − 4.82
(− 0.18) (− 0.07) (2.16) (− 0.06) (− 0.15) (0.06) (− 0.01)1
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PMERW1 program dummy variable − 1,758.00 − 703.59 48.86 − 82.38 − 15.60 79.77 − 672.93
(− 2.86) (− 2.56) (1.23) (− 4.22) (− 0.20) (3.99) (− 2.40)
PMERW2 program dummy variable − 1,387.00 − 530.76 112.39 − 56.51 − 15.12 57.21 − 432.80
(− 1.91) (− 1.61) (1.59) (− 2.34) (− 0.19) (2.27) (− 1.26)
Past member status dummy variable 1,035.00 522.26 − 20.42 53.85 13.56 − 32.22 537.04
(1.95) (1.94) (− 1.36) (2.19) (0.59) (− 1.10) (2.00)
Tobacco-growing household dummy variable 437.70 220.95 . . . . . . − 50.52 − 18.80 151.63
(1.43) (1.42) . . . . . . (− 0.92) (− 1.15) (0.87)
Total hectares of household land − 86.84 107.60 2.29 2.11 − 3.91 − 1.26 106.83
(− 0.24) (1.16) (1.29) (0.93) (− 1.11) (− 0.27) (1.14)
Square of total hectares of household land 71.56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(1.38) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Price of maize (MK/kilogram) 411.70 207.66 3.23 − 0.30 − 7.97 3.43 206.05
(1.24) (1.23) (2.14) (− 0.22) (− 2.12) (0.60) (1.23)
Price of cassava (MK/kilogram) − 235.40 − 118.84 − 3.87 4.18 5.18 − 1.26 − 114.61
(− 1.24) (− 1.24) (− 2.59) (3.36) (2.40) (− 0.34) (− 1.19)
1995 tobacco producer price (MK/kilogram) 207.70 104.98 1.07 − 0.64 − 0.55 0.95 105.82
(3.12) (3.10) (1.62) (− 1.32) (− 0.42) (0.55) (3.12)
1995 tobacco seed price (MK/kilogram) 539.10 272.13 . . . . . . − 9.68 3.41 265.85
(1.66) (1.66) . . . . . . (− 0.78) (0.41) (1.68)
1995 chemical fertilizer price (MK/kilogram) 190.30 96.03 . . . . . . − 3.88 − 4.03 88.13
(0.75) (0.75) . . . . . . (− 1.02) (− 0.56) (0.69)
1995 local maize seed price (MK/kilogram) . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.02 . . . 0.02
. . . . . . . . . . . . (0.09) . . . (0.09)
1995 hybrid maize seed price (MK/kilogram) 8.28 4.18 . . . . . . 1.88 − 0.29 5.76
(0.10) (0.10) . . . . . . (0.96) (− 0.13) (0.14)
R-squared: 0.55 Wu-Hausman chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (15)= 2144
F-statistic (all coefficients): F(35,341)= 11.17 Durbin chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (15) = 186337
F-statistic for regressors used as instruments in other equations: F(10,367) = 9.12 Basmann chi-squared statistics for overidentifying restrictions: χ (38) = 87
Note: t-Values are given in parentheses.
a Including the effects resulting from the induced change in the program participation probability weight.1
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Table 26—Crop income equation: Estimated parameters and partial effects of marginal changes in selected
independent variables
Partial effectsa (∂∂ E(y|x)/∂∂ x)
Because of induced change in
Parameter Formal Informal Formal Informal Sum of
Independent variable estimates (θθ y) Directly credit limit credit limit loan demanded loan demanded partial effects
Constant term − 1,967.00 − 993.07 . . . . . . . . . . . . − 993.07
(− 1.20) (− 1.19) . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 1.19)
Household per capita formal credit limit (MK) 1.80 0.70 . . . . . . − 0.24 0.07 0.53
(0.87) (1.62) . . . . . . (− 1.48) (1.46) (1.68)
Squared household per capita formal credit 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
limit (MK) (− 0.26) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita informal credit limit (MK) 1.75 0.58 . . . . . . 0.09 − 0.96 − 0.29
(0.83) (0.68) . . . . . . (1.10) (− 1.46) (− 0.33)
Squared household per capita informal credit 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
limit (MK) (− 1.26) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total formal loans − 2.82 − 1.10 . . . . . . . . . . . . − 1.10
demanded (MK) (− 1.24) (− 1.66) . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 1.66)
Squared household per capita total formal 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
loans demanded (MK) (0.57) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total informal loans − 12.71 − 5.59 . . . . . . . . . . . . − 5.59
demanded (MK) (− 1.48) (− 1.51) . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 1.51)
Squared household per capita total informal 0.09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
loans demanded (MK) (0.98) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MRFC program dummy variable − 181.10 − 202.19 54.89 − 23.63 − 13.48 52.31 − 132.09
(− 0.46) (− 1.12) (1.32) (− 1.64) (− 0.16) (2.33) (− 0.69)
MMF program dummy variable − 486.60 − 191.20 8.68 − 26.43 13.37 57.99 − 137.59
(− 1.20) (− 1.04) (0.20) (− 1.66) (0.21) (3.18) (− 0.73)
MUSCCO program dummy variable 671.50 315.94 31.35 − 0.62 − 5.83 2.06 342.90
(0.94) (0.97) (2.05) (− 0.04) (− 0.12) (0.08) (1.05)
PMERW1 program dummy variable − 514.20 − 199.53 38.84 − 23.32 − 9.53 53.93 − 139.601
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(− 1.41) (− 1.22) (1.35) (− 2.79) (− 0.15) (3.82) (− 0.78)
PMERW2 program dummy variable − 531.50 − 207.45 89.21 − 15.84 − 9.20 38.01 − 105.26
(− 1.13) (− 0.97) (1.66) (− 1.39) (− 0.15) (2.27) (− 0.45)
Past member status dummy variable 251.90 127.15 − 16.25 13.68 8.40 − 10.61 122.36
(1.17) (1.16) (− 1.43) (1.07) (0.53) (− 0.57) (1.11)
Tobacco-growing household dummy variable 648.00 327.07 . . . . . . − 31.32 − 13.27 282.47
(3.14) (3.12) . . . . . . (− 0.84) (− 1.29) (2.46)
Total hectares of household land − 57.08 78.60 1.79 0.54 − 2.38 − 0.93 77.62
(− 0.30) (1.38) (1.47) (0.51) (− 1.14) (− 0.30) (1.36)
Square of total hectares of household land 50.66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(1.80) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Price of maize (MK/kilogram) 389.30 196.16 2.53 − 0.08 − 4.86 2.51 196.26
(1.61) (1.60) (2.33) (− 0.14) (− 2.05) (0.70) (1.62)
Price of cassava (MK/kilogram) − 96.78 − 48.85 − 3.03 1.06 3.16 − 0.92 − 48.58
(− 0.73) (− 0.72) (− 2.98) (2.00) (2.25) (− 0.39) (− 0.73)
1995 tobacco producer price (MK/kilogram) 171.90 86.85 0.84 − 0.16 − 0.34 0.70 87.89
(3.51) (3.49) (1.82) (− 0.84) (− 0.42) (0.67) (3.54)
1995 tobacco seed price (MK/kilogram) 300.30 151.57 . . . . . . − 5.90 2.50 148.17
(1.18) (1.17) . . . . . . (− 0.75) (0.48) (1.18)
1995 chemical fertilizer price (MK/kilogram) − 102.90 − 51.92 . . . . . . − 2.36 − 2.95 − 57.23
(− 0.90) (− 0.89) . . . . . . (− 0.92) (− 0.59) (− 0.98)
1995 local maize seed price (MK/kilogram) . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.01 . . . 0.01
. . . . . . . . . . . . (0.09) . . . (0.09)
1995 hybrid maize seed price (MK/kilogram) − 6.36 − 3.21 . . . . . . 1.14 − 0.22 − 2.28
(− 0.12) (− 0.12) . . . . . . (0.85) (− 0.14) (− 0.09)
. . . (0.12) (0.32) (− 0.76) (− 1.08) (0.14) (0.08)
R-squared: 0.38 Wu-Hausman chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (15) = 455
F-statistic (all coefficients): F(35,341) = 6.03 Durbin chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (15) = 9781
F-statistic for regressors used as instruments in other equations: F(10,367) = 5.02 Basmann chi-squared statistics for overidentifying restrictions: χ (38) = 80
Note: t-Values are given in parentheses.
a Including the effects resulting from the induced change in the program participation probability weight.1
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Table 27—Nonfarm seasonal income equation: Estimated parameters and partial effects of marginal changes in selected
independent variables
Partial effectsa (∂∂ E(y|x)/∂∂ x)
Because of induced change in
Parameter Formal Informal Formal Informal Sum of
Independent variable estimates (θθ y) Directly credit limit credit limit loan demanded loan demanded partial effects
Constant term 696.7 351.6788 . . . . . . . . . . . . 351.6788
(2.45) (2.41) . . . . . . . . . . . . (2.41)
Household per capita formal credit limit (MK) 0.7406 0.314 . . . . . . − 0.0535 0.0001 0.2607
(1.21) (1.16) . . . . . . (− 0.72) (0.00) (1.17)
Squared household per capita formal credit − 0.0006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
limit (MK) (− 0.79) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita informal credit limit (MK) 1.313 0.5992 . . . . . . 0.019 − 0.002 0.6162
(0.95) (0.97) . . . . . . (0.55) (− 0.00) (0.70)
Squared household per capita informal credit − 0.0024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
limit (MK) (− 0.50) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total formal loans − 0.5369 − 0.2435 . . . . . . . . . . . . − 0.2435
demanded (MK) (− 0.75) (− 0.74) . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 0.74)
Squared household per capita total formal loans 0.0005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
demanded (MK) (0.44) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total informal loans − 0.1916 − 0.0118 . . . . . . . . . . . . − 0.0118
demanded (MK) (− 0.03) (− 0.00) . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 0.00)
Squared household per capita total informal 0.0305 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
loans demanded (MK) (0.35) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MRFC program dummy variable − 201 − 121.117 20.1556 − 18.9683 − 5.6017 − 35.9941 − 161.526
(− 2.21) (− 3.01) (1.48) (− 1.95) (− 0.59) (− 1.27) (− 3.27)
MMF program dummy variable − 346.9 − 148.229 3.4049 − 19.8515 2.8582 − 16.9588 − 178.777
(− 2.49) (− 2.30) (0.21) (− 1.75) (0.33) (− 0.74) (− 2.53)
MUSCCO program dummy variable − 158.5 − 65.3507 12.3723 0.076 − 2.4364 1.8099 − 53.529
(− 1.49) (− 1.37) (1.83) (0.01) (− 0.48) (0.06) (− 0.89)1
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PMERW1 program dummy variable − 79.5 − 23.0108 15.1387 − 17.4661 − 3.3011 − 16.0971 − 44.7363
(− 0.86) (− 0.55) (1.20) (− 2.51) (− 0.44) (− 1.08) (− 0.99)
PMERW2 program dummy variable 59.18 41.6651 32.5264 − 11.6292 − 4.094 − 12.2958 46.1725
(0.51) (0.79) (1.64) (− 1.36) (− 0.61) (− 0.65) (0.85)
Past member status dummy variable 251.7 127.0425 − 6.2642 10.7444 2.3892 28.8024 162.7143
(2.11) (2.11) (− 1.13) (0.96) (0.38) (1.21) (2.22)
Tobacco-growing household dummy variable − 97.64 − 49.2839 . . . . . . − 5.9859 10.2774 − 44.9925
(− 1.18) (− 1.17) . . . . . . (− 0.45) (0.49) (− 0.83)
Total hectares of household land − 33.59 3.074 0.8024 0.5514 − 0.5288 − 0.0019 3.8971
(− 0.31) (0.13) (0.99) (0.51) (− 0.57) (− 0.00) (0.17)
Square of total hectares of household land 9.486 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(0.56) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Price of maize (MK/kilogram) − 39.29 − 19.94 1.1331 − 0.0779 − 1.0793 0.0053 − 19.9588
(− 1.29) (− 1.28) (1.72) (− 0.15) (− 1.26) (0.00) (− 1.28)
Price of cassava (MK/kilogram) − 63.04 − 31.8202 − 1.3556 1.0906 0.701 − 0.0019 − 31.3862
(− 2.99) (− 2.98) (− 2.18) (2.23) (1.34) (− 0.00) (− 2.90)
1995 tobacco producer price (MK/kilogram) . . . 0.038 0.3764 − 0.1663 − 0.0751 0.0015 0.1746
. . . (0.73) (1.23) (− 0.87) (− 0.23) (0.00) (0.24)
1995 tobacco seed price (MK/kilogram) . . . . . . . . . . . . − 1.3109 0.0053 − 1.3057
. . . . . . . . . . . . (− 0.44) (0.00) (− 0.27)
1995 chemical fertilizer price (MK/kilogram) . . . . . . . . . . . . − 0.5245 − 0.0062 − 0.5307
. . . . . . . . . . . . (− 0.51) (− 0.00) (− 0.15)
1995 local maize seed price (MK/kilogram) . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0032 . . . 0.0032
. . . . . . . . . . . . (0.05) . . . (0.05)
1995 hybrid maize seed price (MK/kilogram) . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.254 − 0.0005 0.2535
. . . . . . . . . . . . (0.37) (− 0.00) (0.23)
R-squared: 0.10 Wu-Hausman chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (15) = 4
F-statistic (all coefficients): F(34,1097) = 4.02 Durbin chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (15) = 25
F-statistic for regressors used as instruments in other equations: F(14,1494) = 5.5 Basmann chi-squared statistics for overidentifying restrictions: χ (38) = 88
Note: t-Values are given in parentheses.
a Including the effects resulting from the induced change in the program participation probability weight.choice to borrow in order to grow fertilizer-intensive hybrid maize that negatively ef-
fects their net crop income as a result of the three effects just explained.56
Yet, despite the unprofitability of the in-kind input loans for hybrid maize, the
findings for the formal loan demand equation suggest that, on average, once they gain
access to formal credit, credit-constrained farmers do not restrain themselves from
borrowing. This type of behavior on the part of smallholder farmers may seem irra-
tional at first. But Msukwa et al. (1994) offer an explanation for it: that farmers ex-
pect debt forgiveness or else intend to default in case of drought and use the unprof-
itability of maize as an excuse. Although this explanation is plausible for some
farmers, it is surely not true for all, as the repayment rates of loans to MRFC ranged
between 76 and 95 percent in the two survey years. However, the rate of repayment
of maize loans was considerably lower (54 percent) in 1995/96 than that for tobacco
loans, which achieved a repayment rate of 82 percent (see Table 1).
A second possible explanation is that current members of credit programs are suf-
ficiently inexperienced with the recommended maize-fertilizer technology that they
slavishly follow the cookie cutter advice of the agricultural extension officers. Ex
post it turns out that following these recommendations does not pay off, and farm-
ers are left with the choice of repaying, and thus retaining access to future credit, or
defaulting. In subsequent years, these new adopters of the recommended maize-fer-
tilizer package would have learned from their experiences and would have begun to
apply less fertilizer to hybrid maize. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that
past members who had previously had the opportunity to follow the advice of the
agricultural extension service under the SACA program applied fertilizer less fre-
quently to their hybrid maize than current members. The percentage of households
applying fertilizer to hybrid maize is 71 percent for current members, 35 percent for
past members, and 45 percent for households who have never been members (see
Table 10). It is interesting that those who have the longest experience with the rec-
ommended input package apply it the least. Moreover, past members apply fertilizer
almost as frequently to tobacco as current members (13 percent and 12 percent for
current and past members, respectively; see Table 10).
A third explanation is that the profitability of hybrid maize depends partly on cli-
matic conditions, which can vary greatly from one year to the next. Therefore, the
borrowing behavior of smallholder farmers—although seemingly irrational when
viewed ex post—can be justified from an ex ante point of view.57 Furthermore, bor-
rowing may be the best or only option for the smallholder farmers to finance their
input acquisitions after experiencing a crop failure. Indeed, the evidence in Chapter
3 suggests that without access to credit the ability of smallholder farmers to recover
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56 The analysis does not control for differences in land quality. But, as explained in the descriptive section, we be-
lieve that differences in the unobserved land quality do not explain the negative impact of borrowing on net crop in-
come.
57 We thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding us of this important point: the rational calculated risk that bor-
rowers take while trying to maximize their expected returns.from a crop failure is extremely limited, as shown by the significant drop in their in-
put expenditures (a 50 percent drop, compared with an 18 percent increase for those
with access to credit). Moreover, as emphasized in the introduction and Chapter 4,
the mere knowledge that credit will be available in case of crop failure (that is, the
mere access to credit) can be beneficial to poor farmers living in a risky environment
by inducing them to adopt new and more risky but potentially profitable crops or
technologies. Indeed, as already discussed, the results of the econometric analysis
confirm the positive and quite sizable (though not statistically significant) impact of
merely having access to credit.
In conclusion, the empirical evidence and the econometric results, supported by
other independent research, point out that the recommended level of fertilizer for hy-
brid maize, which has been adopted as part of the in-kind loan package, leads to sub-
optimal results for smallholder incomes. During the years of below-average rainfall
(1993/94 and 1994/95), households who relied on this package earned significantly
less than households who did not.58
Finally, one can see from Table 26 that the most important determinant of house-
hold crop income is tobacco. Indeed, a household that grows tobacco earns MK 282
more in crop income compared with one that does not. In addition, the producer price
of tobacco has a significantly positive effect on crop income (MK 88 of additional
income per capita for every Malawi kwacha increase in the producer price). The price
of maize (the major food staple and most important crop in terms of area planted in
Malawi) and the size of landholding also have positive and relatively large marginal
impacts on crop income (MK 196 and MK 78, respectively). But, with their t-statis-
tics at 1.62 and 1.36, respectively, these marginal impacts are statistically not differ-
ent from zero at the usual 5 percent confidence level.59 The statistical insignificance
of the marginal impact of the price of maize is likely to be the result of adverse cli-
matic conditions during the 1994/95 and 1995/96 seasons, which led to lower yields
and thus lower net income, regardless of the price of maize. This suggests that even
higher maize prices will fail to increase crop income in Malawi under marginal cli-
matic conditions like those during the 1994/95 and 1995/96 seasons.60 In addition,
because most smallholder farmers in Malawi are net buyers of maize (as illustrated
by the 61 percent average maize self-sufficiency rate for 1995 shown in Table 16),
an increase in the price of maize will be likely to have a negative impact on the food
security of the average smallholder household.
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58 These results regarding the low profitability of borrowing in order to fertilize hybrid maize were also presented
at the workshop organized by Bunda College and IFPRI, held at Bunda in October 1996. At the workshop the man-
agement of the MRFC shared its disappointing experience with maize loans during the survey years. Since 1995/96
MRFC has been making an increasing share of its loans for tobacco, a crop that does better in years with low rain-
fall and has a gross margin per hectare about ten times higher than that for hybrid maize.
59 In specifications that do not include a dummy variable for tobacco households, the marginal impact of land is sta-
tistically significant and is the largest. This indicates that, given the current land allocation, the contribution of ad-
ditional land to crop income will come mostly through allocating more land to the tobacco crop.
60 Note that crop income includes the nonmarketed portion of crop production, valued at market prices.Marginal Impact of Access to Credit on Household Food Security
Tables 28–30 present the results related to the effects of access to formal credit on
household food security. Three indicators are used: daily food expenditures per
capita (Table 28), daily calorie intake per capita (Table 29), and daily protein intake
per capita (Table 30).
Access to formal credit has no statistically significant direct effect on per capita
household daily food expenditure (Table 28). The indirect effects (through borrow-
ing and income) are also all negligible and statistically insignificant. The only ex-
ception is the direct effect of membership in a credit program (which includes the ef-
fect resulting from the induced change in the program participation probability
weights), which shows that participants in all the credit programs have significantly
lower per capita household daily food expenditures than nonparticipants. However,
these lower per capita food expenditures may be reflecting the self-selection of food-
insecure households into the programs and the targeting of the programs to those
households. Nevertheless, when all the direct and indirect effects of membership in
the credit programs are added, the per capita household daily food expenditures of
participants are still significantly lower than those of nonparticipants.
Second, regarding the impact of access to formal credit on household food secu-
rity as measured by daily calorie and protein intakes (Tables 29 and 30), neither the
direct nor the indirect effects through borrowing and income are statistically signif-
icantly different from zero. As a result, the overall marginal impact of access to for-
mal credit on household food security, although positive, is not statistically signifi-
cantly different from zero. In fact, after adding all direct and indirect effects of
membership in a credit program and controlling for the other factors, participants in
all the credit programs are significantly more food insecure than nonparticipants.
However, Tables 29 and 30 show that the relative food insecurity of credit program
participants is largely due to the direct effects of membership in a credit program,
which may reflect to a large extent the effects of the self-selection into the programs
of households who are already food insecure as well as the targeting of the programs
to such households. Indeed, as shown in the tables, mere access to credit has a pos-
itive though not statistically significant impact on the food security of credit program
participants. Again, as for income, it is the mere act of borrowing (and not just from
formal sources) that is negatively correlated with both calorie and protein intake.
There are two possible explanations for the negative correlation between bor-
rowing and food security as measured by calorie and protein intake. The first results
from the negative correlation between borrowing and crop income, which, every-
thing else being equal, should lead to lower calorie intake, especially if the small-
holder chooses to repay the loan (as is assumed in our calculations). The second pos-
sible explanation is that, if the loan granted is not enough to cover the planned
investment, the household may cut down on food consumption in order to make up
for the shortfall. However, given the evidence on the negative impact of maize loans
on net crop income, given the fact that agricultural loans represent the bulk of total
loans from the formal sector, and considering that most of it was lent to finance the
110production of a crop that turned out to be largely unprofitable, the first explanation
seems to have more merit.
We further note from the results in Tables 29 and 30 that after controlling for all
other factors the per capita daily calorie and protein intakes of tobacco and nonto-
bacco households are not statistically different. Hence the significant lower per
capita daily calorie intake of tobacco households reported in the descriptive analysis
must be due to other attributes that cannot be controlled for in a simple tabular analy-
sis. In fact the results in Tables 29 and 30 confirm the conclusions reached in the de-
scriptive analysis that these other attributes are their relatively larger household and
adult population sizes and the difficulties they have in meeting their additional food
consumption requirements through market purchases. Indeed, the tables show that
the household size and dependency ratio and the prices of maize and cassava have
relatively large and statistically significant negative marginal effects on calorie and
protein intakes. Furthermore, these effects are mostly the result of the direct effects
these variables have on daily calorie and protein intakes. Their indirect effects
through the various pathways (access to credit, borrowing, and income) are all either
negligible in comparison or not statistically different from zero.
The negative and significant direct impact of maize and cassava prices on calo-
rie and protein intakes is not surprising since the two crops are the most important
food staples in Malawi. Together they used to occupy over 80 percent of the coun-
try’s cultivated land. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, smallholder farmers have
in recent years increasingly begun to allocate more land to the high-margin tobacco
crop at the expense of maize and cassava. But tobacco is a labor-intensive crop that
necessitates a larger than average household size or the hiring of additional labor.
Therefore, given the nonseparability of the food consumption and production deci-
sions of agricultural households (Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986), one should ex-
pect the prices of maize and cassava and the household population size and compo-
sition to have significant direct effects on calorie and protein intakes in addition to
their indirect effects through household income. Furthermore, the fact that the direct
impact of the price of maize on calorie intake is negative and significant while its in-
direct effect through household income is positive but statistically insignificant is
consistent with the findings that its marginal impact on household income, while siz-
able, is not statistically different from zero and that smallholder farmers in Malawi
are, on average, net buyers of maize because of their 61 percent average maize self-
sufficiency (Tables 26 and 16).
Marginal Impact of Access to Credit
on the Nutritional Status of Children
The effects of access to formal credit on the nutritional status of preschoolers as
measured by their weight-for-age and height-for-age Z-scores are presented in Ta-
bles 31 and 32. The weight-for-age Z-score is a measure of short-term or acute mal-
nutrition whereas the height-for-age Z-score is a measure of chronic malnutrition.




Table 28—Food expenditure equation: Estimated parameters and partial effects of marginal changes in selected
independent variables
Partial effectsa (∂∂ E(y|x)/∂∂ x)
Because of induced change in
Formal Informal
Parameter Formal Informal loan loan Household Sum of
Independent variable estimates (θθ y) Directly credit limit credit limit demanded demanded income partial effects
Constant term 12.10 6.11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.11
(6.11) (5.99) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (5.99)
Household per capita formal credit 0.00 0.00 . . . . . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
limit (MK) (0.01) (− 0.04) . . . . . . (− 0.56) (− 0.18) (1.04) (− 0.22)
Squared household per capita formal 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
credit limit (MK) (− 0.09) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita informal 0.01 0.00 . . . . . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
credit limit (MK) (1.34) (1.35) . . . . . . (0.48) (0.13) (0.69) (1.23)
Squared household per capita informal 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
credit limit (MK) (− 0.68) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total formal 0.00 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.00 0.00
loans demanded (MK) (− 0.52) (− 0.55) . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 1.30) (− 0.63)
Squared household per capita total 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
formal loans demanded (MK) (0.19) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total informal 0.00 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.00 0.00
loans demanded (MK) (0.11) (0.13) . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 0.90) (0.10)
Squared household per capita total 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
informal loans demanded (MK) (0.15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total income 0.00 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.00
in the 1994/95 season (MK) (1.43) (1.41) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1.41)
MRFC program dummy variable − 2.87 − 1.87 0.00 − 0.15 − 0.02 − 0.17 − 0.22 − 2.44
(− 5.29) (− 7.34) (− 0.06) (− 2.80) (− 0.47) (− 1.33) (− 1.17) (− 7.21)
MMF program dummy variable − 3.21 − 1.30 0.00 − 0.16 0.01 − 0.10 − 0.18 − 1.73
(− 3.97) (− 3.44) (− 0.00) (− 2.50) (0.26) (− 0.90) (− 1.04) (− 4.11)1
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MUSCCO program dummy variable − 2.98 − 1.25 0.00 0.00 − 0.01 0.01 0.02 − 1.24
(− 4.58) (− 4.26) (− 0.07) (0.01) (− 0.37) (0.09) (0.15) (− 3.58)
PMERW1 program dummy variable − 3.10 − 1.23 0.00 − 0.14 − 0.01 − 0.09 − 0.13 − 1.60
(− 5.32) (− 4.53) (− 0.04) (− 3.11) (− 0.38) (− 1.80) (− 0.96) (− 5.09)
PMERW2 program dummy variable − 2.68 − 1.03 − 0.01 − 0.09 − 0.02 − 0.07 − 0.08 − 1.30
(− 3.28) (− 2.72) (− 0.07) (− 1.80) (− 0.52) (− 0.86) (− 0.73) (− 3.25)
Past member status dummy variable 2.52 1.27 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.12 1.61
(3.21) (3.22) (0.03) (1.38) (0.30) (1.36) (1.35) (3.73)
Tobacco-growing household − 0.22 − 0.11 . . . . . . − 0.02 0.05 0.42 0.34
dummy variable (− 0.50) (− 0.49) . . . . . . (− 0.38) (0.45) (1.46) (0.90)
Adult population between 15 and − 0.81 − 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.42
64 years of age (− 4.49) (− 4.29) (0.10) (− 0.41) (1.59) (0.00) (− 1.08) (− 4.36)
Dependency ratio (household size − 4.53 − 2.30 0.00 − 0.03 0.04 0.00 − 0.03 − 2.33
divided by population ages less (− 3.67) (− 3.67) (0.11) (− 1.39) (1.48) (− 0.06) (− 0.84) (− 3.65)
than 15 or over 64)
Price of maize (MK/kilogram) − 0.02 − 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
(− 0.14) (− 0.14) (− 0.08) (− 0.21) (− 1.13) (− 0.11) (1.09) (− 0.04)
Price of cassava (MK/kilogram) 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 − 0.01 0.04
(0.58) (0.57) (0.08) (2.89) (1.02) (0.06) (− 0.80) (0.64)
Price of beans (MK/kilogram) − 0.03 − 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 − 0.02
(− 0.56) (− 0.56) (0.08) (− 3.46) (1.09) (0.07) (0.33) (− 0.58)
Weighted price index of vegetables 0.41 0.21 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.18
(MK/kilogram) (2.95) (2.94) (− 0.11) (− 3.28) (− 1.20) (− 0.26) (− 0.39) (2.51)
Weighted price index of meat and 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
fish (MK/kilogram) (2.27) (2.24) (− 0.04) (− 1.39) (− 0.87) (− 0.09) (0.60) (2.15)
Weighted price index of drink − 0.04 − 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 − 0.03
(− 3.24) (− 3.20) (− 0.03) (− 3.61) (0.28) (− 0.16) (− 0.86) (− 3.60)
R-squared: 0.04 Wu-Hausman chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (16) = 6.3
F-statistic (all coefficients): F(35,1095) = 5.3 Durbin chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (16) = 59
F-statistic for regressors used as instruments in other equations: F(6,1125) = 2.08 Basmann chi-squared statistics for overidentifying restrictions: χ (45) = 863
Note: t-Values are given in parentheses.
a Including the effects resulting from the induced change in the program participation probability weight.1
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Table 29—Daily calorie intake equation: Estimated parameters and partial effects of marginal changes in selected
independent variables
Partial effectsa (∂∂ E(y|x)/∂∂ x)
Because of induced change in
Formal Informal
Parameter Formal Informal loan loan Sum of
Independent variable estimates (θθ y) Directly credit limit credit limit demanded demanded Income partial
effects
Constant term 6,376 3,218 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,218
(8.59) (8.32) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (8.32)
Household per capita formal 1.35 0.55 . . . . . . − 0.27 − 0.04 0.01 0.24
credit limit (MK) (1.19) (1.18) . . . . . . (− 2.02) (− 0.65) (0.85) (0.62)
Squared household per capita formal 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
credit limit (MK) (− 0.73) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita informal credit 1.34 0.62 . . . . . . 0.10 0.60 0.02 1.34
limit (MK) (0.50) (0.52) . . . . . . (1.57) (0.53) (0.59) (0.93)
Squared household per capita informal 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
credit limit (MK) (− 0.22) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total formal − 2.73 − 1.25 . . . . . . . . . . . . − 0.03 − 1.28
loans demanded (MK) (− 2.02) (− 2.12) . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 1.12) (− 2.17)
Squared household per capita total 0.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
formal loans demanded (MK) (0.83) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total informal 7.12 3.49 . . . . . . . . . . . . − 0.14 3.35
loans demanded (MK) (0.54) (0.55) . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 0.71) (0.53)
Squared household per capita total − 0.04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
informal loans demanded (MK) (− 0.22) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total income 0.07 0.04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.04
in 1994/95 season (MK) (1.10) (1.09) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1.09)
MRFC program dummy variable − 1,061.00 − 740.26 34.73 − 19.79 − 29.15 − 60.76 − 54.25 − 869.49
(− 5.61) (− 8.11) (1.41) (− 1.29) (− 1.50) (− 1.34) (− 0.96) (− 7.48)
MMF program dummy variable − 1,665.00 − 693.42 6.02 − 20.57 14.65 − 55.69 − 45.16 − 794.17
(− 5.30) (− 4.80) (0.22) (− 1.07) (0.67) (− 1.44) (− 0.82) (− 4.92)
MUSCCO program dummy variable − 901.10 − 372.78 21.74 0.09 − 12.67 3.49 4.14 − 355.99
(− 3.19) (− 2.88) (1.69) (0.00) (− 0.81) (0.08) (0.14) (− 2.51)1
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PMERW1 program dummy variable − 954.50 − 354.82 26.57 − 18.11 − 17.17 − 50.00 − 31.08 − 444.61
(− 4.42) (− 3.48) (1.41) (− 1.57) (− 1.14) (− 2.34) (− 0.78) (− 3.79)
PMERW2 program dummy variable − 948.60 − 351.84 56.18 − 12.08 − 21.33 − 31.07 − 20.59 − 380.73
(− 3.20) (− 2.52) (1.72) (− 0.87) (− 1.28) (− 1.09) (− 0.63) (− 2.40)
Past member status dummy variable 1,190.00 600.90 − 11.11 11.38 12.38 18.96 30.66 663.15
(3.87) (3.88) (− 1.37) (0.60) (0.85) (0.66) (1.11) (4.10)
Tobacco-growing household − 89.01 − 44.93 . . . . . . − 31.13 23.20 103.98 51.13
dummy variable (− 0.56) (− 0.56) . . . . . . (− 1.07) (0.74) (1.11) (0.41)
Adult population between 15 and 64 − 340.80 − 172.05 − 5.06 − 0.20 4.52 0.04 − 2.41 − 175.16
years of age (− 5.21) (− 4.95) (− 2.82) (− 0.20) (3.30) (0.01) (− 0.90) (− 4.97)
Dependency ratio (household size − 1,830.00 − 928.74 − 27.81 − 4.27 46.48 − 5.23 − 8.32 − 927.88
divided by population ages less (− 4.14) (− 4.14) (− 3.01) (− 0.71) (3.86) (− 0.25) (− 0.72) (− 4.07)
than 15 or over 64)
Distance from village of parents . . . − 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 − 0.02
of head . . . (− 1.23) (0.16) (− 0.15) (− 0.39) (− 0.20) (− 0.56) (− 0.85)
Price of maize (MK/kilogram) − 142.60 − 72.24 1.97 − 0.08 − 5.55 − 1.57 3.82 − 73.65
(− 2.62) (− 2.63) (1.93) (− 0.11) (− 2.41) (− 0.40) (1.01) (− 2.65)
Price of cassava (MK/kilogram) − 98.23 − 49.58 − 2.36 1.13 3.60 0.57 − 2.12 − 48.77
(− 2.64) (− 2.64) (− 2.15) (1.40) (2.91) (0.24) (− 0.64) (− 2.62)
Price of beans (MK/kilogram) − 31.68 − 15.99 − 0.63 − 0.58 1.57 0.65 0.22 − 14.76
(− 1.81) (− 1.77) (− 1.84) (− 1.65) (3.43) (0.28) (0.29) (− 1.56)
Weighted price index of vegetables 73.30 37.00 6.00 − 1.07 − 14.72 − 4.44 − 0.51 22.25
(MK/kilogram) (1.41) (1.40) (3.03) (− 1.59) (− 3.84) (− 1.01) (− 0.34) (0.82)
Weighted price index of meat and 18.73 9.45 0.57 − 0.25 − 1.37 − 0.50 0.47 8.37
fish (MK/kg) (0.87) (0.87) (1.16) (− 0.70) (− 2.06) (− 0.33) (0.54) (0.76)
Weighted price index of drink − 10.85 − 5.48 0.16 − 0.14 0.09 − 0.42 − 0.47 − 6.25
(− 2.29) (− 2.26) (0.80) (− 1.69) (0.78) (− 0.65) (− 0.71) (− 2.46)
R-squared: 0.01 Wu-Hausman chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (16) = 25
F-statistic (all coefficients): F(35,1095) = 4.1 Durbin chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (16) = 293
F-statistic for regressors used as instruments in other equations: F(6,1125) = 1.98 Basmann chi-squared statistics for overidentifying restrictions: χ (45) =
1946
Note: t-Values are given in parentheses.
a Including the effects resulting from the induced change in the program participation probability weight.1
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Table 30—Daily protein intake equation: Estimated parameters and partial effects of marginal changes in selected
independent variables
Partial effectsa (∂∂ E(y|x)/∂∂ x)
Because of induced change in
Formal Informal
Parameter Formal Informal loan loan Sum of
Independent variable estimates (θθ y) Directly credit limit credit limit demanded demanded Income partial effects
Constant term 283 143.169 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
(8.34) (8.18) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (8.18)
Household per capita formal credit 0.034 0.014 . . . . . . − 0.007 − 0.001 0.000 0.006
limit (MK) (0.61) (0.61) . . . . . . (− 1.11) (− 0.26) (0.22) (0.29)
Squared household per capita formal 0.000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
credit limit (MK) (− 0.39) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita informal credit − 0.006 − 0.002 . . . . . . 0.003 0.012 0.000 0.012
limit (MK) (− 0.04) (− 0.04) . . . . . . (0.96) (0.19) (0.15) (0.17)
Squared household per capita informal 0.000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
credit limit (MK) (0.03) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total formal − 0.072 − 0.033 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.000 − 0.033
loans demanded (MK) (− 1.05) (− 1.09) . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 0.26) (− 1.10)
Squared household per capita total 0.000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
formal loans demanded (MK) (0.47) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total informal 0.125 0.070 . . . . . . . . . . . . − 0.002 0.068
loans demanded (MK) (0.17) (0.20) . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 0.19) (0.19)
Squared household per capita total 0.002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
informal loans demanded (MK) (0.23) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total income in 0.001 0.000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.000
the 1994/95 season (MK) (0.25) (0.24) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (0.24)
MRFC program dummy variable − 48.890 − 32.572 0.857 0.070 − 0.761 − 4.850 − 0.631 − 37.886
(− 4.87) (− 6.85) (0.76) (0.09) (− 0.90) (− 2.07) (− 0.21) (− 6.56)
MMF program dummy variable − 84.410 − 35.758 0.149 0.077 0.384 − 2.833 − 0.525 − 38.505
(− 4.44) (− 4.05) (0.12) (0.08) (0.43) (− 1.41) (− 0.19) (− 4.19)
MUSCCO program dummy variable − 50.670 − 21.352 0.539 0.000 − 0.331 0.253 0.048 − 20.843
(− 3.93) (− 3.67) (1.01) (− 0.00) (− 0.55) (0.11) (0.04) (− 3.36)1
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PMERW1 program dummy variable − 45.870 − 17.549 0.658 0.068 − 0.448 − 2.631 − 0.361 − 20.264
(− 4.03) (− 3.37) (0.77) (0.16) (− 0.73) (− 2.45) (− 0.17) (− 3.64)
PMERW2 program dummy variable − 41.620 − 15.557 1.388 0.044 − 0.556 − 1.866 − 0.239 − 16.786
(− 2.79) (− 2.28) (0.92) (0.08) (− 0.83) (− 1.36) (− 0.14) (− 2.39)
Past member status dummy variable 52.280 26.388 − 0.276 − 0.034 0.323 3.281 0.356 30.039
(3.55) (3.57) (− 0.83) (− 0.04) (0.61) (1.87) (0.23) (3.99)
Tobacco-growing household dummy 1.486 0.750 . . . . . . − 0.812 1.503 1.209 2.650
variable (0.19) (0.19) . . . . . . (− 0.75) (0.60) (0.24) (0.39)
Adult population between 15 and − 14.870 − 7.531 − 0.125 0.001 0.119 0.001 − 0.028 − 7.564
64 years of age (− 4.85) (− 4.63) (− 1.65) (0.02) (2.76) (0.00) (− 0.20) (− 4.69)
Dependency ratio (household size − 84.950 − 43.135 − 0.688 0.017 1.218 − 0.104 − 0.097 − 42.789
divided by population ages less than (− 4.04) (− 4.06) (− 1.74) (0.06) (2.84) (− 0.09) (− 0.18) (− 4.00)
15 or over 64)
Distance from village of parents of head . . . − 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 − 0.001
. . . (− 1.45) (0.10) (0.02) (− 0.32) (− 0.07) (− 0.14) (− 0.69)
Price of maize (MK/kilogram) − 5.556 − 2.807 0.049 0.000 − 0.145 − 0.031 0.044 − 2.890
(− 1.93) (− 1.93) (1.16) (0.01) (− 2.05) (− 0.15) (0.24) (− 1.98)
Price of cassava (MK/kilogram) − 3.182 − 1.606 − 0.058 − 0.004 0.094 0.011 − 0.025 − 1.588
(− 1.39) (− 1.39) (− 1.24) (− 0.15) (1.91) (0.09) (− 0.15) (− 1.45)
Price of beans (MK/kilogram) − 1.899 − 0.959 − 0.016 0.002 0.041 0.013 0.003 − 0.915
(− 2.08) (− 2.05) (− 1.08) (0.15) (2.12) (0.11) (0.08) (− 1.95)
Weighted price index of vegetables 1.471 0.742 0.148 0.004 − 0.386 − 0.088 − 0.006 0.415
(MK/kilogram) (0.56) (0.55) (1.75) (0.16) (− 2.39) (− 0.39) (− 0.08) (0.31)
Weighted price index of meat and − 0.265 − 0.134 0.014 0.001 − 0.036 − 0.010 0.005 − 0.159
fish (MK/kilogram) (− 0.22) (− 0.22) (0.68) (0.08) (− 1.60) (− 0.14) (0.14) (− 0.26)
Weighted price index of drink − 0.397 − 0.201 0.004 0.001 0.003 − 0.008 − 0.006 − 0.207
(− 1.58) (− 1.56) (0.43) (0.18) (0.54) (− 0.23) (− 0.17) (− 1.57)
R-squared: 0.02 Wu-Hausman chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (16) = 6.4
F-statistic (all coefficients): F(35,1095) = 3.9 Durbin chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (16) = 60
F-statistic for the regressors used as instruments in other equations: F(6,1125) = 1.63 Basmann chi-squared statistics for the overidentifying restrictions: χ (45) = 935
Note: t-Values are given in parentheses.
a Including the effects resulting from the induced change in the program participation probability weight.1
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Table 31—Weight-for-age Z-score equation: Estimated parameters and partial effects of marginal changes in selected
independent variables
Partial effectsa (∂∂ E(y|x)/∂∂ x)
Because of induced change in
Formal Informal
Parameter Formal Informal loan loan Calorie Protein Sum of
Independent variable estimates (θθ y) Directly credit limit credit limit demanded demanded Income intake intake partial effects
Constant term 0.2705 0.1381 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1381
(0.20) (0.20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (0.20)
Household per capita formal credit 0.0006 0.0003 . . . . . . − 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002
limit (MK) (0.29) (0.36) . . . . . . (− 0.23) (0.26) (− 0.33) (− 0.33) (− 0.33) (0.31)
Squared household per capita 0.0000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
formal credit limit (MK) (− 0.00) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita informal − 0.0011 − 0.0005 . . . . . . 0.0000 − 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 − 0.0008
credit limit (MK) (− 0.22) (− 0.22) . . . . . . (0.16) (− 0.19) (− 0.27) (− 0.27) (− 0.27) (− 0.33)
Squared household per capita 0.0000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
informal credit limit (MK) (0.15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total formal − 0.0007 − 0.0003 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 − 0.0003
loans demanded (MK) (− 0.22) (− 0.24) . . . . . . . . . . . . (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (− 0.19)
Squared household per capita total 0.0000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
formal loans demanded (MK) (0.05) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total informal − 0.0036 − 0.0018 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 − 0.0016
loans demanded (MK) (− 0.18) (− 0.20) . . . . . . . . . . . . (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (− 0.17)
Squared household per capita total 0.0000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
informal loans demanded (MK) (0.01) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total income in 0.0000 0.0000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0000
1994/95 season (MK) (− 0.42) (− 0.42) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 0.42)
Household per capita daily calorie 0.0000 0.0000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0000
intake (kilocalories) (− 0.02) (− 0.02) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 0.02)1
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Household per capita daily protein − 0.0023 − 0.0012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . − 0.0012
intake (− 0.50) (− 0.51) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 0.51)
MRFC program dummy variable 0.4159 0.3574 0.0173 0.0144 − 0.0073 0.0541 0.0368 0.0027 1.7811 2.2565
(1.34) (2.60) (0.52) (0.49) (− 0.20) (0.79) (0.36) (0.01) (0.44) (0.58)
MMF program dummy variable 0.6352 0.2422 0.0026 0.0152 0.0040 0.0398 0.0283 0.0021 1.3661 1.7003
(1.20) (0.99) (0.06) (0.50) (0.09) (0.69) (0.30) (0.01) (0.39) (0.50)
MUSCCO program dummy variable 1.0570 0.4506 0.0102 − 0.0003 − 0.0032 − 0.0031 − 0.0038 − 0.0003 − 0.1836 0.2666
(2.28) (2.18) (0.66) (− 0.01) (− 0.14) (− 0.06) (− 0.09) (− 0.00) (− 0.11) (0.16)
PMERW1 program dummy variable 0.7338 0.2825 0.0125 0.0132 − 0.0042 0.0363 0.0190 0.0014 0.9178 1.2786
(1.77) (1.50) (0.43) (0.79) (− 0.13) (1.25) (0.29) (0.01) (0.35) (0.50)
PMERW2 program dummy variable 1.2710 0.5352 0.0290 0.0085 − 0.0057 0.0238 0.0121 0.0009 0.5852 1.1889
(2.58) (2.43) (0.54) (0.43) (− 0.15) (0.61) (0.22) (0.01) (0.28) (0.59)
Past member status dummy variable − 0.5375 − 0.2745 − 0.0049 − 0.0064 0.0031 − 0.0268 − 0.0199 − 0.0017 − 0.0001 − 0.3311
(− 1.34) (− 1.34) (− 0.45) (− 0.21) (0.12) (− 0.60) (− 0.40) (− 0.03) (− 0.03) (− 1.54)
Tobacco-growing household dummy 0.0751 0.0384 . . . . . . − 0.0084 − 0.0179 − 0.0676 − 0.0024 − 0.0001 − 0.0581
variable (0.20) (0.21) . . . . . . (− 0.17) (− 0.27) (− 0.42) (− 0.03) (− 0.02) (− 0.23)
Adult population between 15 and − 0.2150 − 0.1100 − 0.0027 0.0002 0.0013 0.0000 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 − 0.1066
64 years of age (− 1.46) (− 1.48) (− 0.94) (0.11) (0.36) (− 0.00) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (− 1.45)
Dependency ratio (household size 0.3098 0.1586 − 0.0151 0.0034 0.0131 0.0028 0.0055 0.0055 0.0055 0.1794
divided by population ages less (0.26) (0.27) (− 1.11) (0.36) (0.47) (0.11) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30)
than 15 or over 64)
Price of maize (MK/kilogram) . . . 0.0001 0.0011 0.0001 − 0.0016 0.0008 − 0.0025 − 0.0025 − 0.0025 − 0.0071
. . . (0.22) (0.63) (0.07) (− 0.34) (0.14) (− 0.36) (− 0.36) (− 0.36) (− 0.30)
Price of cassava (MK/kilogram) . . . . . . − 0.0013 − 0.0009 0.0010 − 0.0003 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0028
. . . . . . (− 0.62) (− 0.83) (0.36) (− 0.09) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.16)
R-squared: 0.05 Wu-Hausman chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (21) = 25
F-statistic (all coefficients): F(37,580) = 1.3 Durbin chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (21) = 714
Basmann chi-squared statistics for the overidentifying restrictions: χ (48) = 114
Note: t-Values are given in parentheses.
a Including the effects resulting from the induced change in the program participation probability weight.1
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Table 32—Height-for-age Z-score equation: Estimated parameters and partial effects of marginal changes in selected
independent variables
Partial effectsa (∂∂ E(y|x)/∂∂ x)
Because of induced change in
Formal Informal
Parameter Formal Informal loan loan Calorie Protein Sum of
Independent variable estimates (θθ y) Directly credit limit credit limit demanded demanded Income intake intake partial effects
Constant term − 3.1760 − 1.6216 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . − 1.6216
(− 1.24) (− 1.24) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 1.24)
Household per capita formal credit − 0.0023 − 0.0010 . . . . . . 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 − 0.0009
limit (MK) (− 0.68) (− 0.75) . . . . . . (0.42) (0.31) (− 0.93) (− 0.93) (− 0.93) (− 0.78)
Squared household per capita formal 0.0000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
credit limit (MK) (0.20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita informal credit − 0.0001 − 0.0001 . . . . . . − 0.0001 − 0.0008 − 0.0001 − 0.0001 − 0.0001 − 0.0012
limit (MK) (− 0.02) (− 0.03) . . . . . . (− 0.31) (− 0.21) (− 0.71) (− 0.71) (− 0.71) (− 0.28)
Squared household per capita informal 0.0000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
credit limit (MK) (− 0.02) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total formal 0.0019 0.0009 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0013
loans demanded (MK) (0.40) (0.42) . . . . . . . . . . . . (1.24) (1.24) (1.24) (0.57)
Squared household per capita total 0.0000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
formal loans demanded (MK) (− 0.16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total informal − 0.0087 − 0.0048 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 − 0.0032
loans demanded (MK) (− 0.19) (− 0.22) . . . . . . . . . . . . (0.84) (0.84) (0.84) (− 0.15)
Squared household per capita total − 0.0001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
informal loans demanded (MK) (− 0.12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Household per capita total income − 0.0003 − 0.0001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . − 0.0001
in 1994/95 season (MK) (− 1.17) (− 1.19) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 1.19)
Household per capita daily calorie 0.0001 0.0001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0001
intake (0.32) (0.32) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (0.32)1
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Household per capita daily protein − 0.0033 − 0.0017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . − 0.0017
intake (− 0.42) (− 0.42) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (− 0.42)
MRFC program dummy variable 1.4010 0.9732 − 0.0594 0.0047 0.0182 0.2758 0.2040 − 0.0944 2.5725 3.8946
(2.51) (3.94) (− 1.01) (0.09) (0.33) (2.07) (1.03) (− 0.27) (0.35) (0.55)
MMF program dummy variable 1.8900 0.7625 − 0.0096 0.0038 − 0.0105 0.1673 0.1565 − 0.0724 1.9731 2.9706
(2.13) (1.85) (− 0.14) (0.07) (− 0.22) (1.37) (0.88) (− 0.24) (0.31) (0.48)
MUSCCO program dummy variable 1.4830 0.6101 − 0.0365 − 0.0002 0.0081 − 0.0151 − 0.0210 0.0097 − 0.2651 0.2900
(1.77) (1.62) (− 1.51) (− 0.00) (0.34) (− 0.13) (− 0.26) (0.07) (− 0.08) (0.09)
PMERW1 program dummy variable 1.4660 0.5521 − 0.0447 0.0034 0.0105 0.1547 0.1051 − 0.0486 1.3257 2.0582
(2.40) (2.00) (− 0.96) (0.12) (0.26) (2.87) (0.81) (− 0.22) (0.29) (0.47)
PMERW2 program dummy variable 2.1620 0.8795 − 0.0996 0.0023 0.0143 0.1082 0.0670 − 0.0310 0.8453 1.7860
(2.61) (2.33) (− 1.16) (0.07) (0.31) (1.38) (0.61) (− 0.18) (0.24) (0.51)
Past member status dummy variable − 2.1420 − 1.0937 0.0179 − 0.0035 − 0.0079 − 0.1786 − 0.1103 0.0587 0.0026 − 1.3149
(− 3.14) (− 3.18) (1.00) (− 0.07) (− 0.26) (− 1.74) (− 1.14) (0.70) (0.70) (− 3.59)
Tobacco-growing household dummy 0.4207 0.2148 . . . . . . 0.0210 − 0.0809 − 0.3742 0.0857 0.0049 − 0.1287
variable (0.76) (0.77) . . . . . . (0.34) (− 0.49) (− 1.22) (0.54) (0.44) (− 0.31)
Adult population between 15 and − 0.4037 − 0.2079 0.0098 0.0000 − 0.0033 − 0.0001 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 − 0.1749
64 years of age (− 1.55) (− 1.56) (2.20) (0.01) (− 0.92) (− 0.00) (1.08) (1.08) (1.08) (− 1.30)
Dependency ratio (household size − 0.7626 − 0.3901 0.0536 0.0007 − 0.0341 0.0072 0.0307 0.0307 0.0307 − 0.2707
divided by population ages less (− 0.37) (− 0.37) (2.54) (0.05) (− 1.14) (0.11) (0.84) (0.84) (0.84) (− 0.26)
than 15 or over 64)
Price of maize (MK/kilogram) . . . 0.0008 − 0.0038 0.0000 0.0041 0.0022 − 0.0141 − 0.0141 − 0.0141 − 0.0390
. . . (0.49) (− 1.42) (0.01) (0.89) (0.17) (− 1.08) (− 1.08) (− 1.08) (− 0.92)
Price of cassava (MK/kilogram) . . . . . . 0.0046 − 0.0002 − 0.0026 − 0.0008 0.0078 0.0078 0.0078 0.0244
. . . . . . (1.54) (− 0.10) (− 0.78) (− 0.10) (0.83) (0.83) (0.83) (0.80)
R-squared: 0.03 Wu-Hausman chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (21) = 286
F-statistic (all coefficients): F(37,580) = 1.5 Durbin chi-squared statistics for exogeneity: χ (21) = 3,329
Basmann chi-squared statistics for the overidentifying restrictions: χ (48) = 264
Note: t-Values are given in parentheses.
a Including the effects resulting from the induced change in the program participation probability weight.lowing exceptions: For both measures of malnutrition, the direct and indirect effects
of access to formal credit are not statistically significantly different from zero for
preschoolers living in the average household. However, in contrast to the food secu-
rity results, the direct effect of membership in a credit program (which includes the
effect resulting from the induced change in the program participation probability
weights) is positive (that is, better nutritional outcomes) and statistically significant
for all the programs except MMF for acute malnutrition and PMERW1 for chronic
malnutrition. This is encouraging, although (as already mentioned) these direct pos-
itive effects of program membership on the nutritional status of preschoolers may be
a pure reflection of the self-selection into the programs of households with better-
nourished preschoolers and the targeting of the programs to those households. The
plausibility of the self-selection and targeting of households with better-nourished
preschoolers is, however, questionable given the previously discussed finding that
credit program member households are significantly more food insecure than non-
member households. In any case, when all the direct and indirect effects of mem-
bership in credit programs are added, there appear to be no statistically significant
differences in both acute and chronic malnutrition between preschoolers in credit
program member households and those in nonmember households.
This insignificant effect of credit access on nutritional status has been confirmed
in other studies (Zeller and Sharma 1998). Nutritional status is the outcome not just
of income, but of a complex set of factors, such as access to water, sanitation, health
and vaccination services, and nutrition education. These services are often offered
by public institutions or through collective action at the community level. Short-run
increases in income in individual households are not likely to increase the supply of
such services. The required investments in these services eventually materialize in
the long run when increased incomes (potentially achievable through improved ac-
cess to credit) lead to greater tax revenue that is subsequently spent on social and
health services.
122CHAPTER 6
Conclusions and Implications for Policy
T
his study analyzes the determinants of household access to and participation in
informal and formal credit markets in Malawi, also considering the question of
whether formal credit services crowd out or substitute for informal services. Much
of the analysis is devoted to measuring the effect of access to formal credit on the
welfare of rural households in Malawi. Such an analysis is important for policy pur-
poses not only because it can serve as a guide for the allocation of scarce resources
to the numerous policy instruments competing for the same funds, but also because
it establishes the relative importance of the various socioeconomic factors within or
beyond the control of policymakers that determine whether or not households will
benefit from access to formal credit. This latter information can guide the design of
institutional programs and the choice of financial services to be offered to different
target groups. We derive a number of conclusions, beginning with those related to
the analysis of credit access and loan demand, and then summarizing those regard-
ing the impact analysis of credit access.
First, the composition of household assets is a more important determinant of
household access to formal credit than the total value of household assets or land-
holding size. In particular, a higher amount of land and livestock as a share of the to-
tal value of household assets is negatively correlated with access to formal credit. In
other words, formal lenders in Malawi prefer to lend to households with more di-
versified asset portfolios and therefore more diversified incomes, presumably to in-
crease and stabilize repayment rates. Considering these patterns of access to formal
and informal credit, we conclude that poor households whose assets consist mostly
of land and livestock but who wish to diversify into nonfarm income-generating ac-
tivities may be constrained by a lack of capital, as both sectors of the market do not
grant them access to credit. They may thus be forced to rely on farming as their sole
source of income, and one that can be unreliable because of the frequency of drought
in Malawi. Indeed, informal loans are usually too small to help start a viable non-
farm income-generating activity. Such poor households may therefore not have any
other choice but to sell some of their agriculture-specific assets if they wish to start
nonfarm microenterprises. At present, two of the four credit programs analyzed in
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Conclusions and Implications for Policythis report, MMF and PMERW, target poor households with small landholdings for
off-farm microenterprise loans. However, they operate in only some of the districts
of Malawi, and their level of coverage within these districts remains too low to have
any sizable impact.
Second, the level of interest rates charged on loans seems not to be an important
factor for households in choosing which microfinance institution to participate in.
Nonprice attributes of credit institutions and their services—including the types of
loans provided and restrictions on their use, and educational and social services pro-
vided by the programs—play a larger role. This result suggests that the acceptance
of an institution by its clientele, and therefore its prospects for growth and sustain-
ability, are determined by a range of characteristics of its financial products. The level
of interest rates is only one of these, and not even an important one for the decision
to participate in a particular member-based financial institution.
Third, at their present levels of access to credit, households in Malawi are, on av-
erage, credit constrained in both the formal and informal sectors, as illustrated by the
fact that, for example, close to half of households participating in formal credit pro-
grams still have their credit constraints binding. From the econometric analysis we
found that when their credit constraints are binding households would borrow, on av-
erage, about half the amount of any increase in their credit limits. However, when
they are not binding, the imperfect information about their credit limits causes de-
creases in their demands for credit in response to changes in their credit limits. The
decrease in the amount of loans demanded in response to increases in the credit limit
when the credit constraint is not binding is explained by the desire of households to
increase their ability to smooth their consumption by further increasing their unused
credit lines.
Fourth, formal and informal credit are imperfect substitutes for one another. In
particular, formal credit, whenever available, reduces but does not completely elim-
inate informal borrowing. This suggests that the two forms of credit fulfill different
functions in the household’s intertemporal transfer of resources. Despite the fact that
credit is fungible, informal credit is being used relatively more for consumption
smoothing purposes. Formal credit is sought and used mostly to finance agricultural
production and investment in nonfarm income-generating activities.
The main findings of the study regarding the impact of access to credit on house-
hold welfare outcomes are discussed next. The marginal effects on household farm
and nonfarm incomes resulting from mere access to formal credit (without neces-
sarily borrowing) are positive and quite sizable. However, they are not statistically
significantly different from zero.
Both the tabular analysis and the econometric analysis show that when house-
holds choose to borrow they realize lower net crop incomes than nonborrowers. Al-
though this result is not statistically significant, it nonetheless points out a risk of
borrowing: that borrowers can be worse off after repaying the principal and interest.
We further find that households with increased access to formal credit choose to bor-
row less from informal sources; that is, they seem to preserve more of their informal
credit lines. The increased exposure to risk due to higher formal borrowing and in-
124debtedness seems to induce households to use up less of their informal credit lines,
presumably to increase their ability to smooth consumption ex post through in-
creased informal borrowing in future periods.
We identify two main reasons for the negative (albeit insignificant) relationship
between borrowing and net crop incomes; both have important implications for fi-
nancial sector policy in Malawi. The first is the focus of the loan portfolio on one
loan product that provides farmers too much costly fertilizer for hybrid maize. Three
of the four institutions investigated in this study provided agricultural credit, focus-
ing mainly on an input package for hybrid maize. The second reason is the below-
average rainfall in the two survey years and the concentration of the loan portfolio
of the formal lenders on maize, a drought-sensitive crop. We now discuss the policy
implications of these two reasons.
First, seasonal loans for the growing of crops constitute most of the loans in our
sample. Of the total amount of those crop loans, most was lent as an in-kind seed and
fertilizer package that was applied mostly to hybrid maize during 1993/94 and
1994/95. Our results demonstrate that households that applied this package realized
lower or even negative gross margins during the survey years as compared with non-
borrowers. The principal problem is that the loan package continued to follow the
officially recommended level of fertilizer application for hybrid maize, despite the
massive devaluation of the Malawi kwacha and the dismantling of fertilizer subsi-
dies, which tripled fertilizer prices during 1994 and 1995. The advice of the exten-
sion service of the Ministry of Agriculture also seemed to ignore the recommenda-
tions of agronomic and socioeconomic research during the early 1990s, which
emphasized the need to reduce substantially the recommended levels of fertilizer and
to customize them to different agroecological zones. These recommendations were
made even before the surge in fertilizer prices during 1994/95. Since MRFC was im-
plicitly the successor to SACA, the former parastatal credit program, it appears that
it simply took over SACA’s major loan product, possibly encouraged by the ministry
to do so. According to the Harvard Institute for International Development (1994b),
the ministry had been slow in adapting its fertilizer recommendations for smallholder
hybrid maize. Indeed, gross margin calculations using on-farm trial data have shown
that, even in relatively favorable climatic conditions, fertilizer use on maize, the ma-
jor crop grown in about 75 percent of the cultivable land in Malawi, is barely prof-
itable owing to the very low relative price of maize and fertilizer (Benson 1997). In
fact, according to Benson (1997:14), “under current prices the use of fertilizer on hy-
brid maize in Malawi cannot be recommended for virtually all of the country.”
Beginning in the 1995/96 season, MRFC responded to the low repayment rates
on its maize loans during its the first two years of operation (these two years coin-
cided with the period of this survey). The low repayment rate—in comparison to very
high repayment rates for tobacco loans—is another indication of the low profitabil-
ity of the input loan package for hybrid maize. Since 1994 MRFC has lent a domi-
nant and increasing share of its loans to smallholders for burley tobacco, and loans
for maize are given only in areas with favorable growing conditions for that crop.
However, our results suggest that the smallholders are diverting a large portion of
125their tobacco input packages toward hybrid and local maize. This diversion is moti-
vated by their desire to be food self sufficient, which they may see as the best way
to guarantee the food security of their households. This food security strategy seems
to be well justified given the direct negative impact of the price of maize on calorie
intake, as shown by our econometric analysis.
The input package did not give any decisionmaking flexibility to farmers. The
agroecological and socioeconomic conditions that drive the optimal intensity of
seed and fertilizer use vary not only between districts but also between communi-
ties, between households and their individual members, between plots, and between
different years of rainfall. The cookie cutter formulations of how much fertilizer and
seed to apply to Malawi’s smallholder maize crop seem to have been based on a de-
sire to maximize yields and food security at the national level, with no considera-
tion for their implications for the income or welfare of rural households. The maize
input packages provided by MRFC should be adapted in line with recent agronomic
and socioeconomic research that calls for a lower-intensity fertilizer package, and
one differentiated for different soils and regions. It is also recommended that the
MRFC and other programs providing agricultural credit offer borrowers more
choices of how to use their loans. The most flexible type of loan in terms of future
use is one paid out in cash. However, those farmers facing costly or unreliable ac-
cess to input markets may prefer to have their desired levels of the various inputs
for tobacco, hybrid maize, and other crops delivered to a convenient nearby loca-
tion. Although a young and growing financial institution is well advised to focus on
its core business, rural financial institutions—with their considerable and to some
extent unavoidable direct exposure to agriculture—should also pay attention to bot-
tlenecks in input markets that may prevent their clients from making optimal use of
their loans.
The second reason for the insignificant impact of credit access on crop income
was simply insufficient rainfall. On the plots of the survey households in Mangochi,
fertilizer grains could be found in the midst of dried-up maize stalks at the end of the
growing season. The recommended response to this covariant risk factor for finan-
cial institutions is to diversify their assets and liabilities, that is, their loan portfolios
and their sources of funds. It is recommended that financial institutions in Malawi
seek to lend for different crops and much more for off-farm enterprises. In years with
below-average rainfall, up to half of total household income is derived from off-farm
enterprises. The considerable risk of drought in Malawi’s rainfed agriculture requires
that financial institutions accumulate sufficient reserves to be able to write off or
reschedule the loans of drought-affected borrowers. Inadequate provisions for loan
losses due to drought are otherwise likely to cause their eventual collapse. To avoid
such a scenario, the Government of Malawi might consider special legislation that
would require rural financial institutions to build up sufficient reserves for drought-
related loan losses. These reserves might be partially supplemented by public funds
in ways that would provide sufficient incentives and responsibility for the financial
institutions to reduce their exposure to drought risk through changes in their portfo-
lio strategies for assets and liabilities, such as those already suggested.
126Consistent with the insignificant results for crop income, we find no significant
impact of access to credit on the per capita income, food security, and nutritional sta-
tus of credit program members. As the credit products of the formal institutions are
mostly geared toward income generation—and in particular toward production of
fertilized hybrid maize and tobacco—access to the type of credit products offered in
Malawi is expected to have mostly indirect effects on consumption and nutrition
through its potential effect on income. The rural financial institutions in Malawi cov-
ered in this study do not offer financial products—such as consumption credit and
precautionary savings options—that could eventually have a direct effect on con-
sumption or on nutritional status. However, for the latter welfare indicator there ex-
ist other, possibly more important, factors than the availability of financial resources
and income. These factors include access to health and vaccination services, safe wa-
ter, and proper sanitation.
The fact that access to formal credit has not yet benefited credit program mem-
bers may also be partly due to the relatively short length of their membership. The
average length of membership at the time of the survey was less than three years.
However, we believe that the overriding cause of the insignificant effect of credit ac-
cess on household incomes and welfare is rooted in the two reasons given earlier: the
concentration on one unprofitable loan product and the occurrence of drought and
below-average rainfall in the first and second survey years.
We further find that the most important determinant of household crop income is
tobacco. This finding suggests that farmers, instead of growing maize, may wish to
devote more of their scarce resources to tobacco in order to increase their household
incomes. That such a shift from maize to tobacco is in fact happening can be seen
from the recent and rapid transformation of Malawi’s tobacco sector. Whereas in
1991 only 7,500 smallholders grew tobacco, it is estimated that over 100,000 grew
the crop in 1996, immediately before the abolition of the tobacco quota system.
However, a notable finding of the study is that households that grow tobacco ap-
pear to be more food insecure, with significantly lower per capita daily calorie in-
take and higher prevalence of both chronic and acute malnutrition than households
that do not. The food insecurity and malnutrition of tobacco households may be
explained by a combination of larger than average household sizes (because of the
labor-intensive nature of tobacco growing) and the high relative cost of buying maize
for consumption. Indeed, the results indicate that, despite their higher per capita in-
come, tobacco households have greater difficulties buying from the market enough
of the additional maize they need to satisfy their consumption requirements. These
difficulties are the result of maize markets that are thin owing to a lack of surplus
maize from smallholder farmers and an inadequate transportation infrastructure. The
unreliability of the market for maize and its consequence for the food security of
tobacco farmers call for urgent reforms in the marketing of maize, including a re-
consideration of the export and import restrictions.
Another important finding of the study is the significant and negative direct im-
pact the price of maize has on calorie intake while its indirect effect on the latter
through household income is positive but statistically insignificant. This finding is
127consistent with two other findings of the study: that the marginal impact of the price
of maize on household income, while sizable, is not statistically different from zero
and that smallholder farmers in Malawi are, on average, net buyers of maize because
of their 61 percent average maize self sufficiency. Therefore, an increase in the price
of maize is likely to have a negative impact on the food security of the average small-
holder farm household.
The scarcity of cultivable land was also found to be a limiting factor for increas-
ing per capita household incomes in Malawi, except perhaps in the northern region of
the country. Therefore policy reforms that emphasize more equitable land distribution,
to ease the land constraints facing the smallholder farmers and encourage efficient and
sustainable use of the existing cultivable land, should be undertaken. However, one
must recognize the possible limitation of land reforms in alleviating the land con-
straint. Indeed, over 80 percent of the cultivated land in Malawi is already being farmed
under the customary tenure system by smallholder households with an average land-
holding of 1.1 hectares (World Bank 1987).61Therefore it is doubtful that any land re-
form that redistributes estate land to smallholders can alleviate in any significant way
the land constraint facing the smallholder, since its scope would be limited to the re-
maining 20 percent of the currently cultivated land in the hands of estates.
Given the limited scope for land reform and expansion of cultivated areas by tak-
ing forestland and bushland under cultivation, policy should put much greater em-
phasis on improving agricultural productivity on the existing land by investing in
agricultural research and extension. The production potential of the promising new
semiflint hybrid maize varieties could be better exploited with a more regionally dif-
ferentiated level and mix of fertilizer, by an increase in applied research and related
extension to develop alternatives for resource-poor farmers, and by adopting cost-ef-
ficient measures to preserve or increase soil fertility, such as the use of organic fer-
tilizer, contour planting, terracing and agroforestry.
Another way of alleviating the severe land constraint facing smallholder farmers
is to encourage diversification away from farming through the creation of off-farm
enterprises. As the analysis indicates, microentrepreneurs could benefit from im-
proved access to credit, along with training in business management and marketing.
The DRD/IFPRI survey found that 57 percent of the members of microfinance in-
stitutions started their microenterprises using their own savings. Yet 41 percent of
them cited lack of working capital as the main cause of the failure of their businesses
(Mandambwe, Zeller, and Diagne 1996).
A major result of this study is that the contribution of rural microfinance institu-
tions to the income of smallholders can be limited or outright negative if the design
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61 A study by Agrarhydrotechnik International (1998), based on aerial photographs, points out that, while virtually
all of the land suitable for cultivation has been used up in the southern region of Malawi, the central region and in
particular the northern region have considerable reserves of suitable land. However, the study includes all land, in-
cluding forests and grassland, some of which must be preserved as watersheds, as sources of fuelwood, and so forth.
Moreover, some of the suitable but uncultivated land is situated in remote areas, and use of it would require the mi-
gration of farmers to such areas.of the institutions and their services does not take into account the constraints and de-
mands of their clients. The risk of drought in Malawi, as in much of rainfed Sub-Sa-
haran Africa and other countries, constitutes a considerable challenge for developing
sustainable rural financial institutions. In such environments, a strategy geared toward
greater diversification of the portfolio of assets and liabilities and related provisions
for loan defaults in case of drought, including the building up of reserves for resched-
uling loans, are necessary preconditions for rural financial institutions to prosper and
be able to offer reliable access to future credit and savings services to their clientele.
From the foregoing discussion we conclude that the necessary complementary re-
sources and economic environment are not yet in place for access to formal credit to
realize its full potential benefits for Malawi’s rural population. Therefore, considering
that the formation of sustainable rural financial institutions is such a difficult task in
rural economies that lack irrigation, exhibit insufficient hard and soft infrastructure,
and have a poorly educated rural population adversely affected by malnutrition and
disease, and considering that the benefits at the household level may not materialize in
drought years, we recommend a cautious and gradual strategy for expansion of the
rural financial institutions. This strategy would require direct support by the state,
through an adequate legal and regulatory framework, of institutional innovations and
pilot programs in rural areas that might have the potential to reduce transaction costs
in providing savings, credit, and insurance services to the rural clientele.
The adoption of a cautious strategy would also imply that the formation and ini-
tial expansion of rural financial institutions should focus on high-potential agricul-
tural areas that allow for lending for the production of a diversified array of cash and
food crops as well as offering financial services for off-farm enterprises at low trans-
action costs. This does not mean that low-potential and drought-prone agricultural
areas should be neglected, because credit may be the best or only option for small-
holder farmers to finance their input acquisitions after experiencing a crop failure.
Indeed, the evidence shows that without access to credit the ability of smallholder
farmers to recover from a crop failure is extremely limited. In addition, the mere
knowledge that credit will be available in case of crop failure can be beneficial to
poor farmers in inducing them to adopt new and more risky but potentially profitable
crops or technologies. As already mentioned, the econometric analysis has confirmed
the positive and quite sizable (though not statistically significant) impact of merely
having access to credit. However, the expansion of microfinance into marginal areas
with insufficient markets and other infrastructure should be coupled with a greater
emphasis on other growth- and welfare-enhancing investments, such as those in
transport, health, and communications infrastructure, and with targeted safety net in-
terventions for the very poor.
In summary, the benefits of access to credit for smallholder farmers depend on a
range of agroecological and socioeconomic factors, some of which are time-variant
and subject to shocks such as drought. Access to credit is therefore no panacea for
poverty alleviation. The full potential of credit access in increasing the welfare of the
poor can only be realized if coupled with adequate investments in hard and soft in-




rom an econometric perspective, the system of equations (1)–(5) to be estimated
is a disequilibrium model with few additional complications (see, for example,
Maddala 1983). Hence if the sample were drawn randomly the likelihood function
of the system and the conditional mean equations could be derived along the same
lines as in Maddala (1983). But, in order to estimate consistently the parameters of
any of the equations in the system, one must derive the likelihood functions and con-
ditional mean equations under choice-based sampling while taking into account the
problems of censored or truncated dependent variables. The likelihood function and
conditional mean equations corresponding to the random sample case will be shown
to be special cases of the corresponding formula derived while taking into account
the choice-based nature of the sample. Hence, instead of doing more or less the same
derivations twice, we will proceed to derive directly the more general likelihood
function and conditional mean equation under choice-based sampling.
Estimation under the Choice-Based Sampling Scheme
First we note that the participation of a household in the jth program, j = 1, . . ., J
(which coincides with the household being in the jth stratum) implies that the fol-
lowing three conditions are met:
1. The program is available and the household is eligible to join it: bj
max > 0.
2. The household’s ex ante demand for the credit provided by the program is
not unconditionally zero: b*j > 0 in at least one possible state of nature.
3. Participating in the jth program is the household’s preferred choice among
all the mutually exclusive alternative choices:
Vj + ξ j > Vk + ξ k k ≠ j; k = 1, . . ., J,
where Vj j = 1, . . ., J is the indirect utility achieved by the household when
participating in program j and ξ = (ξ 1, . . ., ξ J) is a vector of error terms. The
inclusion of the error terms in the third condition involving the indirect util-
ity functions follows the random utility framework of McFadden (1981).
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max,b*k) = 0 k ≠ j:  k = 1, . . ., J.
It follows that a household’s participation in the jth program corresponds to the
event ∆ j ≡ {ξ k <  Vj − Vk +ξ j;k   ≠ j; k = 1, . . ., J} and the amount borrowed by that
household from the formal sector of the credit market is given by
J
bF ≡  Σ bk = bj.
k= 1
To proceed further we must derive the probability density under choice-based sam-
pling of the distribution of y x for a generic dependent variable y and an independ-
ent variable x. We note that x can include variables that are stratum dependent (for
example, the program dummies). Although the case treated in the literature on esti-
mation under choice-based sampling is that in which the same dependent variable y
is used as the stratifying variable (Cosslett 1981, 1993; Hausman and Wise 1981;
Manski and McFadden 1981; Amemiya 1985), the same methods can be used to de-
rive consistent estimators of the population parameters when the endogenous strati-
fying variable is other than y (in this case the membership status variable).
Let j= 1, . . ., Jindex the Jalternative choices. Our choice-based sampling scheme
for selecting a household with data (y,x) amounts to choosing first a stratum jdefined
by the corresponding alternative with probability H(j) and then choosing randomly
a vector (y,x) within the set of all (y,x) belonging to the households in that stratum.
Hence the joint probability density of drawing the triplet (x,y,j) under our choice-
based sampling scheme is given by62
p ˜(y,x,j) = H(j)f(y,x j)
where f(y,x|j) is the conditional probability density of (y,x) given j. But by Bayes’s
rule we have
p(y,x,j) f(y x,j)p(j,x)
f(y,x j) = = ,
Q(j) Q(j)
where p(y,x,j) and p(j,x) are the joint probability densities of (x,y,j) and (j,x), re-
spectively; f(y x,j) is the population conditional probability density of y given (x,j);
and Q(j) ≡ ∫ p(j) x)f(x)dx is the true population probability distribution of alternative
j, with p(j x) being the true conditional probability that program j is chosen given x
and f(x) being the true probability density of x. For good statistical reasons (see
Cosslett 1993), we should take H(j) ≡ nj/n and Q(j) ≡ Nj/N, with nj (resp Nj) being
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62 We will use the superscript ~ to indicate probability density and conditional mean under choice-based sampling.the size of the sample (resp population) stratum defined by program j and n and N
being, respectively, the total sample and population sizes. Hence the joint probabil-
ity density function of (y,x) under choice-based sampling is
JJ H(j)
f˜(y,x) = Σ p ˜(y,x,j) = Σ f(y x,j)p(j,x).
j= 1 j= 1Q(j)
Similarly, the probability density function of x under choice-based sampling is
JJ J H(j)
f˜(x) = Σ p ˜(x,j) = Σ H(j)f(x j) = Σ p(j,x).
j= 1 j= 1 j= 1Q(j)
Hence under choice-based sampling the conditional probability density of y|x is
given by
J H(j) J H(j) Σ f(y x,j)p(j,x) Σ f(y x,j)p(j x) f˜(y,x) j= 1Q(j) j= 1Q(j)
f˜(y x) = = = .
f˜(x) J H(j) J H(j) Σ p(j,x) Σ p(j x)
j= 1Q(j) j= 1Q(j)
To simplify the above expression further, let ∆ y be the support of f and define ∆ j
y ≡
∆ y∩∆ j,j= 1, . . ., J. Thus the ∆ j
y,j= 1, . . ., J form a partition of ∆ y (since the ∆ j,j=
1, . . ., J exhaust the set of possibilities). Therefore the conditional density f˜(y x) can
be written as
J H(j) Σ f(y x,∆ j
y)p(∆ j x)
j= 1Q(j)
f˜(y x) = if y∈∆ y J H(j) Σ p(∆ j x)
j= 1Q(j)
= 0 otherwise.
Or, equivalently, given the partitioning of ∆ y by the ∆ j
y,j= 1, . . ., J,
H(j) f(y x) H(j)
p(∆ j x) f(y x)
Q(j) p(∆ j
y x) Q(j)
f˜(y x) =  = if y∈∆ j
y; j=1, . . ., J
J H(j) J H(j) Σ p(∆ j x) Σ p(∆ j x)
j= 1Q(j) j= 1Q(j)
= 0 otherwise.
It is clear that the preceding expression for f˜(y x) simplifies to the true population
density f(y x) under a random sampling scheme (given the fact that H(j) would be
J
equal to Q(j) in that case and that Σ  p(∆ j x) = 1.
j= 1
132Now, to account for censored or truncated dependent variables, we further parti-
tion ∆ y into three subsets: ∆ y ≡∆ y0∪∆ y1∪∆ y2. This partitioning is general enough to
apply to either the censored dependent variable case or the truncated dependent vari-
able case or a combination of both, provided we allow for one of the subsets to be
possibly empty. For example, the estimation of the credit limit equations fits the trun-
cated dependent variable case with ∆ y ≡ , ∆ y0 ≡ {bmax < 0}, ∆ y1 ≡ {bmax ≥ 0}, and
∆ y2≡∅ . The estimation of the loan demand equations fits the case of a truncated and
censored dependent variable with ∆ y ≡ , ∆ y0 ≡ {b* < 0}, ∆ y1 ≡ {0 ≤ b* <  bmax},  and
∆ y2≡ {b* ≥ bmax}. Let ∆ j





j = 1, . . ., J. From above the conditional probability of any event ∆ ys under choice-
based sampling is given by
J H(j) J H(j) Σ p(∆ ys j,x)p(j x) Σ p(∆ y
j
s x)
j= 1Q(j) j= 1 Q(j)
p ˜(∆ ys x) = = .
J H(j) J H(j) Σ p(j x) Σ p(∆ j x)
j= 1Q(j) j= 1Q(j)
Hence the conditional density of y x under the choice-based sampling scheme and
accounting for censored and/or truncated dependent variable is given by63
H(j) f(y x)
f˜(y x) Q(j)
f˜(y x) =  = if y∈∆ j
ys; j=1, . . ., J; s = 1, 2.





Again, under a random sampling scheme the above expression for f˜(y x) sim-
plifies to the usual conditional probability density of y|x with a truncated and/or cen-
J
sored dependent variable. Indeed, in that case H(j) = Q(j) and Σ  p(∆ j
ys x) = p(∆ ys x),
j= 1
since the ∆ j
ys,j= 1, . . ., J form a partition of ∆ ys for s = 1, 2.
To write the log likelihood function for a sample of n households, we define the
following nJ dummy indicators:
dij
s = 1 if yi ∈∆ j
ys; i = 1, . . ., n; j = 1, . . .,J; s = 1,2.
= 0 otherwise
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63 Note that p(∆ j
ys x) = p(∆ ys x).The likelihood and log likelihood functions of the sample under the choice-based
sampling scheme are then given, respectively, by64
H(ji)
f(yi xi;θ 2)
2 n Q(jiθ 1)








n H(ji) 2 nJ H(j)
L(θ 1,θ 2,θ 3) = 2Σ  log   f(yi xi;θ 2)  − ΣΣ   log    Σ  p(dij
s = 1 xi;θ 3)
i= 1 Q(jiθ 1) s= 1 i= 1 j= 1Q(jθ 1) ( ) ()
Where ji is the alternative chosen by household i, and θ 1, θ 2, and θ 3 are the vectors
of parameters that need to be estimated and Q( jθ 1) = ∫ p(j x;θ 1)f(x)dx.65 The fore-
going likelihood function is essentially the same as the one for the Manski-McFad-
den choice-based sampling estimator, except that here we have the conditional den-
sity instead of the conditional probability choice and that we have additional terms
to account for the possible truncation or censoring of the dependent variable yi.66
Two types of complications arise when estimating θ 1, θ 2, and θ 3 by maximum
likelihood methods. The first type of complication is related to the choice-based sam-
pling scheme that requires some adjustments in the maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) for consistent estimation. The nature of these adjustments depends on
whether or not all the Q(j|θ 1), j = 1, . . ., J are known, and they are somewhat com-
plicated when one is looking for an efficient estimator (Cosslett 1981, 1993). With
unknown population shares Q(j|θ 1) ≡ Nj/N, the MLE estimation is complicated by
the impossibility of factoring out the density f(x) that appears in the likelihood func-
tion (as would be the case in either a random or an exogenously stratified sample).
It turns out that f(x) must be estimated along with the parameters of the model for
consistency of parameter estimates. If all the population shares are known, or if they
can be consistently estimated from a separate sample (as in our case), then the con-
sistent and efficient estimator is found by maximizing the foregoing log likelihood
function under the constraint N J/N = ∫ p(j x;θ 1)f(x)dx, which also requires estimat-
64 Note that in a truncated dependent variable estimation (as in the case of the credit limit equations), the product
over s will have one term only (that is, s ∈ {1}).
65 It is evident from the foregoing that there are parameters that are common to all three parameter vectors.
66 The Manski-McFadden estimator was originally derived for the discrete model, which aims to estimate the pop-
ulation parameters of the conditional probability choices p(j x,θ ) (Manski and MacFadden 1981; Amemiya
1985:330; Cosslett 1993).ing the density f(x) appearing in the constraint. Maximizing the log likelihood with-
out the constraint yields the Manski-McFadden estimator, which is much simpler to
compute because it does not require estimation of the density f(x).67 The Manski-
McFadden estimator, also called the conditional MLE estimator (CML), is consis-
tent, but it is not efficient.
Still, when the population shares are known, a simple modification of the log like-
lihood that would obtain under a random sampling scheme yields another consistent
but not efficient estimator: the Manski-Lerma weighed exogenous sample maximum
likelihood estimator (WESML). This is the estimator used by Pitt and Khandker
(1998). The modification consists of weighting each contribution to the log likeli-
hood that would obtain if the sample were random by the corresponding inverse ra-
tio Q(ji)/H(ji). More precisely the Manski-Lerma WESML estimator is obtained by
maximizing the following pseudo–log likelihood function:
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2 n Q(ji)
L(θ 2,θ 3) = ΣΣ   log(f(yi xi;θ 2)) − log(p(dij
s = 1 xi;θ 3))  .
s= 1 i= 1 H(ji){ }
Cosslett (1993) gives a modified score interpretation of the CML and WESML
estimators and shows how they respectively reestablish the consistency of the MLE
procedure through simple modifications of the score function obtained under a ran-
dom sampling scheme. Although the relative efficiencies of the two estimators de-
pend on sample design, the WESML estimator tends to have low efficiency when
some of the strata are defined by alternatives that are rare in the population (Cosslett
1993).68
Since all the population shares are known in our case (they are obtained from the
village census carried out prior to the survey), it is in principle possible to use either
the Manski-McFadden CML estimator or the Manski-Lerma WESML estimator to
estimate θ 2and θ 3consistently. Unfortunately we cannot use either estimator directly
in our case because of a second complication, due to the multidimensional integral
involved in the evaluation of p(ds
ij = 1 xi;θ 3). Indeed, it is clear from the foregoing
that unless very restrictive distributional assumptions are made, the calculation of
p(ds
ij= 1 xi;θ 3) would involve evaluating a multidimensional integral of order at least
4. The computational difficulty of such a problem is well known. In fact, until re-
cently, when J was greater than 3 the problem was considered computationally
intractable for most probability distributions—including the multivariate normal dis-
tribution. However, recently developed simulation methods for calculating multi-
67 Note also that the θ 1 vector of parameters in the probability choices p(j x;θ 1) is a subvector of θ 3 and need not
be estimated separately.
68 The reason for this low relative efficiency is that the weighting scheme used by the WESML estimator to achieve
consistency assigns low weights to the rarely chosen alternatives; this dilutes the additional information gained by
purposely oversampling the latter.dimensional integrals have considerably reduced the computational difficulty of the
problem (McFadden 1989; Pakes and Pollard 1989; Gourieroux and Monfort 1993;
Hajivassiliou 1993; Keane 1994; Hajivassiliou, McFadden, and Ruud 1996). The
problem is nevertheless a difficult one, despite these advances.
Our estimation problem is further complicated by the fact that we are dealing with
a simultaneous equation system consisting of 11 equations. Therefore, even if we
rely on the recent simulation-based methods, it is doubtful that we can overcome the
computational difficulties involved in estimating the system (as whole or equation
by equation) using MLE with numerical integration. Because of these difficulties,
we use a two-step estimation method similar to Heckman’s two-step procedure to es-
timate the system equation by equation. The first step consists of estimating the prob-
ability choices p(ji xi;θ 1). This estimation is done only once because p(ji xi;θ 1) is
common to all equations in the system, which is not the case for p(ds
ij=1 xi; θ 3). The
different functions of p(ds
ij=1|xi;θ 3) appearing in relevant equations in the second step
of the procedure are estimated in a simple way using the consistently estimated
p(ji xi;θ 1) and the sample analogues of p(∆ ys j). These sample analogues are con-
sistent estimates of their population counterparts because of the random sampling
within each stratum.
Two-Step Estimation of the Model
The equations in the second step of our two-step procedure are obtained by deriving
the population conditional means of the regression yi = gs(xi,z(ji);α ) + ν i if yi ∈∆ yis;
s = 1, 2; i = 1, . . ., n, where gs is a (possibly nonlinear) scalar valued function, xi is
the vector of regressors that are not specific to any alternative, z(ji) is the vector of
alternative-specific regressors, α is the vector of parameters of interest to be esti-
mated, and ν is the error term. In our particular case, the alternative-specific regres-
sors in the equations are composed of only the credit program dummy variables. In
other words, we have z(ji) ≡ (D1(ji), . . ., DJ− 1(ji)) with Dk(ji) = 1 if ji = k and Dk(ji)
= 0 otherwise; k = 1, . . ., J − 1. The conditional means under choice-based sampling,
including all observations, are
2 f(yi xi,z(ji);θ 2)
E ˜ (yi xi,z(ji)) =∫ ∆ yi










s = 1 xi,z(ji);θ 3) p(∆ yis ji,xi,z(ji))p(j xi,z(ji);θ 1)
Q(ji) Q(ji)
wjis(xi,z(ji);θ 3) =  = .
J H(j) J H(j) Σ p(dij
s =1  xi,z(j);θ 3) Σ p(∆ yis j,xi,z(j))p(j xi,z(j);θ 1)
j= 1Q(j) j= 1Q(j)Hence
2
E ˜ (yi xi,z(ji)) =Σ wjis(xi,z(ji);θ 3) {gs(xi,z(ji);α ) + E(vi xi,z(ji),∆ ji
yis)} i = 1, . . ., n.
s=1
If we integrate the multidimensional integrals involved in the probabilities
p(j xi,z(j);θ 1) and p(ds
ij=1 xi,z(j);θ 3) and in the conditional mean E(ν i, xi,z(ji),∆ fi
yis),
then we can express them as functions of the indirect utility differences,
Vj − Vk ≡µ j(xi,z(j);β j) −µ k(xi,z(k);β k), k ≠  j;€ € k =  1, . . ., J,
where µ j is a (possibly nonlinear) real-valued function and β≡ (β 1, . . ., β J)′ is the
vector of indirect utility parameters to be estimated.69 Indeed, let Aj be the (J − 1) ×
Jmatrix with ones in the diagonal, minus ones in its jth column, and zero everywhere
else. Thus for each j, the (J − 1) dimensional vector of indirect utility differences
equals AjV; V ≡ (V1, . . ., VJ)′. With that transformation it can be shown that (see, for
example, Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou 1993)
p(j xi,z(j);θ 1) = Fj(Ajµ (xi,z;β );θ F),
p(ds
ij = 1 xi,z(j);θ 3) = Fvj(hs(xi,z(j);α ),Ajµ (xi,z;β );θ vF),
and
E(vi xi,z(ji),∆ ji
yis) =λji(hs(xi,z(ji);α ),Ajiµ (xi,z;β );θ 3),
where θ 1 ≡ (β ,θ F)′; θ 3 ≡ (α ,β ,θ ν F)′; µ (xi,z;β ) ≡ (µ 1(xi,z(1); β 1), . . ., µ J(xi,z(J); β J))′;
Fjand Fν jare the marginal distribution functions of the random vectors Ajξ and (ν ,ξ ),
respectively; λ ji is a nonlinear function of its arguments, and hs is a scalar-valued
(possibly nonlinear) function.70 Hence the conditional means equations that must be
estimated in our two-step procedure are given by
2
E ˜ (yi xi,z(ji)) =Σ wjis(xi,z(ji);θ 3) {gs(xi,z(ji);α ) +λji(hs(xi,z(ji);α ),Ajiµ (xi,z;β );θ 3)}.
s=1
The expressions of λ j(.) can be derived if (ν ,ξ ) is distributed multivariate normal
(Tallis 1961; Johnson and Kotz 1972; Amemiya 1974, 1985; Duncan 1980). In par-
ticular λ j(.) reduces to the inverse of Mill’s ratio if (ν ,ξ ) has the bivariate normal dis-
tribution. McFadden (1978) also derived the general expression λ j(.) in the case in
which (ν ,ξ ) has the generalized extreme value distribution. In general λ j(.) is a
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69 For identification purposes, we must set one of the µ j to zero (say, we set µ j ≡ 0).
70 In most cases hs is equal to gs or is a simple linear transformation of gs.J-dimensional integral with its calculation requiring the same numerical integration
procedure as for the calculation of the probabilities p(j xi,z(j);θ 1) and p(ds
ij =
1 xi,z(j);θ 3). To avoid the difficult numerical integration problem, we do two things:
First we combine the (possibly nonlinear) unknownfunction gs(.;α ) and the unknown
nonlinear function λ ji(hs(.;α ),Ajiµ (.;β );θ 3) into one unknown nonlinear function
Gjis(.;θ 3), which we will approximate by a known functional form that can be com-
puted without numerical integration.71 In other words we write
Gjis(xi,z(ji);θ 3) ≡ gs(xi,z(ji);α ) +λj
i(hs(xi,z(ji);α ),Ajiµ (xi,z;β );θ 3).
The standard methodology consists of postulating first a linear function for gs and µ
and then dealing with the censoring problem by postulating a probability distribu-
tion function for the error term (ν ,ξ ) to arrive at a nonlinear regression function to be
estimated. Our alternative method of specifying the nonlinear regression function to
be estimated has been motivated by our desire to circumvent the numerical integra-
tion problem. But Deaton (1990) justifies the method on the ground that it is the con-
ditional mean regression that is identified from the data and that it is impossible to
disentangle the censoring problem from the unknown functional form problem with-
out using arbitrary and untestable identifying assumptions.
The second thing we do to circumvent the numerical integration problem is to
approximate the wjis(xi,z(ji);θ 3) probability weights by another set of probability
weights defined by
H(ji)
p(∆ yis ji)p(j xi,z(ji);θ 1)
Q(ji)
wjis(xi,z(ji);θ 1) ≡ .
J H(j)
Σ  p(∆ yis j)p(j xi,z(j);θ 1)
j=1 Q(j)
The weights wjis(xi,z(ji);θ 1) are approximations of wjis(xi,z(ji);θ 3 because we are
replacing the probability p(∆ yis j,xi,z(j)) (which is conditional on j and (xi,z(j)) with
the marginal probability p(∆ yis j) (which is conditional on only j). However, the
equality of the two probabilities is not a necessary condition for the approximation
to be exact. For example, if p(ds
ij = 1 xi,z(j);θ 3) = p(∆ yis xi)p(∆ yis j)p(j xi,z(j);θ 1),
then we would have wjis(xi,z(ji);θ 1) = wjis(xi,z(ji;θ 3).72 There are two computational
advantages for using wjis(xi,z(ji);θ 1) instead of wjis(xi,z(ji);θ 3):
1. Since the households were randomly selected within each stratum, for each
j and each s, the sample share of the yi that are in ∆ yis is a consistent estimate
of the corresponding population conditional probability p(∆ yis j). For the
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71 Note that we know from the foregoing derivations that the parameter vectors α and β are part of θ 3.
72 Note that the approximation issue is relevant only for the equations with limited dependent variables. Indeed, in
the equation in which the dependent variables are not limited we always have s ∈ {1}, ∆ yis = ∆ yi and p(∆ yi j,xi,z(j))
= p(∆ yi j) = 1.formal and informal credit limit equations, these sample shares are the pro-
portions of households in a given stratum with and without access to credit,
respectively, as defined previously. For the loan demand equations, the
shares are the proportions of households in a given stratum with and with-
out a binding credit constraint, respectively.
2. With these shares as consistent estimates of the p(∆ yis j), the first-stage esti-
mation of the probability weights wjis(xi,z(ji);θ 1) is now reduced to estima-
tion of the probability choices p(j xi,z(j);θ 1) , which are common to all equa-
tions in the system. This estimation still requires the computation of a
multidimensional integral of order 3 since we have four alternative choices.
But the problem is more manageable than performing the same type of diffi-
cult MLE estimation for at least five equations, with four of them involving
a multidimensional integral of order 4. Furthermore, by adopting the nested
multinomial logit model for this first-stage estimation, we can avoid entirely
the problem of computation of the multidimensional integral. The first-stage
estimation is described in the next section. In the remainder of this section
we focus on the estimation of the system of simultaneous equations in the
second step of our two-step procedure.
Second Step of the Estimation Procedure:
Estimation of the System
Because of an already large set of regressors, in all the equations we use a quadratic
(in the variables) approximation for the Gjis functions with limited squared and in-
teraction terms for only the most important variables.73 A more flexible functional
form usually causes high-dimensionality problems, which we want to avoid. We be-
gin with the credit limit equations.
The Credit Limit Equations
As explained previously, we have a truncated dependent variable with truncation
point at zero. That is, ∆ y≡ , ∆ y0≡ {bmax< 0}, ∆ y1≡ {bmax≥ 0}, and ∆ y2≡∅ . Hence
s ∈ {1} and
E ˜(bi
Kmax x1i,zK





K∈ {F,I} ≡ {formal, informal} and i = 1, . . ., n.
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73 In other words, the Gjis(.;θ 3) functions are linear in the parameters with squared and cross-product terms for a














Kmax is the credit limit of household i in sector K of the credit market; zK
1vi is
the vector of characteristics of all sector K potential lenders present in village vi of
household i; z1vi ≡ (zF
1vi,zI
1vi)74; x1i is a subvector of household i’s vector of demo-
graphic, asset, and community characteristic variables (including prices); nK
ja/nj is
the sample proportion of households in stratum j with access to sector K credit (that
is, with bi
Kmax> 0); the p(j xi,zi,rF,z(j);θ 1) are the estimated probability choices from
the first stage of the two-step procedure; rF = (r1
F, . . ., rF
Jp) with rj
F being the inter-
est rate being charged by the credit program defining stratum j; xi ≡ (x1i,x 2i) and zi
≡ (z1vi,z2i). The two vectors x2i and z2i are regressors in the loan demand equations.
The precise list of all the regressors in xi and in zi is given in Table 17.
The Credit Demand Equations
For the credit demand equations we have dependent variables that are truncated at
zero on the left and censored at the values of the respective credit limits on the right.
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74 We note that some of the unobserved formal lender characteristics are being absorbed into the vector of program
dummy variables z(ji) that is household and alternative specific. In other words, ji or the corresponding programwhere bi




Imax); r –F is the interest rate for formal credit; zK
2i is a subvector of the
vector of characteristics of sector K lenders who gave loans to household i; z2i ≡
(zF
2i,zI
2i); x2i is a subvector of household i’s vector of demographic, asset, and com-
munity characteristic variables; and nK
jc/nj and nK
jnc/nj are the sample proportions of
households in stratum j with binding and nonbinding sector K credit constraints, re-
spectively (that is, with bi*K ≥ bi
Kmax and 0 ≤ bi*K <  bi
Kmax, respectively).
The Outcome Equations
The outcome equations are all estimated with any possible truncated dependent vari-
able problems assumed to be taken care of by the use of a nonlinear functional form.
Hence we have
E ˜( yi bi
max,bi,xi
y,xy









w ˆji ≡ wji(xi,zi,z(ji);θˆ
1) ≡ , J H(j) Σ p(j xi,zi,z(j);θˆ
1)
j=1 Q(j)
where y is one of the outcome variables (total income, net crop income, nonfarm in-







yis a subvector of house-
hold i’s vector of demographic, asset, and community characteristic variables (in-
cluding prices); xy
ie is a subvector of the vector of outcome variables in the system
excluding y (xy
ie is not included in the income equations).
First Step of the Estimation Procedure:
Estimation of Conditional Probability Choices
The four-alternative nested multinomial logit is specified to have two levels. At the
first level, the choice is between participation and nonparticipation in a credit pro-
gram (corresponding to choice j = 0). At the second level, which is reached only if
participation is the chosen alternative, the choice is between (1) joining and remain-
ing a member of MRFC (j = 1), (2) joining and remaining a member of the second
program (j = 2), or (3) joining either MRFC or the second program and then drop-
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dummy variable stands for both the alternative choice of household i and the identity of the formal lender defining
stratum j, including all of its unobserved attributes (see the discussion on identification that follows).ping out of the program (that is, being a past member; j = 3).75 MRFC is the only
program operating in one of the five districts represented in the survey. Therefore the
estimation imposed the restriction that households in that district not have a second
program choice. Allowing for different parameter vectors for the regressors in the
four alternative choices and normalizing the coefficient for the fourth alternative to
zero while taking account of the fact that there is no second program in one of the
five districts, the four probability choices for a household i are given by
eX′0iβ 0
P0i ≡  prob {ji = 0} = ,
eX′0iβ 0 +  aTi(γ )ρ
eX′1iγ 1
P1i ≡  prob {ji = 1} = ,
Ti(γ )
eX′2iγ 2
P2i ≡  prob {ji = 2} = (1 − di)  ,
Ti(γ )
and
1 P3i ≡  prob {ji = 3} = ,
Ti(γ )
where Ti(γ ) ≡ 1 + eX′1iγ 1 + (1 − di)eX′2iγ 2 and γ≡(γ 1,γ 2) ≡ (β 1/ρ ,β 2/ρ ) (Schmidt and
Strauss 1975; Maddala 1983; Amemiya 1985; Judge et al. 1985). The Xji are vectors
of alternative specific regressors, di is a district dummy variable, and β j,a ,and ρare
the parameters to be estimated. McFadden’s (1981) sequential MLE for nested multi-
nomial logit models consists first of estimating γ from the last three equations, which
constitutes a simple multinomial logit model (with the Manski-Lerman weighted
MLE). The estimated γparameter is then plugged into the first equation to get esti-
mates of β 0, a, and ρby means of the Manski-Lerman weighted MLE. The estimates
of β 1 and β 2 are then obtained from the estimates of γ and ρ . The estimation was im-
plemented in GAUSS using the Berndt et al. (1974) algorithm.
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75 The reason for dropping out may be either a voluntary decision on the part of the borrower or exclusion because
of default. However, almost all the past members in the sample are from SACA, a failed government agricultural
credit program, the operations of which have been taken over by MRFC. MRFC has offered defaulters from SACA
the option of joining MRFC after agreeing on a rescheduling of payments on their SACA loans.References
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